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In the recent years, e-commerce has gained much importance. Traditional commerce (in which 
case the customer physically goes to the merchant’s shop, purchases goods and/or services and 
makes a payment) is slowly being replaced with e-commerce and more people tend to prefer 
doing their shopping online. One of the main reasons for this attraction is the convenience the 
e-commerce provides. Customers can choose from a lot of different merchants at the 
convenience of their homes or while travelling by avoiding the hassle and stress of traditional 
shopping. However, e-commerce has lots of challenges. One key challenge is trust as 
transactions take place across territories and there are various legal & regulatory issues that 
govern these transactions. 
Various protocols and underlying e-commerce technologies help in the provision of this trust. 
One way to establish trust is to ensure fair exchange.  There is also a question about traceability 
of transactions and customers’ need for privacy.  This is provided by anonymity – making sure 
that the transactions are untraceable and that the customers’ personal information is kept 
secret. Thus the aim of this research is to propose a protocol that provides fair exchange and 
anonymity to the transacting parties by making use of a Trusted Third Party. The research is also 
aimed at ensuring payment security and making use of a single payment token to enhance the 
efficiency of the protocol.  
The proposed protocol consists of pre-negotiation, negotiation, withdrawal, purchase and 
arbitration phases. The analysis of the protocol proves that throughout all the phases of the e-
commerce transaction, it is able to provide fair exchange and complete anonymity to the 
transacting parties. Anonymity provides the privacy of customers’ data and ensures that all 
Personally Identifiable Information of the transacting parties are kept hidden to avoid misuse. 
The protocol proposed is model checked to ensure that it is able to show that the fair exchange 
feature is satisfied. It is implemented using Java to show that it is ready-to-use and not just a 
theoretical idea but something that can be used in the real-world scenario.  The security 
features of the protocol is taken care of by making sure that appropriate cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols are used to ensure provision of confidentiality and integrity.  
This research explores those areas that have not been covered by other researchers with the 
idea that there is still a lot of scope for improvement in the current research. It identifies these 
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opportunities and the ‘research gaps’ and focuses on overcoming these gaps.  The current e-
commerce protocols do not cover all the desirable characteristics and it is important to address 
these characteristics as they are vital for the growth of e-commerce technologies. The novelty of 
the protocol lies in the fact that it provides anonymity as well as fair exchange using a Trusted 
Third Party that is entirely trustworthy unlike certain protocols where the trusted third party is 
semi-trusted. The proposed protocol makes use of symmetric key cryptography wherever 
possible to ensure that it is efficient and light weight. The number of messages is significantly 
reduced. This overcomes the drawback identified in various other protocols which are 
cumbersome due to the number of messages. Anonymity is based on blind signature method of 
Chaum. It has been identified that usage of other methods such as pseudo-identifiers have 
resulted in the inefficiency of the protocol due to the bottlenecks created by these identifiers.  It 
also ensures anonymity can never be compromised unlike certain protocols whereby an 
eavesdropper can find out the customer’s identity as the customer is required to disclose his/her 
public key during transactions. Further to this, the protocol also provides immunity against 
message replay attacks.  Finally, the protocol always assumes that one or more parties can 
always be dishonest which is unlike certain protocols that assume only one party can be 
dishonest at any point. This ensures that all scenarios are taken into consideration and two 
parties cannot conspire against the other thus compromising on the fairness of the protocol. 
Detailed analysis, implementation, verification and evaluation of the protocol is done to ensure 
that the research is able to prove that the protocol has been carefully designed and the key 
goals of fair exchange and anonymity. All scenarios are taken into consideration to prove that 
the protocol will indeed satisfy all criteria. The research thus expects that the protocol could be 
implemented in real-life scenarios and finds a great potential in the e-commerce field. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of both e-commerce and the intended 
research. It offers a platform that would enable the reader understand the need for this 
research and also provides a gist about recent developments both in the industry and in 
research circles with respect to electronic commerce.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Describe to the reader the e-commerce terminology, growth, advantages and 
disadvantages as well as recent developments in this area 
 Understand the background, motivation and research process 
 Describe the central research question and discuss in detail the contributions of this 
research 
 Explain how the thesis is organised 




The rapid development of technology and the reach of such technologies at affordable costs has 
made it possible for all people across the world not only to be able to connect with anybody, 
anywhere anytime but also to make purchases at a click of the mouse and at their most 
convenient time. Furthermore, consumers’ reliance on technology has also increased 
dramatically, which now makes electronic commerce (e-commerce) one of the most promising 
markets for merchants. Given that these technologies are developing at a very rapid pace, it is 
evident that internet markets and the potential for e-commerce will continue to flourish for the 
next few decades.  
E-commerce technologies and protocols facilitate the processing of online transactions. The 
development of these technologies has led to more and more merchants being able to sell their 
goods online. Not only have there been changes in the technological arena, but changes have 
also been engendered in the business models and in the way businesses operate. For example, 
the manner in which businesses now reach customers has drastically changed. Various business 
models are now being adopted, such as subscription to online services whereby the customer 
pays a fixed sum at specific times to enable them access and benefit from a specific service. 
Another such business model is pay-per-use; this is commonly used in e-commerce transactions 
involving digital services for the purposes of downloading music, video or software. This does 
not bind the customer to a specific provider (as the subscription model does), rather, it affords 
the customers the flexibility to choose from a variety of service providers and to pay only for 
what they use (Y Zhang, 2013).  
E-commerce is gaining in popularity these days, for many reasons; however, the most popular 
ones are the following (Y Zhang, 2013): 
1. E-commerce obviates the need for the customer to physically travel to the merchant in 
order to purchase goods or services. It enables the customer to purchase the same 
goods online with ease and also at a time that is suitable to them without having to 
worry about opening and closing hours (unlike in traditional commerce). 
2. Given that all the relevant information is available to the customer on the internet 
website, and given the fact that there are many merchants trying and sell similar 
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products, customers are able to compare prices, have plenty of options, read reviews 
from other customers and buy those products that suit their budget. 
3. Customers can purchase from anywhere in the world depending on the willingness of 
the merchant to deliver. This accords customers additional choices and they are not 
restricted by geographical and territorial boundaries. 
(Y Zhang, 2013) 
However, complications arise due to the fact that both transacting parties, namely the merchant 
and the customer, could be anybody, and this could lead to issues of trust and security. The 
customer cannot be sure that he/she will receive the goods that he/she has ordered, and hence 
there is an issue of trust involved here. From the point of view of the merchant, a transaction 
represents a risk; this is because he/she is obliged to send the product to an entirely unknown 
entity. Similarly, from the point of view of the merchant, he/she will not be sure that the funds 
received would be materialised until the money is deposited in the bank account.  
It also poses many questions for the customer, such as: How can I trust that the goods that I 
have ordered will definitely reach me? Or what happens if I cancel the transaction; will I be 
wrongly charged? Or how will my online identity be protected, and how secure are the personal 
details that I gave when registering with the website? The customer may be concerned about 
the protection of online identity so that in the future he/she is not bombarded with spam or 
subjected to identity theft. As most payments are traceable, customer may also be worried 
about the merchant tracking their purchasing habits, thus raising privacy issues. In the 
traditional commerce environment, this problem is resolved as the customer has the option of 
paying for the goods and/or services in cash. This eliminates any concern that the customer’s 
financial information may be disclosed. In an e-commerce scenario, there is also the issue of the 
theft of any financial data that is stored and/or transmitted electronically. To avoid any misuse 
of this information, adequate measures need to be taken to ensure that the data are encrypted 
whilst being stored or transmitted over the internet to the merchant. 
The party that sends the information, goods and/or money first is at greater risk, as the party in 
receipt could abort the transaction and receive the goods but not pay – in simpler terms, 
misbehave. This poses many questions about fairness. The main aim of this research is to 
propose a protocol that ensures fairness during transactions while making sure that the identity 
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of the customer remains concealed (data anonymity) in order to ensure privacy for the 
customer. This protocol is different from Paypal and other similar service providers as it does 
not retain a part of the service charge as commission and is strictly tied on to the e-commerce 
transaction in process and not designed as a payment mechanism like Paypal.  
Certainly, the internet eases the buying and selling of goods and/or services across the globe. 
However there are key issues relating to security, trust and anonymity. It is essential that the 
technologies and the protocols used to facilitate e-commerce transactions are able to ensure 
that these aspects are well taken care of while also making sure that process is simple and not 
unnecessarily complicated. Thus, the main idea of the research is to propose an e-commerce 
protocol that will ensure that both of the transacting parties remain honest while enabling 
efficient and smooth exchange of information (including payment-related information), digital 
goods and/or services online, and also keeping the identity of the customer undisclosed. 
1.1 Background 
Boston Consulting Group recently conducted a study on e-commerce trends and found that the 
UK is one of the most internet-aware markets in the world, with internet sales representing 
8.3% of the economy, with a total worth of £121 billion, which accounts for almost 13.5% of 
total sales. The study also indicates that this will rise to 23% by 2016. Nearly 32 million people in 
Great Britain (which accounts for 66% of all adults) have used e-commerce technologies to buy 
products and services online (New Media Trend Watch, 2013). 
In the traditional marketplace, there is a certain level of trust between the vendor and the 
customer, as they can see each other and in some cases have already established a relationships 
and some measure of goodwill. However, in case of an e-marketplace, trust is a key concern 
because transactions may take place across great distances and even across national borders; 
there are various legal and regulatory issues that govern such transactions. Trust in e-commerce 
is an issue for a number of reasons.For example, lack of brand recognition could make it difficult 
for customers to really know the brand. Many retailers have only an electronic presence and 
hence customers may not be aware of the new brand.  Secondly, natural distrust in e-payments; 
customers have a natural distrust when it comes to making online payments. This issue arises 
because customers are not sure how their data are stored or viewed. Thirdly, there is a limited 
understanding over the legal issues relating to e-commerce, shortage of persons trained in 
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understanding the legal complexities or who can give advice to aggrieved customers and 
differences amongst countries in terms of legislation, capacity to import/export goods, 
resources available, et cetera. Research also shows privacy and data protection also concerns 
users as not every country has sufficient regulation (Maity and Dass, 2014). 
Grau (2006), in his research report, discusses the importance of privacy. Privacy refers to 
avoiding the misuse of any personal data collected or to preventing the collection of excessive or 
unnecessary data from the user. Grau also discusses how people are generally reluctant to use 
online payment systems due to perceived security issues and concerns relating to privacy, i.e. to 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Provision of Anonymity is a means toward achieving 
customer privacy; this also helps to increase trust from the viewpoint of the customer. A 
customer is more likely to visit a website that provides anonymity or where the customer 
believes that his/her personal data will not be misused. It is thus imperative that e-commerce 
websites state how personal data are stored or used; this promotes customer confidence and 
thus increases trust. 
1.2 Motivation 
As discussed above, Anonymity and Fair Exchange plays a pivotal role in the provision of trust. 
There are many protocols in the literature that concentrate on Fair Exchange (Bao, 2998; Khill, 
2001;Ray, 2000; Ray, 2005; Zhang, 2003; Zhang et al, 2006;Zhang, 2004; Zhang & Shi, 2006). 
However, only a very few of these protocols concentrate on both anonymity and fair exchange 
aspects (Ray, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2003). Though these three protocols address fair 
exchange and anonymity, there are various weaknesses, some of which are inherent. One for 
example relates to the number of messages sent between the transacting parties and also to the 
fact that the Trusted Third Party (TTP) is not entirely trustworthy; the TTP is capable of viewing 
and/or modifying a message. Although these protocols ensure that the TTP does not collude 
with a particular party, they do not guarantee that the TTP is genuine and impartial. Also, they 
do not provide any mechanism for tackle a situation where the TTP modifies the message sent 
by either the customer or the merchant, thus becoming semi-trusted. 
Normally, a TTP is an unbiased party or an arbitrator that facilitates smooth transactions 
between two or more parties. In reality, however, there are opportunities for the TTP to exploit 
transactions for personal benefit. Where there is the chance of such an event occurring, the TTP 
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is categorised as a semi-trusted party, as opposed to the ideal scenario of the TTP being entirely 
trustworthy.  
Various protocols used in e-commerce provide certain security features, assisting in the 
establishment of trust by providing mechanisms for Fair Exchange, Anonymity, Dispute 
Resolution and Non-Repudiation (of the transaction). Though there are various desirable 
characteristics that an e-commerce protocol should possess, Zhou and Gollman (1996) 
formalised these characteristics and defined the conditions that any e-commerce protocols 
should satisfy. There are five key such characteristics defined in their paper. The main 
characteristics include fair exchange, dispute resolution, assurance,trusted third party and 
commitment to the transaction.  
All the features mentioned above are not implemented by all protocols.  However, most of the 
e-commerce protocols provide most or all of the features mentioned above. In short, the above 
characteristics are very much desired; however, due to practical limitations, only a subset of 
these features is incorporated by the protocols.  
One of the other motivations for conducting this research is to address another key challenge in 
e-commerce protocols: providing anonymity along with fair exchange. Designing a protocol with 
a mechanism to safeguard the customer’s details thus represents a key question on which to 
focus. This is essential as it assists in providing privacy for any data relating to the customer, and 
also ensures that the merchant cannot track the customer or misuse those data for any other 
purpose.  
The following chapters discuss in detail the various technical drawbacks of these protocols and 
also the motivation for researching a new protocol that would help eliminate the discussed 
technical drawbacks. 
The research will mainly focus on designing a protocol that would ensure fair exchange and 
anonymity. It will make use of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) also ensure that the TTP is unable to 
masquerade or take undue advantage of the situation. This means that the TTP is forced to be 
honest and thus does not have the authority to view or modify the messages sent.  Since in most 
cases the Trusted Third Party is partially trusted and it is not very realistic to be able to ensure 
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that TTP is entirely trustworthy, this protocol enforces certain means to make sure the trust 
between the parties is not breached.  
1.3 Objective & Central Question 
Given the background and the motivation of this research, the purpose of undertaking this 
research or the key objectives of this research are described in this section of the document. 
There are various protocols that provide fair exchange and discuss the problems of e-commerce 
trust using various methods. However each protocol has various disadvantages. 
The key objective of this thesis is to compare the key protocols that provide fair exchange, 
anonymity and built in dispute resolution to identify the technical flaws, drawbacks, limitations 
and gaps. Once this is done, the gaps are identified and areas that needs to be improved or 
enhanced. This also helps to justify the need for the new protocol and the need to place controls 
on the Trusted Third Party to ensure that there is no breach of trust due to the partially trusted 
nature of TTP. Given that fair exchange and anonymity are key components of a trust-based e-
commerce protocol  the thesis aims at developing a protocol that would overcome the flaws 
that are identified and in addition keeping in mind that confidentiality and integrity of the 
messages exchanged between the merchant and the customer are maintained. 
The key research problem that is identified is derived from the current research; it could be the 
case that there are too few effective and efficient e-commerce protocols that provide the 
characteristics below: 
 Fair exchange through all the phases of the e-commerce transaction 
 Total customer anonymity 
 The Trusted Third Party by nature is partially trusted. The TTP should however be 
restricted from reading or modifying messages and masquerading. 
 Built-in dispute resolution mechanism 
 Termination of the protocol when either party behaves dishonestly 
 Efficient and effective purchase mechanism (not cumbersome and with a limited 
number of messages) 
Therefore, the central research question is as follows: 
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Is it possible to design an e-commerce protocol that uses a TTP by ensuring that its partially 
trusted nature is circumvented to provide fair exchange throughout all phases of the transaction 
in addition to providing anonymity for the customer and a built-in dispute resolution? 
1.4 Contribution 
The research develops a robust protocol that would provide both anonymity and fairness. The 
key contribution of this research is combining these two properties in a protocol and achieving 
effective dispute resolution mechanism based on a Trusted Third Party and also with minimal 
messages. The novelty lies in the fact that this protocol provides not just anonymity of customer 
data but also fairness all throughout the e-commerce phases.  
The first  contribution  is  the protocol that provides the following features: 
 A simplified protocol that helps in the provision of fair exchange to enforce honesty 
between the transacting parties.  
 It helps in the development of a new protocol that would provide anonymity and fair 
exchange.   
 Circumventing the partially trusted nature of TTP by placing controls 
 Avoid Replay attacks 
 Provide payment security 
 An inbuilt dispute resolution mechanism 
The second contribution  is the implementation and model checking 
 The implementation of the proposed protocol to ensure that it is ready for adaptation in 
the real-world 
 Model checked to ensure that the protocol is viable and the logic is correct.  
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1.5 Measuring Success 
At the end of the research, to determine the research success, it is necessary to ascertain that 
certain key points are achieved. These points or success criteria enable measuring the level of 
achievement of the research and assist in determining whether the research has made a 
significant contribution. These key points are to be used as guidelines for establishing how 
successful the research has been in terms of achieving the key objectives discussed. In order to 
measure the success of the research, the following criteria are described. 
 The first measure of success is to evaluate the protocol to check if the research questions 
are answered. Answering the research questions appropriately . 
 An in depth analysis to determine the difference between various other protocols and the 
proposed protocol to show how efficient it is. 
 Development of the protocol: There are a number of fair exchange protocols available. The 
research aims at analysing the existing protocols, identifying the gaps and proposing a 
protocol that is efficient and that overcomes the issues identified. The protocol would then 
be compared against the criteria mentioned and checked how far it helps overcome the 
issues and gaps identified.  
 Specifying the effectiveness criteria of the protocol: the proposed protocol would clearly 
indicate how many messages are sent and the contents of messages.  
  Automated dispute resolution: In some cases or instances, disputes are bound to arise 
between the transacting parties, namely the merchant and the customer. The aim of the 
protocol is to minimise issues and to provide an automated dispute resolution mechanism 
in situations where there are disputes.  
 Protocol analysis: The proposed protocol is analysed completely in all given circumstances 
and scenarios, and is formally verified. Furthermore, all dispute scenarios are clearly 
identified.  
 Having a good proof of concept by implementing the protocol to prove that it could be 
adopted in real-world scenarios and also to check for the output data flows and to identify 
issues, bugs and errors. 
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 Model checking and verification: The proposed and implemented protocol is model-
checked and verified thoroughly to validate the logical flow of steps, and also to determine 
that the protocol successfully satisfies all the key criteria mentioned. In simple terms, this 
assists in establishing that the protocol implements fair exchange, anonymity and payment 
security throughout all stages. It also helps identify any deadlock situations that might 
prevent the protocol from running successfully. 
In summary, this chapter has provided a brief overview of the research, addressed the key 
challenges or gaps in the literature and justified the need to conduct this research. This chapter 
has also set the background and motivations for the research in order to enable the reader to 
better understand the subsequent chapters. The central question for the research has 
addressed here, and the reader now also understands the problem statements that have led to 
this research. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The  thesis structure is as follows. Chapter 1 provides the introduction to the research, a brief 
about the key research questions, the objectives of the research and the research contribution. 
It also gives a list of factors that would contribute to the success of the research.  
The second chapter discusses the research methodology and also the research process that has 
been adopted by the research. 
 The third chapter provides the literature review and discusses topics relating to e-commerce, 
trusted third party, legal and regulatory aspects of e-commerce , fair exchange, data privacy , 
anonymity and also various protocols providing these.  
The fourth chapter provides an overview of various cryptographic concepts used in the protocol 
along with the assumptions made. 
 The fifth chapter provides a detailed description of the proposed protocols and also provides an 
analysis.  
The sixth chapter compares the protocols using various Key Performance Indicators as well as 
with other protocols. 
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Chapter 7 discusses the protocol’s implementation and the key concepts  and components of 
the implementation.  
Chapter 8 shows the verification of the protocol, Model Checking, the process and analysis. The 
final chapter provides a summary of the research, revisits the success criteria and discusses the 
protocol’s contribution. The limitations and future work is also discussed in this section. 
1.7 Summary 
The introduction has enabled the reader to understand the key challenges in the e-commerce 
arena, and how these can be addressed. This chapter has also given the reader an in-depth 
understanding of how these concepts interrelate and how they are implemented or adapted in 
the real world; this is to enable the reader understand the role that trust plays in the e-
commerce environment. 
The reader has been introduced to the concepts of trust, fair exchange and anonymity although 
the following chapter will give more detailed descriptions and insights derived from the 
literature review. The chapter has concluded by specifying the key success criteria that are to be 
used at the end of the research in order to determine how successful it has been and also to 





CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide  a brief of the research methodology used for the research 
and discuss the research process. 
Chapter Objectives: 
 Introduce the reader to the research methodology 
 Discuss the research process 
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2.1 Research Process 
The success of the research is admittedly determined by measuring the extent to which each of 
the research objectives is met. The following steps are followed during this research to ensure 
its success. These steps are as follows: 
Firstly, a background into the research and its motivations is given. Following this, the key 
literature in this area is thoroughly investigated. This is intended to ensure that all aspects of the 
research are identified and that the technical challenges or gaps in the current literature are 
identified and clearly understood. 
Once the gaps in the current literature are understood, the key research objectives are drafted 
and the research contribution is carefully analysed. It also discusses the key characteristics that 
e-commerce protocols should ideally possess.  
It then aims to design the protocol as mentioned in the objectives and it finally lists future work 
and areas for improvement.  
In short, the research process is summarised in the flow chart below (Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 2.1: The research process 
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2.2 Research Methodology 
The methodology employed in this research is described in detail in this section. The above 
diagram demonstrates the various processes involved in the thesis; for any research to be 
successful, adequate steps need to be taken in order to ensure that the method for conducting 
it is well thought out and that all areas of the research process are addressed. This enables the 
researcher not only to understand the key challenges but also to meet those challenges with 
preparedness and ease. A constructive research methodology is adopted in this research. In a 
constructive research methodology,a new contribution to the research is referred to as the 
construct. This involves clearly identifying objectives, identifying a process for finding out the 
research gaps, prepare simulation, run simulation and give feedback on the results (Crnkovic, 
2010) The following methodology has been adopted for the purposes of this research. 
 Gathering data and comprehending the field: 
The first step in this process entails a detailed research into the existing literature. All 
relevant literature must be collated in order to understand the gaps and also to gain a 
deep understanding of the underlying technologies. The aim of this task is also to help 
formulate a roadmap for the protocol process and also to correctly establish the line of 
research. This enables identification of the central question of the research and helps to 
understand why other researchers have used certain specific methods to achieve their 
research goals.  
Various books and online referencing exploiting search engines such as Google are 
utilised. Research papers from IEEE, ACM and SpringerLink are also being used.  
 Analysis: 
This step assists in identifying all the key protocols; it entails analysing each and every e-
commerce protocol in order to understand their core strengths and weaknesses. It also 
helps to gain a better understanding of the various cryptographic techniques used to 
achieve the desirable qualities of the protocols, and to comprehend why these 
techniques were being used in the first place. 
 Theoretical design: 
Analysis of the protocols helps to identify gaps and this step will further assist in the 
literature review and in framing the central research question. The theoretical design 
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stage then assists in formulating the actual protocol and in describing how this protocol 
overcomes the weaknesses identified in the other protocols; it also reveals the key areas 
it shall contribute.  
 
 Implementation: 
The theoretical design stage now has the protocol and steps in detail. The next stage of 
the research is to implement the proposed protocol to demonstrate a workable 
prototype. This is done in order to show that the protocol is feasible in the real world, 
and also to informally test and verify any flaws within the protocol. 
 
 Evaluation, model checking and verification: 
This is the final stage in the research process, whereby the protocol is formally 
evaluated and verified. Model checking is conducted to ensure that the protocol’s 
design flaws are identified, statistics are obtained and any errors that might have been 
missed in the previous steps are captured. It also helps to identify deadlocks, flaws in 
the logic or design of the protocol, and the steps whereby further developments can 
take place.  
 
The flowchart Figure 2.2 below gives a clear picture of the research methodology. Please note 
that this is an iterative process and will continue until the research is completed (taking into 




Figure 2.2: The Research Methodology 
2.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the research process has been clearly defined and this should assist the reader in 
understanding how the research is to be conducted and how it is to produce the desired results. 
The reason for selecting the research methodology and the steps involved in answering the 
research question has been discussed in this chapter.  
 
 17 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a broad overview of the various key literatures that are being 
utilised in this research. It includes all the main topics such as e-commerce, security, digital 
payment, anonymity, fair exchange, et cetera.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Introduce the reader to the various literatures and key terminologies that are to be used 
throughout the research. 
 Understand the various protocols that are being used as well their shortcomings, and 
identify any gaps in current research. 
 Explain various e-commerce protocols in detail along with the steps that are being used 
in each and every protocol; diagrams of each protocol and the mechanisms and 
techniques these protocols use shall be explained. 
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3 Literature Review 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss in detail all the related literature. It is imperative to 
read and review the existing literature as the purpose of this research is to propose a new and 
efficient protocol that would overcome the negatives or the drawbacks of the existing ones. This 
new protocol aims at providing privacy/anonymity and true fair exchange in such a manner that 
ensures that the Trusted Third Party (TTP) which is by nature partially trusted is circumvented by 
not allowing to modify the messages and that the exchange of the digital products is both 
effective and efficient. The literature review first discusses what e-commerce actually means 
and then walks through various other terminologies and concepts. The literature also aims to 
introduce the basic cryptographic mechanisms and concepts that would be used in the protocol 
that is to be proposed. Furthermore, it also covers other aspects that are indirectly related to 
this research, and these include electronic cash, verification techniques, and model checking 
methodologies and tools. The literature is broken down into the main areas and starts by 
discussing the two key attributes, namely fair exchange and anonymity, and describes in detail 
the current key research in those areas.   
3.1 E-commerce 
This research addresses e-commerce protocols that facilitate the smooth processing of 
transactions and the purchasing of goods and services between two parties, namely the 
customer and the merchant, over the internet; but what exactly is e-commerce? The business 
dictionary defines electronic commerce or e-commerce as, “Business conducted through the use 
of computers, telephones, fax machines, barcode readers, credit cards, automated teller 
machines (ATM) or other electronic appliances (whether or not using the internet) without the 
exchange of paper-based documents. It includes activities such as procurement, order entry, 
transaction processing, payment, authentication and non-repudiation, inventory control, order 
fulfilment, and customer support. When a buyer pays with a bank card swiped through a 
magnetic-stripe-reader, he or she is participating in e-commerce.” (Business Dictionary, 2013) 
There are various other definitions as well. Roger Clarke (2000) defines e-commerce as follows: 
“the conduct of commerce in goods and services, with the assistance of telecommunications 
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and telecommunications-based tools; some people use the term 'electronic trading' to mean 
much the same thing. Others use 'electronic procurement', 'electronic purchasing' or 
'electronic marketing'.” 
He discusses the different segments that constitute e-commerce, which include the following 
terms and concepts: (Clarke, 2000) 
Electronic catalogues: a means whereby sellers or merchants can communicate effectively with 
buyers (or potential buyers) about the services they provide or the products they offer. 
Electronic Data Exchange (EDI): standards (or the family of standards) that are used for 
expressing the structured data during e-commerce transactions. 
The author further provides details about the various phases that are involved in an e-commerce 
transaction; he details six key stages or phases in every transaction. This model or phased 
approach comes in very handy and is extremely useful when analysing the application of specific 
technologies or protocols to e-commerce. The author explains that the six phases listed are 
easily identifiable in most real-world scenarios as they are quite distinct. However, in certain 
cases, one or two phases could be merged or there might be a change in the order or sequence 
of the phases (or they could overlap each other).  (Clarke, 2000) 
The phases described by the author include the following: 
(1) The Pre-Contractual Phase  
This is the first phase in any e-commerce transaction. At the commencement of the process, the 
buyer and merchant are concerned with the collection and gathering of market data and 
intelligence. The buyer is concerned with information on the various suppliers of the required 
goods or services, the goods or services themselves, the prices, availability, the terms and 
conditions applicable to a purchase, logistics, and the legality of buying a specific product and/or 
service. The buyer is also concerned with the authenticity of the supplier as there is not much 
trust at this point. The merchant seeks information about prospective purchasers of their goods 
and services. The merchant at this stage advertises the products and services offered to grab the 
attention of potential buyers. This is where marketing techniques are used by the merchant. In 
the case of a digital product, the merchant addresses issues relating to copyright and obtains 
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rights and/or permission from the producer of the product to enable him/her to sell these 
without any legal issues arising. (Clarke, 2000) 
 (2) The Contractual Phase  
During this phase, a formal relationship is established between the buyer and the seller, 
including terms and conditions to be applied to any transactions (under the contract). This 
details the laws and regulations that would be followed and any special conditions that might 
apply; the steps that would be taken in case of dispute, as well as the policies and procedures, 
are outlined in this phase. This phase also details the negotiation procedures between the two 
transacting parties (Clarke, 2000). 
(3) The Ordering Phase  
Now, the contract has been laid out, and the next step involves the actual placement of an 
order, or in e-commerce terms, placing the offer. Once the offer is made, it is accepted and 
acknowledged by the other party (generally the merchant). Once there is an acknowledgement 
on the part of the merchant, this indicates the preparedness from the merchant’s end to deliver 
the product as stated (this is referred to as acceptance in e-commerce). There are possibilities 
whereby there could be amendments made to the existing order (cancellations, renegotiations, 
etc.) (Clarke, 2000). 
 (4) The Logistics Phase  
This stage describes how the actual delivery of goods and/or the performance of services would 
take place, despite the order having to take place over the Internet (using various technologies). 
This phase deals with the physical delivery of products and services. In addition, there are also 
some post-delivery functions that could be involved in this phase in relation to inspection of the 
goods or services delivered, and acceptance or rejection of the goods from the customer’s end 
(Clarke, 2000).   
(5) The Settlement Phase  
This is a key phase whereby the goods or services are paid for by the customer. This pivotal 
phase includes the involvement of financial institutions, such as the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), which would assist in the provision of effective fund transfers between the parties, by 
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confirming any transactions that affect the relevant accounts, and also by confirming any 
balances as well as the identities of the parties where relevant and necessary. The transactions 
involved in this phase include those that revolve around payments such as invoicing, payment 
authorisation, actual payment, and remittance advice transmission (Clarke, 2000).   
 (6) The Post-Processing Phase  
The basic transaction phase is complete at this stage. However, not all the phases and activities 
are complete. There are a number of additional activities that could be pending, which might 
include management of information and reports et cetera for the merchant. In certain cases, 
there could be a statutory obligation to report data or statistics to industry associations or other 
legal authorities and/or the government. There might also be an extended relationship resulting 
from the sale; this could include value-added additional services such as servicing, extended 
warranty, maintenance, upgrading, etc. This phase involves all those additional activities that are 
not covered in the other e-commerce transaction phases (Clarke, 2000). 
Rolf Wigand (RT Wigand, 2006) describes e-commerce as a relatively new concept that began 
only a few decades ago (somewhere around 1970). He describes how the concept has evolved 
and discusses in detail the contributing factors, the market drivers and the evolution of the 
technology and the Internet. This publication further discusses the theoretical and conceptual 
approach to e-commerce. 
3.1.1 Components of E-commerce 
Zhang (Zhang Qin, 2009) in his book discusses e-commerce in detail, including its components, 
technologies, etc. ISO (International Standards Organisation) defines e-commerce as the 
“general term for exchange of information among enterprises and between enterprise and 
customers”. This definition however does not give a holistic meaning to the actual term. E-
commerce nowadays is more than just the sharing of information between parties; it is a 
business enabler and consists of a great many underlying technologies and components, 
designed to enable the smooth flow of any related information between these parties.  
The key e-commerce components as described by Zhang are shown in Figure 3.3.  As depicted, 
e-commerce involves not just the transacting parties but also relies on other parties, such as the 
bank, Trusted Third Party and/or Certification Authority (CA), etc., to ensure seamless 
transactions and also assist in the provision of security and privacy and/or anonymity. Provision 
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of trust is not an easy task, and is considered a formidable challenge, particularly in the e-
commerce arena.   
 
Fig. 3.3: Components of e-commerce 
Figure source: Z Qin, 2009 
 
3.1.2 E-commerce Types 
E-commerce can be broadly classified into different types depending on the entities involved in 
the transaction (for example between businesses or individuals). The different categories are 
Business-to-Consumer (B2C) where e-commerce transaction that takes place between a 
business organisation and any individual customer, for example, a transaction takes place 
online, where a merchant displays products to sell and a customer buys those products, as one 
does in a traditional marketplace, Business-to-Business (B2B)where an e-commerce transaction 
takes place between two business organisations, for example, one business can purchase raw 
materials or other products from a different business online for the purpose of developing a 
new product or for reselling,Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) where one individual customer sells 
products and/or services online directly to other customers requiring the products and/or 
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services and Consumer-to-Business (C2B) whereby a customer uses the Internet and/or 
telecommunication technologies to sell products and/or services to business organizations   
(Gefen, 2000) 
3.1.3 Advantages, Disadvantages and Restrictions of E-commerce 
Having understood the definition and types of e-commerce, the aim of this section is to highlight 
the various advantages, disadvantages and restrictions e-commerce might have. 
3.1.3.1 Advantages of e-commerce 
E-commerce changes the way businesses operate and has had a major impact on the way that 
business is conducted; it is now a key driver that enables businesses to rethink their business 
strategy and business operating model. This paper earlier discussed the advantages of e-
commerce from the point of view of the customer. This section concentrates on describing the 
advantages of e-commerce to the merchant. 
The various advantages of e-commerce are as follows : 
1. In simple terms, it enables the owner/manager to increase the profitability of the 
business and to reduce costs (Min & Wolfinbarger, 2005). 
2. It allows businesses to reach out to different customers across the globe. 
3. It enables the creation of virtual communities that can be an ideal target for certain 
specific types of products or services (G Schneider, 2010). 
4. It increases the speed and the efficiency at which information is stored and processed 
(Patil et al, 2014). 
3.1.3.2 Disadvantages of e-commerce 
As with any product, service or technology, e-commerce has disadvantages, some of which can 
be critical. These disadvantages sometimes become a bottleneck forcing the businesses to 
constantly upgrade technologies. There are certain other issues, such as trust, transaction 
security, data protection, etc., that can be a major challenge to a business, particularly as e-
businesses are required to comply with various laws and regulations, including data protection 
regulations. There is also a concern relating to the particular legislation that must be invoked in 
any dispute resolution, which forces both the merchant and the customer to clearly understand 
the contracts and legalities associated with purchasing or selling online, especially across 
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borders. This section describes the disadvantages of e-commerce both to the customers as well 
as the merchants.  
The major disadvantages relating to e-commerce are as follows : 
1. It is not possible to adequately inspect certain items, such as foods that are perishable, 
jewellery that is custom-made, etc. The underlying technologies do not provide the 
means to inspect goods although they can ensure delivery of goods (G Schneider, 2010). 
2. E-commerce technologies are rapidly developing and this makes it challenging for both 
merchants and customers as there is a constant need to upgrade. However, this should 
soon fade as e-commerce becomes more mature (Patil et al, 2014). 
3. From the point of view of the business, it is very hard to commit to investing technology, 
as it is difficult to calculate returns-on-investment, especially if the business is entering 
the e-commerce arena for the first time (Min & Wolfinbarger, 2005). 
4. Businesses face cultural and legal issues while conducting business online. 
5. The legal environment in which e-commerce works is not very clear, due to overlapping 
laws and legislations in different parts of the world (Min & Wolfinbarger, 2005).   
3.1.3.3 Restrictions of e-commerce 
Though e-commerce enables the availability of goods and services across the globe, there are 
certain factors that restrict e-commerce transactions from taking place smoothly. These pose as 
restrictions and can either be legal, ethical or social issues which prohibit business from taking 
place either in certain industries or regions. 
These restrictions include the following: 
1. Legacy laws and regulations: in certain industries or geographical regions, laws inhibit e-
commerce, forcing businesses to pay penalties for shipments of certain specific goods 
and/or services in certain industries or in specific regions. This could be because of the 
fact that many of these laws were developed before e-commerce came into vogue, and 
hence there might be a different distribution/administrative system through which the 
merchant is required to pass in order to conduct business (R T Cruz, 2003). 
2. Economy: certain economies that are not liberalised do not promote the buying or 
selling of certain goods or services, and may subject some to a ban. This leads to a 
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bottleneck as businesses cannot operate within these economies (Min & Wolfinbarger, 
2005). 
3. Cultural, social and ethical factors: there are various cultural and social factors that can 
prove to be difficult while conducting business globally. These could prove to be a hassle 
as certain products might not be appreciated by consumers in certain areas due to the 
underlying cultural and social factors affecting the same. Also, depending on the cultural 
and social values, and on changes in ethics and perception, market penetration in 
certain countries can be tough (Patil et al, 2014). 
4. Government support and the legal system: some governments have unnecessary 
restrictions on e-commerce, thus making the legal system an entry barrier; improper 
and unclear legal frameworks make it very difficult for businesses to penetrate a new 
market (C L Mann et al., 2000). 
3.1.4 E-commerce Trust 
Prins (C Prins, 2002) describes the different aspects that encapsulate trust. Trust deals with the 
belief, or willingness to believe, that one can rely on the goodness, strength, and the ability of 
somebody (the seller or the buyer) or something (for example Information Technology 
applications). The author argues that it as an indispensible element in an e-commerce 
environment, as the only contact between the buyers and the sellers is through the networking 
medium, and there is no other means to build a personal relationship (unlike in traditional 
commerce). 
The author (Princs, 2002) further describes how trust can be viewed from different perspectives, 
and that it takes various forms, including trust in technology, trust between trading parties, trust 
in the system, and so on. Apart from trust in the communication channel and in the transaction 
medium, there is a huge risk in terms of trusting the parties involved in a transaction. It is risky 
because there is no guarantee that the goods will be delivered on time or that the goods 
ordered will be the same as the ones delivered. Similarly for the merchant, there is a trust issue 
in terms of receipt of payment. 
The author (Prins, 2002) describes how trust can be improved with the help of legislation 
designed to ensure that the honest party is not liable for any dishonesty on the part of the other 
party. Such legislation should protect the interests of those customers and merchants who have 
no intention of cheating or being dishonest during a transaction. From a psychological point of 
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view, the author discusses how trust can be improved for customers by making changes to the 
User Interface Design and by improving the Human Computer Interaction (HCI) factor. From a 
technical point of view, trust can be improved greatly by means of cryptographic mechanisms 
(such as digital signatures, hash functions and time-stamps) to improve the level of authenticity 
and also to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data as well as of the entire 
transaction.  
The issue of trust therefore spans a great many different areas and has a serious impact on the 
business, legal and technological domains. It provides a variety of opportunities and challenges 
and needs to be handled carefully by businesses. Businesses also need to understand the 
different perspectives and be able to identify the key components of trust, and to understand 
the differences between trust in a traditional environment and an electronic environment to be 
able to effectively handle the issue (Min & Wolfinbarger, 2005).  
In many day-to-day circumstances, people place trust in a variety of entities, events, products, 
belief systems, services, et cetera (Prins, 2002). However, the Internet being a very unfamiliar 
environment, placing blind trust in it becomes almost impossible. It is critical yet difficult for one 
party to establish that trust in an e-commerce environment. Trust, in an e-commerce scenario is 
established in a different manner, unlike in traditional commerce, as relationships are shorter 
and most of them are transaction-oriented. Furthermore, e-commerce is more impersonal and 
the scope for committing fraud and abuse is high. It is automated and provides fewer 
opportunities for the transacting parties to gain a sensory cue to evaluate the other party, as 
would be the case in traditional commerce. Research has shown that the two critical factors that 
impact on trust are credibility and benevolence. Benevolence refers to the fact that the one 
party trusts that the other has good intentions and, whether or not there is a contractual 
obligation, the party would act in a favourable and reliable manner. Credibility on the other 
hand, refers to the belief that one party has in terms of the other’s expertise to complete the 
task at hand effectively, efficiently and reliably. Therefore, trust is a dynamic process that would 
either be enhanced or lowered based on experience. For example, in eBay, depending on the 
past experience with a vendor, the customer’s trust in the vendor might increase or decrease 
and vice versa. Initially, if trust is established, when expectations are met, trust is not only 
reinforced but also enhanced (Roy et al., 2001). 
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The spectrum of the term ‘trust’ and its relevance in the e-commerce environment is huge. It 
can be analysed from various angles and various domains and disciplines. There is already a 
great deal of research being conducted on specific domains and/or disciplines as well as into 
enforcing trust in e-commerce transactions. However, the scope of trust in this paper is 
henceforth restricted to the trust between two mutually distrusting parties in an e-commerce 
transaction, namely the merchant and the customer. The paper discusses various mechanisms 
that could be used to induce or enhance the trustworthiness of the transacting parties and also 
to incorporate honesty and integrity into the transacting parties’ actions. Henceforth, the type 
of trust discussed in this paper is strictly restricted to the trust between the merchant and the 
customer, or the trust that both these transacting parties place on an unbiased arbitrator, 
namely the Trusted Third Party (TTP) (Prins, 2002; Roy et al., 2001). 
There are various trust models that use various factors, such as familiarity, credit-history scoring, 
fuzzy logic, and reputation-based trust, which are used by both the merchant and the customer 
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the other party. One author (Li et al., 2003) summarises the 
key parameters of trust for reputation-based systems (e-commerce systems that utilise 
feedback and the past experiences of the parties involved in the transaction to determine the 
trust levels). These parameters, as noted by the author and that are specific to reputation-based 
trust systems,  and includes feedback relating to satisfaction levels, number of transactions, 
credibility of the feedback, the transaction context factor and finally the community context 
factor (Li et al, 2003) 
The following diagram (Fig. 3.4) shows an online trust model that focuses on the customer’s 




Fig. 3.4: Phases of trust lifecycle 
Source: (Head M & Hassanein K, 2002). 
The quality of the data that are presented in an e-commerce website also increases or decreases 
the level of trust in Business-to-Consumer (B2C) websites. Various models have been used to 
evaluate the quality of such data and to help identify any vulnerabilities in the websites. 
Identifying vulnerabilities helps the affected business to take appropriate action in order to 
ensure that the threat does not materialise. One such study (Al-Dwairi & Kamala M A, 2010) 
proposes a model to identify vulnerabilities and to evaluate the quality of the website; it is 
based on four key quality factors, namely security, privacy, design and content. Taking into 
account only these four key quality factors assists in reducing the huge amounts of data that 
would be needed for testing in some other models. Another research also stresses the 
importance of having an integrated trust model and discusses about how trust could be 
perceived from different perspectives, such as economic, social, psychological, organisational or 
technological. Given the various perspectives associated with trust, it is difficult for businesses 
to implement trust, and thus there arises a need for an integrated point of view to help 
implement the key elements into electronic commerce websites (Al-Dwairi & Kamala M A, 
2009). 
Trust therefore plays a pivotal role in e-commerce and it is imperative that businesses ensure 
that their customers’ trust is winnable. Businesses need not only to be able to understand the 
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effects and impact of trust on business success and but also be able to adapt to the changing 
perceptions and technologies. 
3.1.5 E-commerce Architecture 
There are various components that encompasses e-commerce technologies and it is not just 
confined to the web portal. These components are built together to provide a variety of services 
in the e-commerce architecture and acts as an enabler to e-commerce websites. These 
technologies include but are not limited to Extensible Markup Language popularly known as 
XML, standards such as Secure Electronic transactions (SET), Open Buying on the Internet (OBI), 
et cetera. Researchers believe that it is key to be able to embody the needs of the business 
architecture within the technological framework  and components (F Hoque, 2000). 
These technological components that are a part of the e-commerce technology framework are 
used to provide seamless communication and secure channels that facilitate the provision of 
user-friendly websites to customers.  The various components that act as enablers are the 
underlying e-commerce software, infrastructure including server software, hardware as well as 
the server-side operating system. (R M Stair et al, 2012). These are depicted in Fig. 3.5 
 
Fig. 3.5: Key components of e-commerce infrastructure (R M Stair et al., 2012) 
Source: R M Stair et al, 2012 
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3.1.6 E-commerce Risks 
It is key to understand what a Risk is. Risk according to ISO/IEC Guide 73 (ISO/IEC Guide) has 
been defined as  the probability of an event occurring along with its consequences combined. It 
can also be defined as the uncertainty of an event occurring be it positive or negative in terms of 
project management (SANS Institute, 2008 525.5 2-5). Understanding what impacts the risk has 
on a business is assessed by performing a risk assessment. In the global technological age where 
everything is digital all business organisations rely on the use of Information and Communication 
Technologies to facilitate automation of business processes (Computer Systems laboratory 
Bulletin, 1994). Risk Management in IT enables to identify the key risks, assess the same for the 
impact it would have on the business, prioritise the risks based on  the probability and impact it 
would have on the information assets of a business. It also facilitates the constant monitoring 
and controlling either the occurrence of the risk or mitigating the impacts it would have within a 
business environment (Hubbard, 2009). To enable mitigate losses that might arise out of the risk 
materialising, it is imperative for the business organisations to identify, evaluate and have an 
effective risk management strategy and framework for monitoring, recording and reporting 
risks. Risk management strategy thus enables the business to have a better understanding of the 
threats that they might be facing and come up with effective and efficient strategies that would 
help countering these threats and avoid losses. It also paves way for the businesses to be 
prepared and accept the risk where unavoidable.  
Electronic business and e-commerce pose may threats and risks to a business, as much as the 
opportunities they offer. Chaffey (D Chaffey, 2011) discusses the risks to business while 
implementing e-commerce; these include both strategic and practical risks. Strategic risks to 
business could range from poor business decisions that lead to a collapse of the business, 
improper planning and management of e-commerce strategies, through flaws in executing the 
right technological solutions (which can lead to additional costs), to inappropriate investment 
strategies that makes it impossible for the business to gain what it hoped for. 
Apart from the strategic risks, there are various other risks that merchants as well as customers 
face on a day-to-day practical basis. These risks could be any of the following: 
1. Sudden decrease in customer traffic due to various external elements that had not been 
factored in. For example, there could be a sudden decrease after the end of an 
advertisement or a roll out campaign (Hubbard, 2009). 
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2. Websites always face the risk of being hacked, which might lead to loss of reputation, 
financial loss and in certain cases also act as a threat to the legal compliance of the 
business (Li et al, 2002). 
3. Fulfilment of orders in a timely manner is always a challenge, as it is based on external 
entities that are not directly related to the business. There is heavy reliance on the 
supply chain, which might be affected or compromised. Hence this could result in the 
delay of goods and/or services being delivered at the right time, leading to loss of trust 
in the customer (Chaffey, 2011). 
4. Customers face the risk of being contacted by the company or the merchant by receiving 
constant unsolicited emails or the threat of being constantly harassed with spam mails. 
5. There are problems relating to identity theft, whereby the customer’s personal 
information is stolen and used for illegal purposes. 
6. Should a problem arise, the customer’s emails may not reaching the appropriate contact 
due to network, server or system errors, thus leading to a dissatisfied customer. 
(Chaffey, 2011) 
From the above, it is clear that there is a fundamental difference between traditional business 
risk and e-commerce risk. The latter varies in terms of scope, size and nature, and the fact that 
the risk spans across countries. There is also a difference here as the e-commerce market is not 
as mature as the traditional marketplace; it is constantly evolving and will take a few more years 
to stabilise and become sufficiently mature for businesses to easily predict risks and to decide on 
the risk strategies.   
Another author (Panko, 2004), while discussing risk,  stresses on having a formalised process for 
risk management strategy and to ensure that this strategy that has been developed keeping in 
mind the business strategy. The author says that not only is it essential to have  a well developed 
risk strategy but it is also key to ensure that all business processes are aligned to this strategy.  
While implementing e-commerce solutions there are various risks that businesses might face .  
DoS Attacks: Denial of Service is one of the major risks that businesses can face. This attack stops 
legitimate users like the business as well as the customers from being able to access services at 




Intrusion attacks: In these attacks, the customers’ data or the database that holds this 
information is attacked. This type of attack is performed to obtain Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) or other sensitive information held by the system which could potentially lead 
to greater thefts and losses (Panko, 2004). 
 
Identity theft:  Following intrusion attack, once the PII is obtained by the attacker, this might 
lead to identity theft as there is a huge volume of data that is held by the servers and e-
commerce systems (Panko, 2004). 
  
Malware: this includes viruses, worms, Trojan Horses and any hybrid malwares that target the 
system or the network with the aim to damage the data or for other purposes like relaying 
information, stealing data et cetera (Hubbard, 2009).  
There are thus various ways of managing the risks; they can be tackled depending on the 
dimension or the processes they occurs in. This can be classified into: risks in services, risks in 
business models, risks in technology, risks in processes and risks in fulfilment. Once the risk and 
its dimensions are identified, it is important to then understand the legal approach that must be 
taken to manage the e-risk (J Sounderpandian, 2007).  
3.1.7 E-commerce Security  
From the above it can be understood that there are various ways in which the e-commerce 
systems can be targeted by attackers. Hence security plays a major role for e-commerce 
websites. It is essential to have a security strategy implemented to be able to counter these 
threats and also to provide a safe environment for the customers that would increase their trust 
in the business. To be able to do this, businesses would first have to identify the areas of 
concern and also the security needs for the technology as well as the business as a whole.  
From a technology point of view, a web server that is secure has to be first obtained based on 
the needs and wants of the business.  Before procuring the server, it is essential that the 
business is aware of the costs, functionalities provided and the security support the server can 
offer.  It is also important to assess whether the server would be able to handle various security 
protocols such as the SET. Next various authentication mechanisms should be implemented and 
it is essential that the administrators define the rights, permissions for various users and the 
server should be hardened. While doing all this, the business should also take into account the  
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compromise on speed and should be able to decide on an optimal security software and speed 
capacity limit. Encryption mechanisms should be followed while storing passwords for various 
databases and industry best practices needs to be followed. Based on the authentication and 
user level permissions, the web server should be capable of displaying or hiding certain pages to 
the end user (R Russell, 2001). 
Another key issue is being able to offer transactional security by e-commerce technologies. 
These include origin non-repudiation, payment receipts, submission times and care should be 
taken to host the website on a secure platform. Being compliant with various rules and 
regulations is also key. There are various acts and regulations such as the Data Protection Act of 
1998 the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulation 2003, that businesses need to adhere to. Similarly to conduct an online business it is 
also important to follow financial standards like the PCI/DSS (Payment Card Industry ) (A Calder, 
2006). 
Anup Ghosh (AK Ghosh, 1998) discusses the various vulnerabilities, threats, risks and security 
issues relating to e-commerce. He further addresses securing the various components of e-
commerce architecture. The various key threats to e-commerce include Vandalism and sabotage 
on the Internet, Breach of privacy and/or confidentiality of data,Theft and fraud, Issues relating 
to data integrity, DoS attacks that lead to a situation whereby the organization is unable to 
conduct its business online for a while until they are able to resume activities on the server 
(Ghosh, 1998). 
According to the author, it is important to take into account the entire architecture (system-
wide security), including Client security, Transport security, Server security, including all web 
applications and database servers, Operating System security, Application security,  Payment 
system security, Communication channel security, using HTTP over SSL (HTTPS), Gateway and 
script security, to prevent malicious software or scripts from being executed (Ghosh, 1998) 
The author discusses building trust in detail, through making use of appropriate authentication 
and authorization mechanisms and exploiting cryptographic techniques to ensure that the entire 
e-commerce architecture is protected from both the client end as well as the server side. Careful 
coding, effective testing and using secure coding practices can avert a great many threats and 
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can prevent attacks caused due to malfunction or poor code, such as buffer overflow attacks, 
cross-site scripting attacks, SQL injections, etc (Ghosh, 1998). 
E-commerce technologies are susceptible to vulnerabilities and threats. From a technological 
point of view, e-commerce transaction security includes the usage of digital signatures; using a 
certificate authority (CA) ensures that certification policies are adhered to and that the digital 
signatures do indeed help in verifying the identity of the parties involved. E-commerce 
transaction security also entails the usage of appropriate end-point and network security 
solutions, such as firewalls, VPN’s (Virtual Private Networks), email security, web security, et 
cetera.  
From a business and legal point of view, it is important to have appropriate technical security 
policies and procedures; these need to be adhered to, and the Public Key Infrastructure must be 
understood for it to be implemented effectively and efficiently. Cross-border regulations must 
also be adhered to, and it is imperative for the business to thoroughly understand the various 
data protection laws and regulations (W Ford et al., 2000). 
Total security can be provided when there is care taken to protect all the platforms and the 
information assets. One of the key security threats is transferring data over wireless channels 
and this can be countered if the business has a good policy that would help protect the wireless 
communication channel and media. Various key technologies are involved in ensuring the 
success of the e-commerce platform and businesses need to have a thorough understanding of 
this. It is not just enough to buy security solutions off the shelf without performing adequate 
research on the needs of the business and also getting an idea of the different key vendors in 
the marketplace and their service offerings. It is important that the business is able to map the 
requirements to the service offerings of the vendors and make an informed choice of the vendor 
as well as the security solution. Furthermore, the businesses can also be protected from other 
liabilities and risk can be transferred to third parties by having good Service Level agreements 
(SLAs) with the parties concerned.  This acts as a legal binding between the parties and the 
business can enforce legal action when the contract is breached. (SANS reading room, 2012). 
Another author (V Hassler, 2000) discusses the various attacks that are possible in an e-
commerce environment that might jeopardise the entire system and/or the data. These attacks 
could range from any of the following but is not limited to the following. 
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Eavesdropping: in this type of attack, the attacker intercepts messages by constantly monitoring 
and reading messages meant for other parties (Ford et al, 2000). 
Masquerading: here the attacker uses a false identity to send and/or receive messages (SANS 
reading room, 2012). 
Message tampering: this is more than eavesdropping, where the attacker not only reads the 
message but also alters the same (Hassler, 2000) 
Replaying: in this type of attack, the attacker uses one of the old messages sent between two 
parties to gain certain privileges. Infiltration: abusing the authority of a legitimate user, the 
attacker gains entry into a system to run a malicious program in order to compromise the 
system and/or steal data. Traffic analysis: here the attacker monitors constantly the packets of 
data that are sent between two parties. It is a passive attack whereby the attacker limits himself 
to only analysing the packets. Denial-of-Service (DoS): the attacker does not allow legitimate and 
authorised users to use the system and its resources (Hassler, 2000).  
The various security services that are key to any system and also to an e-commerce system, as 




Data that is stored needs to be kept confidential and should be available only to users who have 
the rights to view it. Confidentiality ensures that illegitimate or unauthorised users do not have 
access to the data that is stored on the databases or any other systems.  Traditionally, 
confidentiality has been achieved by businesses by having access rights that would allow only 
certain specific users to view or modify data based on their privileges granted by the system 
administrator and controlled by means of using a username and password combination (SANS 
reading room, 2012).  
 
Availability 
E-commerce websites are built with the idea of providing a 24/7 service to customers across the 
globe. Different people would make purchases at different times and it is therefore essential to 
ensure availability of the website and the data to legitimate users at any given point in time. 
Unavailability leads to financial loss to the business as every minute of downtime would mean 
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loss of revenue. Also, given the competition in the market, customers might not prefer to use 
the website again if it has a lot of downtime as there are various other vendors that would 
provide similar products at competitive prices. To avoid unavailability for longer periods of time, 
businesses should have a good back up policy that would help resume the system and make it 
up and running even within short spans of time (SANS reading room, 2012) 
 
Integrity 
While confidentiality ensures that only legitimate users have rights to access the data, integrity 
ensures that the data that the business holds is exactly the same as the one entered by the 
customer. It means that the data has not been tampered with and that no unauthorised or even 
authorised resources can make illegitimate modifications to the data intentionally or by 
accident. Businesses make use of firewalls that would harden the data servers and also ensuring 
that secure methods are followed while redirecting from and to the payment gateway channels. 
Integrity  provides reliability and also ensures that the data held by the business is up-to-date 
and constant across different databases (SANS reading room, 2012).  
 
Non-repudiation 
Non repudiation of origin, transactions, purchase , payment, receipt is essential and e-
commerce technologies should be able to provide this service. It helps to ensure that the person 
or the entity performing certain specific actions cannot at a later stage refute the actions for any 
given reason (SANS reading room, 2012; Ford et al, 2000).  
The author (Ghosh, 1998)describes the key security mechanisms for e-commerce that could be 
used in order to implement the security services mentioned above. These security mechanisms 
also help combat any attacks to the e-commerce solution. These include the following: 
1. Encryption mechanisms that help protect confidentiality.  
2. Digital signatures, which verify the claimed identity of the party. 
3. Access control mechanisms, to help prevent attacks that arise out of unauthorized 
access and also to assign permissions for different entities. 
4. Data integrity mechanisms, to avoid data manipulation and message tampering. 
5. Authentication exchange mechanisms.  
6. Traffic–padding, to stop message replays and traffic analysis. 
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7. Routing control mechanisms, to help send data only through trusted nodes. 
8. Notarisation mechanisms, to make use of a trusted third party notary that can be used 
in case of dispute resolution. 
3.1.7.1 E-commerce security – users’ perception 
Perception of trust and security in many cases are driven by the design and the layout of the e-
commerce website in the minds of the users or customers. Research shows that this perception 
of trust and security can be enhanced by the businesses by providing a good design for the 
interface and also ensuring that the data that is presented in the website is accurate, up-to-date 
and also correct. Furthermore, following best practices in terms of design and using layouts that 
customers are used to, displaying information clearly, having a detailed FAQ section and 
providing ease of navigation enhances the perception of security in the users’ minds. (F Kamoun 
et al., 2012)  
Similarly other studies also show that the concept of a good interface design is pivotal in 
increasing the perception of the security offered by the website and this includes integrity 
perception, privacy control perception and the overall system security perception. (M Chaisson 
et al., 2011)  
3.1.7.2 Data quality & security 
Data quality has a major role to play in the provision of good security of the system. It is not just 
enough to have good technologies but these needs to be backed up by good data quality 
policies. Documenting and enforcing policies ensures that the data that is held is consistent 
while being stored, transferred or transmitted even over insecure channels. This policy should 
also specify instructions about the backup of data at regular intervals, data access mechanisms, 
policies and rules.  Analytics that are performed on date help businesses gain an understanding 
of various customer preferences and it is therefore necessary that the data held is accurate as 
inaccurate data would lead to gaining false business insights. The most recent data backup 
should be identifiable and also reliable and the business should be able to access these 
immediately in case of any data issues. Understanding the drawbacks of data loss, data leakage 
and data unavailability would ensure that the business policies are written and enforced to take 
into considerations these factors and help profile data in an effective and accurate manner 
(Kamoun et al., 2012) .  
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Data owners and access control techniques and methods should be used to ensure that the data 
held is kept confidential. Classification of data also helps to make sure that unauthorised entities 
or those entities that do not need the data is able to gain access to it. These policies relating to 
data cleansing, integrity, storage and backup should be addressed in the security policy and 
aligned with the business strategic policies and goals and should remain consistent across the 
business  (M Chaisson et al., 2011). 
3.2 Trusted Third Party 
Trusted third party (TTP) can be defined as “an entity in a domain that is trusted to perform a 
specific service” (Springer Reference, 2013). 
A Trusted Third Party enables transparent, seamless transactions to take place in an e-
commerce scenario. The TTP emanates from the need to quantify and account for the 
transactions as and when they occur electronically (L Columbus, 1999). 
One research (J W Palmer et al., 2006) talks about the role of Trusted Third Parties and other 
intermediaries in the critical development of an e-commerce business. It describes a TTP as “one 
set of organizations that try to promote trust on the Web. A TTP will display its logo on a firm's 
web site if that firm has demonstrated that it conforms to the policy of the TTP.”  Some of the 
most trusted third party organizations include TRUSTe, BBB Online & VeriSign. From the 
customers’ point of view, the intermediary or the TTP acts as a guarantor, where they can place 
trust in its integrity. Many Internet vendors make use of the TTP to answer strategic business 
questions and also to increase customer confidence by building a trusting relationship.  
In a paper by Jonathan et al. (Jonathan et al., 2006), the authors describe the importance of 
establishing trust between the suppliers and the consumers (merchants and customers) and 
argue that it is critical for the continued growth of e-commerce. To establish this trust in 
customers, a TTP plays a major role. In simple terms, it could be one or a set of organizations 
that display their logo on the webpage to ensure the customer that the website is highly 
trustworthy and that it follows certain principles and conforms to various compliance policies. 
The TTP in this case acts as an intermediary between the merchant and the customer. 
Cryptography plays a key role in the establishment of trust in e-commerce. For secure electronic 
transactions, most cryptographic protocols make use of a separate party that is unbiased, known 
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as the Trusted Third Party or TTP. The TTP can be any organization or in certain cases individuals 
such as banks, financial institutions or Certificate Authorities (CA). For example, the Certificate 
Authority would verify the link between the said individuals and their identities by making use of 
their public keys. The TTP would not vouch for the trustworthiness of the mentioned party but 
merely verifies the public key and authenticates the identity of the party (Grandison and 
Sloman, 2000). 
Nenadic & Zhang (Nenadic & Zhang, 2003) defines a Trusted Third Party as a neutral party 
(entity) that is used in fair exchange protocols to ensure fairness for all parties involved in the 
exchange of items. The TTP is assumed to be available, trusted by all parties and not to collude 
with any party. The TTP therefore ensures that fairness is achieved in a transaction across all 
parties, acts as an intermediary and delivery agent that is used to deliver items to the parties, 
acting as an authority that can validate and verify the identity of the transacting parties, act to 
resolve any disputes that might arise out of dishonest transactions or misbehaving parties and 
finally validating and/or issuing certificates where necessary (Nenadic & Zhang, 2003) 
Trusted Third Parties are thus entities that are employed in an e-commerce environment to 
facilitate trust. In traditional commerce, these entities could be anything ranging from lawyers, 
bankers, financial institutions, brokers, et cetera. In addition to these entities, the new TTPs in 
the modern e-commerce environment include Certificate Authorities (CA), time-stamping 
authorities and digital notaries. In a dynamic and ever-changing e-commerce environment, the 
role of the TTP is constantly evolving and the services offered reflect the paradigm shift in the 
establishment of trust over the Internet. The author describes some of the key questions that 
could be answered by using a TTP. These include: Will the authenticity of the other party be 
verified? The verification of the “claimed identity” is checked. How good is the trustworthiness 
of the other party? How sure can I be that the communication that has been sent is genuine and 
not tampered with? Can eavesdroppers be prevented? In case of a dispute, is there any reliable 
source to provide evidence? (P J Skevington & T P Hart, 1997) 
To answer these questions, there are various services offered and different roles that the TTP 
can play. These roles enable smooth transaction between the two parties by helping 
authenticate the identities of the transacting parties, check credentials, guarantee the integrity 
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and confidentiality of any information sent and received, settle disputes, provide a secure 
communication channel for secure payment. 
(P J Skevington & T P Hart, 1997) 
3.3 Legal and Regulatory Aspects of E-commerce 
E-commerce solutions add a layer of complexity to the business when compared to the 
traditional marketplace as any person across the globe will be able to access the Internet and 
there can be threats from any corner of the world. Also, customers can be from any part of the 
world which means that the business should understand the legal framework and the regulatory 
aspects of transacting worldwide. Various regulations and legal boundaries pose a challenge to 
the business and there are various laws and directives that the business needs to adhere to. 
Similarly there are various international standards that are mandatory to be complied with in 
order to trade globally and the business needs to be aware of these.  
In the UK, the E-Commerce Regulations of 2002 (EC Directive) is a pivotal directive that governs 
various aspects of e-commerce that the business needs to follow and adhere to.  This directive 
forms a basis that provides guidance on key terms related to the e-commerce marketplace like 
contract, order, service provider and also gives a detailed explanation of what the businesses 
need to do to be compliant with the directive. It governs the jurisdiction that would need to be 
adopted to when there is a dispute, burden of proof in case of criminal court proceedings, the 
rights and responsibilities of the trading parties, service providers and their liabilities et cetera.  
(EC Directive, 2002). 
The EU directive also governs regulations relating to competition law, describes and details 
various terms such as the laws in the country of origin of transactions, responsibilities of the 
network service providers, what and who is responsible for the webpage being hosted, duties of 
the certification authority, and the legal effectiveness of digital signatures (which is described 
within the Signature Directive). The Signature Directive describes when and how digital 
signatures can be used in a court of law as evidence and how digital signatures that are secure 
could be used as an alternative for handwritten signatures. It also describes in detail 
competition law, torts, and the contractual obligations of both the customers and the 
merchants. The EU directive has another directive known as the Distance Selling Directive, which 
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is provided for the unique protection of the customers of e-business. Other directives within the 
EU directive include the Data Protection Directive and the Directive on Privacy and 
Telecommunications, which contains rules on the data privacy of customers and the freedom of 
customers not to choose to share personal information over the Internet (T Kono et al., 2002). 
Blythe (S E Blythe, 2011) explains that the legal landscape as well as e-commerce law refers to all 
regulations relating to electronic contracts, electronic signature law, certification authority law 
and regulations, consumer protection in e-commerce transactions and aspects relating to the 
provision of electronic evidence and processing. The MLEC (Model Law of E-Commerce) was 
drafted by the United Nations in 1996 to offer internationally acceptable rules and to also 
enable the provision of a secure environment. It applies to any kind of data or network that is 
used in the context of commercial activities over the Internet. It acts as an enabler providing a 
set of guidelines, a framework and principles to facilitate the use of modern technology in 
business. It acts only as a framework giving every individual nation an opportunity to draft in 
detail the specific laws and regulations necessary for implementation.  
Based on the Data Protection Act, there is a necessity for organisations or businesses to notify 
the local data authority (the Information Commissioners Office in the case of UK) of any 
personal data breach within 24 hours of becoming aware of the basic facts. Furthermore, the 
organisation/business that has reported a breach must follow up with an update within the next 
3 days. If a breach is likely to adversely affect individuals, the organisation/business must notify 
those individuals without undue delay. A personal data breach is defined as “a breach of security 
leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alternation, unauthorised disclosure of, or 
access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise protected in connection with the 
provision of a public electronic communications service.” (ICO, 2013) 
Personal data means any kind of information (a single piece of information or a dataset) that can 
personally identify an individual or single them out as an individual. Examples include vehicle 
registration plate numbers, credit card numbers, fingerprints, IP address (e.g. if used by a person 
rather than a device, like a web server), or health records.    
The data authority will review the incident that has been reported and decide if any 




 Penalties of up to £500,000 
 Audits 
 Enforcement notices 
 Prosecution 
According to the data provided by the ICO (2013),   
 During 2012, the number of organisations that received monetary penalties from the 
ICO increased by more than 200%.  
 Between 03/2011 and 02/2012 there were 730 self-reported breaches and 1,150 in the 
same months during 2012 to 2013. Over the same periods, the number of monetary 
penalties imposed increased: from 9 penalties totalling £791,000 in 2011-2012 to 20 
penalties totalling £2,610,000 in 2012-2013, a growth of more than 200%. (ICO, 2013) 
Given the legal requirements and the stringent rules in case of data security breaches and 
concerns relating to data privacy, there is now a paradigm shift in the way security is looked at 
by organisations and businesses. No longer is security just a matter of securing the end points. It 
is now considered a holistic process and an end-to-end business requirement which is 
incorporated in all aspects of the business . 
3.4 Fair Exchange 
In an e-commerce transaction, as in a traditional business environment, there are two 
transacting parties, namely the merchant and the customer, who possibly do not know each 
other, and hence there is a lack of trust between these parties. For example, if the customer 
wants to buy a product online (say a software program or digital music), the merchant needs to 
receive the correct digital payment for the product from the customer, and the customer needs 
to receive the right software from the merchant. The customer should not be cheated by the 
merchant, who either does not deliver the software after receiving the payment or sends the 
wrong software to the customer, and similarly the merchant should not be cheated without 
receiving the payment from the customer. This problem is called ‘fair exchange’ and most e-
commerce protocols enable the provision of fair exchange, where either both parties receive 
their products or neither does. Furthermore, there is another problem that fair exchange 
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protocols tackle, namely dispute resolution, i.e. an online or automated solution when there are 
disputes arising out of the transaction between the two parties. 
According to Ray (I Ray & I Ray, 2002), a fair exchange protocol is defined as a protocol that 
ensures that no player in an e-commerce transaction can gain an advantage over the other 
player by misbehaving, misinterpreting or by prematurely aborting the protocol.  It describes 
that fair exchange is achieved in an electronic exchange when at the end of the business 
transaction, each of the transacting parties fulfils its obligations and receives the item expected 
or none of the transacting parties involved gets anything. 
Asokan (Asokan et al., 1997) defines fair exchange as a system that does not discriminate against 
a correctly behaving player. As long as a player is behaving correctly, a fair system should ensure 
that other players will not gain any advantage over correctly behaving players.  It states that no 
transacting party (merchant or customer) should receive unfair or undue advantage, thus 
ensuring fair exchange in the transaction. It describes that the transaction between two parties 
X & Y (the merchant and the customer) should satisfy three main conditions, namely 
Effectiveness, Timelines and Fairness. 
Effectiveness, whereby on correct execution of the protocol both the transacting parties honour 
their commitments appropriately. In other words it means that both the parties at the end of 
the transaction or deal receive their items (Asokan et al, 1997). 
Timelines, whereby the protocol that provides fair exchange would be executed within 
acceptable timeframes (Asokan et al, 1997). 
Fairness: this refers to the scenario whereby fair exchange is achieved. The paper describes two 
types of fairness, namely strong fairness and weak fairness. Strong fairness: this is a type of fair 
exchange whereby on successful execution of the protocol either both the transacting parties 
receive the goods or neither receives anything. Weak fairness: in this case, either strong fair 
exchange is achieved or if not the correctly behaving party is able to prove via a trusted third 
party that the other transacting party has been misbehaving and provides a means for dispute 
resolution. Though strong fair exchange is a desirable characteristic, it is not always achievable 
due to constraints of cost and complexity (Asokan et al, 1997). 
There are quite a number of protocols that concentrate on providing fair exchange. Exchange of 
goods and money takes place over the Internet between two or more parties that do not trust 
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each other, and hence the provision of fair exchange plays a key role in ensuring that neither 
parties cheat. Fair exchange protocols belong to the group of security protocols that enable 
better management between the buyer and the seller in an unknown, risky and un-trusted 
space. 
3.4.1 Fair Exchange Categories 
Depending on whether or not the protocol involves a Trusted Third Party, fair exchange 
protocols can be broadly classified into two types: 
1. Those that do not involve a TTP and 
2. Protocols that involve a TTP  
Protocols that involve a TTP can further be classified into three types, namely inline, online and 
limited use of TTP. 
Use of an inline TTP: in this type, the transacting parties, namely the merchant and the 
customer, send their items to be exchanged to the TTP, who in turn would deliver them to the 
transacting parties, thus avoiding any direct contact between the transacting parties. This 
ensures that fair exchange is guaranteed. The disadvantage of this type of protocol is that the 
TTP sometimes becomes a bottleneck as it must always be available. It also acts as a single point 
of failure for the protocol, i.e. if the TTP crashes, then the protocol fails, as the TTP cannot 










Fig 3.6: Inline TTP based fair exchange model (Springer , 2010) 
 
Use of online TTP: in this type, the TTP is used to validate the items that are to be exchanged. 
Unlike an inline TTP, an online TTP is used only for validation and hence the involvement of the 
TTP is slightly reduced. It uses the TTP for the purposes of verifying the items, generating and/or 
sorting proof of exchange for the times. However, the use of an online TTP also has similar 
disadvantages (as with an inline TTP) as the TTP needs to be online for the exchange process and 
also during any disputes that arise. It might also lead to dishonest users or misbehaving parties 











Fig 3.7: Online TTP based fair exchange model (Springer, 2010) 
The proposed protocol uses an online TTP model as the TTP helps to build trust between the 
customer and the merchant. Despite being a bottleneck, it acts as a trusted arbitrator facilitating 
and recording all transactions which makes it easier to resolve any conflicts if they occur. Also, 
the TTP verifies that the e-cash and the digital product are valid by verifying it with the bank and 
the producer respectively. Since there are various benefits of using an online TTP, this research 
uses this model. 
Limited use of TTP: in this type, the TTP is used only when something goes wrong or when a 









Fig. 3.8: Offline TTP (Optimistic Fair Exchange) protocol model (Springer Images, 2010) 
3.5 Data Privacy 
The implementation of an e-commerce system brings about a new set of challenges in terms of 
privacy of data. While a transaction is processed, there is a huge volume of data that is being 
collected from the customers. A lot of this could be sensitive information including card number 
and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and this makes it mandatory for the business 




Once businesses decide to implement an e-commerce solution, it is imperative that the business 
understands that the success of the business is closely related to the level of the trust the 
customer has on the system as well as the brand image of the business.  To be able to build that 
trust customers should understand and believe that their data is confidential and that there 
would be no issues in relation to the privacy of information. They should be assured that there 
would not be any problems that would crop up due to the loss or theft of data and that their 
personal information will not be mishandled by the business.   Data privacy issues can lead to 
legal complications, and to loss of reputation and finance (Hines, 2002). 
Businesses need to understand and appreciate that the privacy of customer data is of huge 
importance and that they should not be constantly nagged or bothered with emails, 
promotional offers or offers from other third parties that might not be useful to them. This 
would lead to the customer being put-off and lose trust in the business. Care should also be 
taken by the business to constantly be vigilant to prevent data leak and also ensure that 
appropriate security mechanisms are in place to protect information about the customer that is 
being held by the business. A customer privacy policy should be formulated and enforced strictly 
by the business and this policy should be available to the customers to view (M Hines, 2002). 
3.6 Anonymity 
Anonymity could be defined as A condition in which an individual’s true identity is unknown. 
Privacy on the other hand is A person’s right to control access to his or her private data (Kimpl, 
2012). 
From the above definitions, it can be clearly understood that anonymity and privacy are not the 
same and are in fact entirely different things. Anonymity, in the scope of this research, means 
that the true identity of the customer is hidden. While entering into a contract, the customer 
does not have any obligation to reveal his or her true identity to the merchant, and there is no 
way the merchant has the ability to track the true identity of the customer (based on the 
transaction details). For ensuring privacy of data, various cryptographic mechanisms such as 
encryption are used.  
E-commerce transactions, as discussed, takes place over the Internet where there is no mutual 
trust between two or more transacting parties.  A customer, due to the lack of this trust, would 
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not want to disclose all his/her details during a transaction. This is achieved by making use of 
electronic cash that helps to provide transaction anonymity to the customer. Anonymity is thus 
a mechanism that hides the identity of the customer and keeps it secret during an e-commerce 
transaction. It helps protect the customer’s privacy. Though privacy is an ancient concept, with 
the development of more technologies, this is yet to achieve its full potential. 
3.7 E-Payment 
Margaret Tan (M Tan, 2004) defines e-payment, in simple terms, as a process in which monetary 
value is transferred electronically or digitally between two transacting or entities, as a 
compensation or consideration for the goods purchased or services obtained. The entities 
referred to here could be a bank, business, government or any individual customer. This 
definition explains that any payment that has been made (which is not effected by paper-based 
instructions such as cash or cheques) and that is done electronically through the use of 
technology (such as payment cards, store value cards, GIRO instructions, ETF or virtual or 
digitised money) thus forms a part of electronic payments. E-payment channels include those 
technologies that actually facilitate these payments. These include Internet-based wired 
channels, Bluetooth, infrared technologies, contactless payment enablers such as proximity 
sensors, key fobs, transponders etc., mobiles, and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). 
The major concern relating to electronic payment is security; this entails securely transmitting 
payment details over the network and secure storage (Hsieh, 2001). From the  point of view of 
the customer, apart from just security, privacy is also a huge concern. Anonymity and privacy 
prevent merchants from building a customer profile based on recent purchases (Wright, 2002). 
Depending on the type of payment (along with the entity involved in the transaction), electronic 
payment transactions fall under three main categories, including retail e-payments, corporate e-
payment and wholesale e-payment (Wright, 2002) 
Retail e-payments includes Consumer-to-Business (C2B), Business-to-Consumer  (B2C) and Peer-
to-peer (P2P). Corporate e-payment includes Business-to-Business (B2B) transactions for 
corporate procurements, Bank-to-Business transactions, etc. Wholesale e-payment refers to 
payments between banks as well as payments between banks and central banks (Wright, 2002). 
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The figure below (Fig. 3.9) describes the scope of electronic payment transactions. This figure 
explains the different electronic payment transaction categories. 
 
 Fig 3.9: Scope of e-payment transactions 
Source: Wright, 2002 
 
There are many new technologies involved in making electronic payments secure. With the 
increase in the computing power and availability of technologies at lower costs, security and 
anonymity have become key concerns. The trend indicates that over the time, these protocols 
and technologies that facilitate these transactions will become insecure. There is much research 
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and literature available that critically analyses the existing protocols and technologies and that 
assesses those that contribute further by devising new technologies and/or protocols to make 
the electronic payments more secure and efficient. Various protocols use various security and 
cryptographic methodologies. For example, some use multi-application smart cards, Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standards (DES), MD5, hashing, Kerberos, Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), etc. There are various regulating 
authorities and standards that govern electronic payment transactions, such as the Fair Credit 
Billing Act (FCBA), Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) etc. Also, electronic payments are subject 
to more contract laws than traditional payment methods. To ensure security, the Certificate 
Authorities (CA) would normally be the government, banks or financial institutions. The diagram 
below (Figure 3.10) shows an example of electronic cheques (D O’Mahony et al., 2001): 
 
 
Fig. 3.10: Electronic cheques (O’Mahony et al., 2001) 
One protocol by Wen et al. (2013) is based on a quantum proxy blind signature, quantum key 
distribution, and a one-time pad for provision of anonymity; it also provides unconditional 
security and supports inter-bank transactions. Some protocols focus on protecting the end-to-
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end electronic payment transactions by making use of powerful client handheld devices such as 
key fobs, etc. Such protocols make use of a strong client-centric model, whereby the assumption 
is that the intermediary or the TTP is not trustworthy. This means that only the customers with 
the handheld device have the option to communicate with the banks or other financial 
institutions over the Internet (Qin, 2009). Another protocol (Raghuwanshi, 2009) makes use of 
an intermediary (TTP) to ensure that the electronic money that is transferred from a customer 
to a merchant over a telecommunications channel or network is accurate and secure. The aim of 
the protocol is to verify the payment order as this is critical in an arena where there is not much 
trust. This model makes use of the TTP, which receives messages from both transacting parties 
(i.e. the merchant and the customer) in order to verify the integrity of the payment. It also deals 
with scenarios whereby the merchant and/or the customer are dishonest.  
E-commerce architecture provides payment processing service that forms the backbone of any 
e-commerce website. The payment processing is subject to various strict data protections rules 
and regulations and regulated by many parties such as the government, financial regulation 
bodies and authorities of the country, the central bank of the country and is subject to various 
laws depending on the physical location of the transacting parties. The customer and the 
merchant normally authenticate each other mutually in an e-commerce environment. Where 
there are trust issues or there are no means to be able to mutually authenticate the other a 
third party or an arbitrator such as the TTP, financial institution or a bank comes into play. 
Payment authentication is normally done using public key cryptographic mechanisms and 
techniques.  In most cases the customer is being vouched by a bank, local building society or an 
financial institution that provide a platform to like an internet banking service which would 
enable the user to authenticate themselves and the details can be passed on by the arbitrator to 
the merchant who would then process the purchase order and deliver the product. One such 
initiative is the FAST (FSTC Financial Agent Secure Transaction); this can enable the provision of 
various services such as authentication of customer, payment guarantee, etc. (D O’Mahony et 
al., 2001). 
Payment gateway is nothing but a set of servers that usually uses a secure internet channel to 
connect to the bank’s or the financial institutions private network. This is the pivotal component 
in case of payment processing and this ensures that the authentication and the payment for the 
transactions are done not only in an effective manner but also done securely.  For  a gaurantee 
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of seamless flow of information both from the merchant and the customer and also to 
successfully be able to carry out the transaction payment, the payment gateway encrypts and 
secures the data. It is also responsible for ensuring good communication between the customer 
and the merchant. All these components are important as they act as a facilitator to ensure that 
the transactions over the internet are carried out smoothly and also in a secure way. A VPN  is a 
virtual private network that extends a private network across the public network like internet. 
The main advantage of using a VPN is that it provides a secure connection even while connecting 
with a wireless Local Area Connection. The key components of an e-commerce portal are 
depicted in the diagram below (Figure 3.11) (Z Qin, 2009). 
 
 
Fig. 3.11: E-commerce components (Qin, 2009) 
 
There are three key functions that a payment gateway performs when a customer purchases 
goods or services online. These include:  
1. Authorization whereby the  customer details provided are verified 
2. Clearing which helps to report the transaction and the amount to the appropriate bank 
,building society or the financial institution to process the payment and 




(VP Gulati & S Srivatsava, 2007).  
For example, implementing a Payflow gateway requires that the appropriate PayPal APIs are are 
used in order for the payment to be processed. To be able to implement this, there are various 
SDKs that are available and these can be implemented in the code of the website that is being 
built.  Figure 3.12 below depicts the working of a PayPal transaction (M Miller, 2011). 
 
 
Fig. 3.12: Paypal working model (Miller, 2011) 
 
3.8 Anonymous Electronic Cash 
In an electronic payment system, electronic cash refers to the payment scheme whereby the 
transacting parties make use of a cash-like payment system, which is very similar to cash in the 
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real world. Anonymous electronic cash refers to the payment system that helps in the transfer 
of electronic funds from the party purchasing products or the payer (customer) to the party 
providing goods/services or the payee (merchant), and also helps protecting the original identity 
of the payer or the customer.  
Anonymous electronic cash works on the cryptographic principle of blind signatures, which 
makes payments untraceable and hence provides anonymity and privacy to the payer. It was 
originally introduced by Chaum in 1983 as a means to protect the customer’s identity. In 
Chaum’s blind signature, the two key parties involved include the signer, who issues a blind 
signature to the payer, and the payer, who requests a signature from the signer. A blind 
signature satisfies two key properties, namely: 
1. Blindness: this property allows a payer to request a signature on a message from the 
signer without having to reveal the contents of the message.  
2. Unforgeability: a property which ensures that only a signer can produce valid signatures. 
(Chaum, 1983) 
 
For example, Ray’s protocol makes use of electronic cash in order to provide anonymity for the 
customer.  
3.9 Dispute Resolution 
A dispute can arise in a transaction when either party believes and has a reason to raise a 
concern that they were being cheated because the other player was being dishonest, as in 
traditional commerce. However lucrative and beneficial e-commerce might be, it can also suffer 
from disputes and conflicts. Despite the increase in the number of disputes and conflicts due to 
the tremendous growth of e-commerce, there is a variety of mechanisms and resources that can 
be employed to resolve conflicts that arise during a transaction (Tang, 2007).   
In traditional commerce, disputes that arise are formally handled and settled in the courts of 
law. In an e-commerce scenario, however, there are other dispute resolution techniques that 
can be used, and these avoid the disputes being resolved in the courts. Such methods are known 
as Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which includes mediation and arbitration (Jannadia et 
al, 2000).  
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Arbitration refers to a process whereby a neutral third party (who is unbiased) collects and 
collates information from both the transacting parties that are in dispute, namely the customer 
and the merchant. This third party then makes a decision in favour of one of the parties, and the 
decision made is binding on both parties (Jannadia et al, 2000).  
Mediation is a process like arbitration in that it makes use of a neutral trusted third party who is 
unbiased. This mediator collects and collates information from both the transacting parties that 
are in dispute, namely the customer and the merchant. However, the mediator only facilitates 
both parties to come to a favourable conclusion or decision, unlike arbitration where the third 
party decides on behalf of both parties (Tang, 2007).  
Disputes resolved online use a technique known as Online Dispute Resolution (ODR). Certain 
researchers (Katsh et al., 2001) describe in detail how a ‘fourth party’ can be used to work with 
and also assist the traditional trusted third party to effectively and efficiently resolve conflicts.  
ODR assists in resolving disputes online and also in taking the help of the fourth party in cases 
relating to disputes that arise offline. It uses various opportunities that are provided by the 
Internet not just to employ the processes that are available but also to use the same processes 
to help resolve the conflict. ODR helps to mediate and arbitrate, and it allows various processes 
to work with neutral third parties to resolve any disputes and conflicts that arise. It is not an 
entirely new concept, as it has its roots in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 
There is now a rapid increase in adapting to ODR for many reasons. A few of these include: 
Rapid growth: there has been a tremendous and extraordinary growth in Internet technologies 
and in the e-commerce marketplace, resulting in a huge increase in the number of transactions. 
Non-traditional marketplace growth: e-commerce has now started taking over from traditional 
marketplaces as well as non-traditional marketplaces.  
Government agency concerns: Departments of Commerce, Federal Trade Commissions and 
other government agencies are now more concerned about the available dispute resolution 
mechanisms due to the growing number of disputes arising cross-border. (Katsh et al, 2001) 
E-commerce protocols should be designed in such a way that they ensure that any disputes that 
might arise are reduced in number. This can be done by ensuring that both the merchant and 
the customer are confident of receiving their goods and/or payment. This ideally reduces the 
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number of messages required to resolve disputes, which in turn reduces any overheads or load 
on the communication channel itself, thus making the protocol efficient and effective. 
 
3.10 Fair Exchange and Anonymity Protocols  
This section aims at researching protocols that provide fair exchange and anonymity; it also 
discusses in detail the pros and cons of each protocol described. Each protocol is designed with a 
different purpose in mind and provides varying degrees of fair exchange and/or anonymity. 
Some provide true and strong fair exchange while others provide weak fair exchange. Similarly, 
some protocols provide complete anonymity, whereas some others fail to provide anonymity 
throughout all the e-commerce phases. This varies depending on the costs and also on the fact 
that true and strong fair exchange is sometimes improbable to achieve in certain scenarios and 
situations.  
3.10.1 Frankin & Reiter 
Franklin and Reiter’s (Franklin & Reiter, 1997) protocol describes a method for verifying the 
consistency of any documents that are sent online before the exchange takes place. The 
protocol uses a one-way function ‘f’ which computes to F, such that F (x,(f(y)) = f(xy). The 
protocol assumes that the function f is known by both parties, and that F is known by the 
trusted third party. For example, consider two parties X and Y trying to exchange secret 
information KX and KY. It is assumed that X and Y know f(KY) and f(KX), respectively. Both X and 
Y send their components of the message to the TTP. The TTP compares the components to 
ensure that both parties are sending the correct components, and then forwards X’s 
components to Y, and vice-versa. X and Y multiply the components received by x1 and y1 to 
obtain their respective messages (Franklin & Reiter, 1997). 
The advantages of this protocol are: 
1. The TTP does not reveal the information it receives from X or Y unless invoked. 
2. The TTP can be invoked if there is a problem. 
The main disadvantages of this protocol include: 
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1. The TTP is only semi-trusted. 
2. The protocol does not work without a TTP, which leads to certain overheads. 
3. The protocol also assumes that only one of the parties would be dishonest at any given 
time. Hence it does not cater for scenarios where more than one party is being 
dishonest.  
4. The protocol provides only partial anonymity. 
Franklin and Reiter’s protocol mainly concentrates on providing fair exchange. Due to the way 
the protocol is designed, partial anonymity is achieved. This holds well if the protocol is not 
disrupted.  
3.10.2 Boa’s Fair Exchange Protocol 
Bao’s protocol (Bao, 1998) primarily makes use of an offline TTP for the provision of fair 
exchange. It provides fair exchange for all electronic data, including digital signatures, payment 
transactions and confidential data, between two transacting parties, namely A & B. The key 
features, which are quite unique to this protocol, are usage of offline TTP, number of messages, 
true fair exchange guarantee, avoiding TTP where possible and using Certificate of Encrypted 
Message Being a Signature Method.  
It makes use of an offline TTP. This means that the TTP does not become involved with the 
transactions between the two parties. The TTP comes into picture only when either of the 
communicating parties misbehaves or for the purposes of dispute resolution. When the parties 
misbehave, it leads to a dispute whereby the TTP is asked to give a statement, officially known 
as an affidavit. 
During an exchange, only three messages are sent across.  
It guarantees a true fair exchange, whereby the transacting parties both receive the other’s data 
or neither does. This avoids any loss that could be incurred irrespective of how badly either of 
the transacting parties behaves during the exchange process. 
By providing true fair exchange, it avoids any dispute resolution where the TTP gives an affidavit 
relating to what happened during the transaction and attesting to the processes involved during 
the exchange between the parties.   
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It uses a cryptographic mechanism called a Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature 
(CEMBS), which makes the protocol novel and which acts as the basis of it. This cryptographic 
primitive enables the signature of the parties to be encrypted on a public file without having to 
reveal the signature itself.  
The only disadvantage from the point of view of this research is that this protocol does not 
provide customer anonymity. It is also important to note that this was one of the earliest 
protocols to guarantee a true fair exchange while making use of an offline TTP.  
3.10.3 Ray’s Anonymous & Failure Resilient Fair Exchange Protocol 
Ray et al.’s protocol (Ray, 2005) on provision of anonymous and failure resilient fair exchange is 
another key protocol in the fair exchange arena. It is an optimistic protocol and invokes the 
Trusted Third Party only when it is absolutely necessary, that is during a transaction where 
either of the parties is misbehaving or when the transaction aborts unexpectedly. It uses an off-
line TTP, thus avoiding any bottlenecks caused by the usage of online TTPs, which are involved in 
all stages of the transaction. It also avoids the vulnerabilities that are posed by TTPs, such as a 
DoS (Denial of Service) attack.  
Ray’s protocol also provides anonymity by making use of a principle first proposed by Chaum, 
called the blind signature, which is implemented here as electronic cash. Electronic cash 
transaction takes place by means of using coins of the same denomination. Therefore, to make a 
purchase, the customer sends multiple coins. This protocol has about nine different stages, 
which occur during the course of a normal transaction. The key steps that are used in the 
protocol are as follows: 
Step1: When a customer has decided to make a purchase, he/she downloads a copy of the 
product which is encrypted, from the TTP. 
Step 2: The customer then sends the blinded coins, which are unsigned and which are worth the 
total value of the product, to the bank, which then debits the amount from the customer’s 
account. 
Step 3: After the customer’s account has been debited, the bank signs the blinded coins digitally 
and sends them to the customer. On receipt of the blind signed coins, the customer then 
unblinds the same to acquire the coins of the necessary value, which have been signed and 
authorised by the bank. 
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Step 4: The customer now has the coins of the necessary value. Hence he/she proceeds to 
encrypt the signed coins, and sends these along with the purchase order to the merchant. At the 
same time, the customer also creates and generates pseudo identifiers in order to keep his/her 
real identity a secret. 
Step 5: The merchant receives the purchase order and the signed coins, and sends the encrypted 
product copy to the customer.  
Step 6: The customer receives the product copy, decrypts it, and after verification of the 
product, if satisfied, sends the decryption key for the electronic coins sent earlier. 
Step 7: The merchant, on receipt of the decryption keys, checks with the customer’s bank to see 
if the coins issued are still valid.  
Step 8: The bank then checks for the validity of the coins, credits the merchant’s account with 
the appropriate amount, and then records the transaction in its database, along with the serial 
number of the coins that have been spent.  
Step 9: The transaction is finally completed when the merchant sends the decryption key for the 
product to the customer.  
 
The notation of the protocol is summarised in the table below: 
 
Message Notation 
Message 1: The customer downloads copy of 
encrypted  product 
TP =>C : [m; KM] 
 
Message 2: Customer sends blinded coins C=>M: PO, [CC(PO), Cprv], [[PT, K0><Kc2], Bprv],B 
Message 3: Bank signs blinded coins digitally 




Message 4: Customer encrypts the coins and 
sends these with the purchase order to the 
merchant and generates pseudo identifiers for 
keeping his/her identity secret. Sends 
decryption key to the merchant on receipt of 
the encrypted product and the decryption key 
 
Message 5: Merchant receives the decryption 
key, checks with the Customer Bank to check 
for validity and transaction is complete when 
the product decryption key is sent 
 
Table 3.1: Notational representation of Ray’s Anonymous and Failure Resilient Fair Exchange 
Protocol 
The trusted third party here acts as a mediator to establish whether both the parties, namely 
the customer and the merchant, are acting fairly. If there is any unfairness, the TTP requests 
more details, as the protocol is based on the offline TTP model. Anonymity is achieved here as 
the customer does not give out his/her details to the merchant, and also makes use of the blind 
signature concept. 
The verification of this protocol by Kong et al. (2004) reveals that the TTP is only semi-trusted, 
and has the capability to alter messages or to masquerade and become an intruder. This is one 
of the drawbacks of the protocol.   





Fig 3.13: Execution steps of Ray’s protocol (Ray, 2005) 
 
This protocol implements fair exchange and dispute resolution mechanisms that are 
automatically performed within the scope of the protocol. However, it does not provide a true 
fair exchange. It distributes the function of the TTP across many TTPs, thus increasing the 
robustness of the protocol. It adopts a payment mechanism (called electronic cash) that enables 
provision of anonymity. The other drawbacks include: 
1. Usage of asymmetric cryptography for encryption/decryption. This is not very efficient 
or effective if the content is huge. 
2. It uses electronic cash based on the principle of Chaum’s electronic cash. This method 
has its vulnerabilities; for example, Chaum’s concept assumes that the bank cannot 
break the signature that is used by the party paying cash. The scheme has an 
unfortunate property in that the bank can frame Alice (the one paying cash) as a 
multiple spender. This in turn makes void any legal significance. To prevent the frame-
up, it is assumed that Alice has a digital signature scheme and a certified copy of her 
public key. Because digital signatures are being used here, Alice is protected against a 
frame-up, only computationally and not unconditionally, which represents vulnerability 
(D Chaum et al., 1990). 
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3. For purposes of anonymity, customers create pseudo identifiers with a one-time private 
key and a public key for their transactions. This becomes a bottleneck in cases where 
customers try to generate multiple identities for many different transactions.  
3.10.4 Zhang’s Anonymous Purchase and Physical Delivery Protocol  
The next protocol that is key is the practical fair exchange protocol for anonymous purchase and 
physical delivery, proposed by Zhang et al. (2006). This protocol is effective and efficient, and 
provides the means to support fair document exchange over the Internet for e-commerce 
transactions. It incorporates an RSA-based cryptographic mechanism, which provides a measure 
to recover the party’s decryption key offline. The idea is based on the principle that the recovery 
of the offline key is dependent on the verifiable and recoverable decryption key. This verifiability 
property allows the other party to check the correctness of the key without having any 
knowledge whatsoever of the original key. The recoverability property allows the parties to 
decrypt the encrypted key to obtain the original key. However, this process necessitates the 
good management of keys and the secure transmission of those keys.  
3.10.5 Zhang’s Anonymous and Fair Exchange Protocol 
Another protocol by Zhang et al. (2003) on anonymity and fair exchange describes the exchange 
of information between two transacting parties, namely Pa and Pb, with the assistance of an off-
line TTP Pt. The methodology for the process of generating and verifying Pb’s commitment (COb) 
assures Pa that Pt can re-cover rb from cob, which then allows Pa computation of Pb’s key. In this 
scenario, Pa is unable to obtain rb after handing over all the information to Pb. Also, the key 
recovery conducted by Pt does not require any information about the identities, locations, 
exchanged documents and keys of Pa and Pb, so the impact of Pt’s security on the protocol is 
weakened. This, coupled with anonymous communications between the parties involved, 
demonstrates the protocol’s true anonymity. 
It is important to note that Zhang’s protocol provides both anonymity and fair exchange, and 
this uses symmetric key cryptography and an off-line TTP that is not involved entirely in the 
transactions. The protocol assumes that both the transacting parties have a document and a 
symmetric key to encrypt or decrypt the document. The first stage before the protocol is 
invoked is to get the documents certified by the relevant authorities. For example, a digital 
signature is certified by a CA, a payment token is certified by a bank, etc. This certification 
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process is key as it allows each of the transacting parties to verify the correctness of the 
documents and the decryption key, and it ensures fair exchange in the transactions. 
Anonymity is a key feature of this protocol and this is achieved by making use of communication 
channels that are anonymous; it also makes use of anonymous electronic cash. This protocol has 
two sub-protocols, namely document exchange and key recovery. 





ka(Da),kra) => Pb A party represented by Pa (anonymous) first 
initiates the transaction by sending in his or 
her encrypted document to the other 
transacting party Pb. The encrypted document, 
E
ka(Da) along with the item sent kra is used to 





kb(Db),krb, COb)=> Pa After receiving the document from Pa, the 
other party (Pb) sends his or her encrypted 
document, represented by 
E
kb(Db), along with 
the item sent (krb) for the computation of the 
key, which is done in step number four. This is 
along with Pb’s commitment (COb), which is 
produced in relation to the symmetric keys (kra 
and krb). This is done if Pb successfully verifies 
the document received, 
E
ka(Da). The 
commitment COb assures Pa that Pt, which is 
the TTP, would definitely be able to help Pa 
recover the key kb from cob without actually 
 
 65 
knowing the key kb, and also be able to  
Pa(ra)=>Pb The next step involves Pa  sending an item ra  to 
Pb after verifying 
E
kb(D) b and the commitment 
COb. Pb now uses the item ra to compute ka 
from the kra. 
 
Pb(rb)=>Pa Similar to the previous step, the next step 
involves Pb  sending an item rb  to Pa after 
verifying 
E
ka(D) a and the commitment COa. Pa 
now uses the item rb to compute kb from the 
krb. 
Table 3.2: Zhang’s Document Exchange Protocol notation 
The second sub-protocol describes the offline key recovery process and consists of two key 
stages, where each of the parties invoke the TTP Pt to help recover rb from Cob to compute kb 
from the krb, and then rb from Coa to compute ka from the kra, respectively. The second stage 
involves Pt sending the recovered ra and rb to Pb  and Pa, respectively, to enable them compute 
the symmetric keys. 
The drawback however in this protocol is the number of messages exchanged, which makes it 
very complex. The protocol also does not provide mechanisms for fair exchange throughout the 
e-commerce transaction, i.e. there is no provision for fair exchange during the negotiation 
phase, and this protocol does not address the issue of what would happen if either party 
withdraws the purchase. Another drawback is the heavy reliance on the TTP, which provides the 
security of the transactions. Thirdly, though the protocol claims to offer anonymity, the 
customer is required to disclose his/her public key during the transaction. If the customer uses 




3.10.6 Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol 
Another protocol by Zhang et al. (2006) provides both anonymity and fair exchange. In addition 
to these, the protocol also provides a feature whereby the correct item could be ensured before 
the transaction.  It makes use of a ‘commit buffer’ account which temporarily holds the 
customer’s credit details until they are passed on to the bank. It consists of six different phases 
and has a total of 11 messages.  
This makes the protocol quite cumbersome. One more disadvantage of the protocol is that it 
assumes that the commit buffer being held by the TTP would always be sufficient to hold 
enough data. It does not discuss what would happen if there is an error in the commit buffer or 
if a buffer overflow occurs. This protocol has not been formally verified or model-checked to 





Fig. 3.14: Execution of Zhang’s  Mutual Authentication protocol (Zhang, 2006) 
3.10.7 Zhang’s Non-Repudiation Protocol 
Another protocol by Zhang (1996) provides fair exchange by making use of an online TTP. The 
main aim of the protocol however is provision of non-repudiation of receipt, that is, the receiver 
cannot deny having received the message/product or cash. This protocol mainly aims at 




3.10.8 Wang’s Protocol 
Based on an RSA cryptographic mechanism of key exchange, Wang’s protocol (2005) mainly 
concentrates on the contract signing phase in e-commerce. It primarily deals with RSA-based 
signatures and addresses fairness and abuse-free mechanisms. This protocol discusses fair 
exchange in terms of signature exchange, and does not concentrate on providing anonymity. 
Though there are various protocols that provide anonymity or fair exchange in general, only 
three protocols (Ray, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2003) provide both of these features. It is 
therefore imperative that the scope of this research is narrowed down to only these three 
protocols. 
3.11 Research Gaps 
 
From the above literature, it can be clearly seen that there are only three protocols (Ray, 2005; 
Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2003) that provide anonymity and fairness during e-commerce 
transactions. However, there are various weaknesses and gaps in these three protocols. The key 
gaps are as follows: 
1. Ray’s protocol (2005) uses a TTP as an arbitrator for transactions, however the TTP is only 
semi-trusted thus is able to alter messages or become an intruder 
2. Ray’s protocol (2005) requires that customers create pseudo-identifiers for their transactions 
which becomes a bottleneck. 
3. Zhang’s protocol (2006) has too many messages (11 messages across 6 different phases) 
which makes it very cumbersome. 
4. Zhang’s protocol (2006) also assumes that a commit buffer is held by the TTP and does not 
take into consideration what would happen if the buffer is unavailable.  




6. Zhang’s protocol (2003) does not provide complete anonymity as it requires the customers to 
disclose his/her public key  during the transaction which might lead to the merchant collecting 
details such as customer preferences. 
The six gaps mentioned above in the literature are overcome by the current protocol. The 
novelty of the protocol lies in the fact that it provides anonymity and fairness like the other 
protocols (Ray, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2003) and also ensures that it overcomes those 
gaps/drawbacks mentioned above thus ensuring that the protocol is robust and efficient.  
 
3.12 Summary 
This chapter has discussed e-commerce in detail; it has addressed the advantages, 
disadvantages and restrictions of e-commerce, fair exchange, types of fair exchange protocols 
(along with a detailed analysis of different fair exchange protocols, highlighting the pros and 
cons of each), anonymity, electronic cash and the means to achieve anonymity. It discussed the 
issue of trust and how trust plays a key role in e-commerce transactions. It also described how 
this trust can be established in e-commerce. It detailed payment gateway systems and described 
how transactions and payments are processed as well as emphasising the importance of 
security. It discussed the legal and regulatory aspects of e-commerce, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and the role of Trusted Third Parties. It identified gaps in the literature, justifying 





CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give a broad overview and to detail key definitions for the various 
cryptographic concepts and mechanisms that form the basis of the proposed protocol. It 
includes all the key assumptions that the proposed protocol is based upon. The idea of this 
chapter is to enable the reader to familiarise himself/herself with the main ideas, techniques 
and methods that are being used.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Introduce the reader to the various key terminologies, concepts and cryptographic 
mechanisms that are being used throughout the research. 
 Understand various technologies, algorithms and other cryptographic principles and 
primitives. 





4 Concept and Assumptions 
The aim of this chapter is to present all the cryptographic concepts that are to be used in the 
proposed protocol and also to present the key assumptions made in the protocol. 
Though this research is not on cryptographic methods, cryptography plays a key role in the 
security and provision of anonymity and fair exchange. Hence, it is essential for the reader to 
understand the underlying concepts and this chapter thus provides a background into the key 
concepts that are being used in the protocol. It discusses in detail the different types of 
cryptography and proceeds to explain RSA, hashing and Certificate Authority, and then discusses 
the assumptions upon which the proposed protocol is based.  
4.1 Types of Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of locking up information (usually on a personal computer) so that 
only authorized people can access it (Kirkby, 2001). There are two different types of 
cryptography: these are Symmetric Key Cryptography and Public Key Cryptography (commonly 
known as Public Key Infrastructure or PKI). 
4.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Symmetric Key Cryptography as described by the author (Kirkby, 2001) refers, in the simplest 
terms, to making use of the same key for both encryption and decryption; the key that is used in 
the process is referred to as a Symmetric Key. The key that is used here for encryption and 
decryption needs to be distributed prior to the communication over a secure channel or 
medium.  
Encryption is defined as, “The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic 
algorithm and key.” Ciphertext refers to the text in encrypted form (Kirkby, 2001).  
Decryption is defined as, “The process of changing ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic 
algorithm and a key” (E Barker et al., 2012). 
A key in cryptography refers to a secret (similar to a password) that is used to encrypt and 
decrypt messages (G Wooledge, 2011). 
 
 72 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines key as, “A parameter used in 
conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an 
entity with knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without 
knowledge of the key cannot. Examples of cryptographic operations requiring the use of 
cryptographic keys include: The transformation of plaintext data into ciphertext data, the 
transformation of ciphertext data into plaintext data, the computation of a digital signature 
from data, the verification of a digital signature, the computation of an authentication code from 
data,  the verification of an authentication code from data and a received authentication code, 
the computation of a shared secret that is used to derive keying material and the derivation of 
additional keying material from a key-derivation key (i.e., a pre-shared key).” (E Barker, 2012) 
As described by GC Kessler (2013), in this type of cryptography, the key is known both to the 
sender and the receiver; that, in fact, is the secret. The author also discusses the biggest 
difficulty with this approach, which is the distribution of the key. There are two categories of 
secret-key cryptography schemes; these could either be stream ciphers or block ciphers. Stream 
ciphers are those ciphers that operate on a single bit (byte or computer word) at a time, and 
that implement some form of feedback mechanism so that the key is constantly changing. A 
block cipher is a form of cipher whereby one block of data is encrypted at a time using the same 
key on each block. In general, the same plaintext block will always encrypt to the same 
ciphertext when using the same key in a block cipher, whereas the same plaintext will encrypt to 
different ciphertext in a stream cipher. 
4.1.2 Public Key Cryptography 
Public Key Cryptography (PKI), as defined by G Wooledge (2011), refers to cryptography where 
one key is used to encrypt, and a matching key is used to decrypt. These two keys together are 
called a key pair. One of these keys is called the secret key or private key, and should be kept 
secure. The other is called the public key and should be given out to everybody who would want 
to participate in the communication or transaction (G Wooledge, 2011).  
Another author (Schneier, 1996) describes how the concept of Public Key Cryptography is based 
on the mathematical principle that the two keys (the private and the public key) are related.  
There are various cryptographic encryption techniques that make use of Public Key 
Cryptography. The most commonly used are the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, ElGamal and RSA. In a 
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public key encryption, the sender encrypts the message using the pubic key, and the receiver of 
the message decrypts the message using the private key.  
Modern Public Key Cryptography as a concept was first described by Stanford University 
professor Martin Hellman and graduate student Whitfield Diffie in 1976. It is based on the 
mathematical concept of one-way functions, whereby it is easy to compute but inversing is 
nearly impossible (GC Kessler, 2013). Public key cryptography is depicted in the image below 
(Figure 4.15) 
 
Figure 4.15: Different types of cryptography (Figure source: GC Kessler, 2013) 
 
4.1.2.1 RSA 
RSA is a public key cryptography system that is named after the three mathematicians who 
developed it, namely Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. It is one of the most 
popular PKI encryption systems being used today. It is used for various purposes, namely key 
exchange, digital signatures or encrypting small blocks of texts, and is used in over hundreds of 
software products. The public key is known to anybody and the private key is only known to the 
party that owns it. It uses variable-sized encryption blocks and the size of the encryption key is 
also variable. RSA works as mentioned below: 
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A large number n, which is a product of two prime numbers p and q, is generated. n = p*q, 
where both p and q are prime. The next step is to calculate Ø (n). This is done using the formula 
Ø(n) = (p-1)*(q-1). The third step is to select an integer e whereby the following condition is 
satisfied: 1<e< Ø(n) and e is relatively prime to Ø(n). The fourth step of the RSA algorithm 
calculates d using the formula d = e-1 mod Ø(n). Now all the variables are calculated.  
 
The next steps determine the private key and the public key for the RSA algorithm.  
1. The public key is (e,n).  
2. The private key is (d,n). 
Now that the keys are generated, the message to be encrypted (M) is taken and the size of the 
message is determined. If the size of M is greater than n (which is the product of two primes p 
and q), then the message is broken down into smaller blocks, where each block is less than n.  
Encryption is done using the following: 
C = Me (mod n) 
To decrypt the message or the block, the following is used: 
M = Cd (mod n) 
(Rivest, Shamir & Adleman, 1978) 
RSA is believed to be highly secure as the key-pair is derived from a very large number n, which 
is a product of two large prime numbers p and q. As a rule, these prime numbers have 100 or 
more digits and therefore the product of these would yield twice as many digits as the prime 
factors. The public key contains n but it is very difficult for the attacker to compute the prime 
factors p and q. Hence, the private key remains safe and becomes almost impossible to obtain 
just from n. The success of RSA is based on this fact that it is virtually impossible to compute the 
factors and is hence secure. Given the ability of computers to process the factors of large 
numbers, the attacker is now able to find out the prime factors of numbers with more than 200 
digits. However, it is still difficult to find out the prime factors of two large numbers that have 
the same size; it takes a while to compute the prime factors as there is currently no known 
factorization algorithm that can compute the factors within a reasonable amount of time. Time 
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is a critical factor here, as most messages need to be secure only for a reasonably short period of 
time, for example, during message transit (GC Kessler, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4.16: RSA public key encryption 
Figure Source: RSA Encryption and Decryption (Bill’s Design, 2013) 
 
4.2. Hashing 
Hash functions use the mathematical concept of irreversibility to encrypt a message. It takes a 
variable length input and delivers a fixed length output, which makes it mathematically 
impossible to determine the plaintext from the ciphertext (or even the length of the plaintext). 
Hash functions, also called message digests and one-way encryption, are algorithms that, in 
cryptographic terms, do not use a key. The main uses of hash include the provision of digital 
fingerprinting for a file’s contents or for a message (to ensure that the message or the file has 
not been modified). Most operating systems and certain web-based systems make use of a hash 
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to encrypt passwords, storing the hash in the database rather than the password itself; this 
helps achieve integrity.  
Many different hash algorithms are being widely used today. Some of the most common 
algorithms are message digest, MD2, MD4 and MD5.  
Message Digest: commonly referred to as MD. This algorithm provides a hash output of 128 bit 
length from any arbitrary length of plaintext message. 
MD2: this is mainly used in systems that have very limited capacity in terms of memory, such as 
smart cards.  
MD4: very similar to MD2, this was developed by Rivest, one of the developers of the RSA 
algorithm. This is specifically used in fast processing software solutions and technologies that are 
time critical. 
MD5: again, developed by Rivest, this was originally designed to ensure that the weaknesses of 
MD4 were resolved. Much slower than MD4. 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA): this produces a hash output of 160 bits. It is an algorithm for 
NIST’s Secure Hash Standard (SHS). (G Wooledge, 2011) 
 
4.3 Certificate Authority 
In simple terms, a Certificate Authority (CA) can be defined as a server or a trusted organisation 
whose main responsibility is to issue and maintain certificates. A certificate in cryptography 
refers to a mechanism that binds or puts together the public key and all other related 
components in order to uniquely identify the identity of the person who claims to be the owner. 
In an e-commerce environment, the parties do not trust each other. A CA thus helps to verify 
the identity of a person or organisation and issues a certificate to that effect. A CA does this by 
binding the public key to the individual’s identity. This in turn implies that the CA takes the 
liability for the individual’s identity.  
A Certificate Authority (CA) in short is thus responsible for creating, handling and revoking 
certificates (where necessary). When a certificate is revoked by the CA, it is securely stored in a 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), which is updated periodically. The standard for the CA to create 
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and issue certificates is described by X.509, which describes the different components or fields 




Figure 4.17: Establishing trust between two parties by a Certificate Authority (CA) 
Figure Source: S Harris, 2010 
 
4.4 Digital Signatures 
In a traditional commerce environment, where two parties meet face-to-face, an offer and 
acceptance can be proved when both parties physically sign a contract. However, in an e-
commerce world, where the parties do not see each other, a digital signature is used.  
A digital signature is obtained by combining a user signing a hash value with the private key; this 
assists in the provision of authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Digital signatures are 
used to replace passwords in many systems that require a stronger form of authentication. 
Many algorithms are used for digitally signing documents or messages. The most commonly 
used algorithms are RSA, El Gamal and DSA.  
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A digital signature can be defined as, “An electronic signature based upon the cryptographic 
methods of originator authentication, computed by using a set of rules and a set of parameters 
such that the identity of the signer and the integrity of the data can be verified.” The act of 
encrypting this hash value with a private key is called digitally signing a message (S Harris, 2010). 
Digital signatures are created in accordance with the Digital Signature Standards (DSS) issued by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST describes the uses of digital 
signatures as follows: Digital signatures are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data 
and to authenticate the identity of the signatory. In addition, the recipient of signed data can use 
a digital signature as evidence in demonstrating to a third party that the signature was, in fact, 
generated by the claimed signatory. This is known as non-repudiation, since the signatory cannot 
easily repudiate the signature at a later time.(NIST, 2013) 
To encrypt a message, the sender uses the private key and the receiver uses the public key to 
verify the identity of the sender, as only the sender will have the private key.  
4.5 Notations and Participants - Proposed Protocol 
This section of the document aims at describing the key participants or entities in the proposed 
e-commerce protocol and how these participants are denoted. It also gives a brief description of 
the role each participant plays in the proposed e-commerce protocol. 
1. Merchant: Merchants are entities (individual or corporate) that have digital products to 
sell. This entity has the authorisation to advertise its intention to sell such goods online 
from the producer of the online products. Merchants, in return for sale of the digital 
products, take cash (in the form of electronic cash) from the customer, which is then 
redeemed at the Merchant’s bank. In the protocol, Merchant is represented by the 
letter M. 
2. Customer: Customers are entities (individual or corporate) that require digital products 
sold by the merchant. Customers verify the authenticity of the products using a TTP and 
purchase the online product in exchange for electronic cash that is withdrawn from the 
Bank. Where the transaction has not been carried out as required, the Customer can 
initiate arbitration process. In the protocol, Customer is represented by the letter C. 
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3. Bank: Banks help withdrawal and redemption of electronic cash to the Merchant and 
Customer. The Bank is also responsible for verifying details when requested by the TTP. 
In the protocol, Bank is represented by the letter B. 
4. Trusted Third Party: Refers to an individual or corporate that helps in mediating the e-
commerce transaction. It is an entity trusted by both the Customer and the Merchant. In 
the protocol, it is represented as TTP. 
5. Certificate Authority: Refers to an individual or corporate that is responsible for issuing, 
verifying and revoking certificates and is represented in the protocol as CA. 
6. Producer: Producers are entities (individual or corporate) that create and own digital 
contents and have the digital copyrights over the products. The Producer gives 
permission to the Merchants to sell these products online to customers. In the protocol, 
Producer is represented by the letter P. 
4.5.1 Protocol Assumptions 
The proposed e-commerce protocol assumes the following, and aims at achieving fair exchange 
and customer anonymity. First and foremost, the protocol assumes that a secure 
communication channel has already been established and will continue to remain secure 
throughout the e-commerce transaction; hence it does not deal with Transport Layer Security. 
Secondly, the protocol does not dictate who the Trusted Third Party should be; it assumes that 
the Customer and Merchant have mutually agreed on who the TTP would be, and hence, is not 
involved in the selection process. 
The other assumptions include: 
1. The Trusted Third Party (TTP) is semi-trusted, and hence, is used only to validate the 
authenticity of the Merchant to the Customer and vice-versa. Therefore, TTP is used 
heavily in the initial stages while trust is being established. This assumption acts as a 
building block to develop a protocol that will break through this weakness of the nature 
of the TTP.  
2. The TTP cannot read or modify messages sent. 
3. The TTP will not collude with any other party. 
4. All parties involved in the protocol will behave rationally. 
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5. The protocol avoids any replay attacks by making use of a cryptographic mechanism, 
such as a digital signature and time-stamped messages. Time stamps can also be used in 
cases of dispute resolution. 
6. The protocol also assumes that a resilient connection is present between all parties 
involved, namely, the Customer, Merchant and the TTP. This means that all messages 
sent are relayed appropriately to the appropriate recipients.  
7. With regard to payment, the protocol makes use of digital cash and any double 
payments are dealt with and refunded to the customer by the appropriate payment 
authority. 
8. The protocol also assumes that all the transacting parties make use of the same 
cryptographic mechanisms for all purposes including encryption, decryption, signing 
messages and hashing. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has given the reader an overview of the key terms, assumptions and cryptographic 
principles and mechanisms that are to be used in the proposed protocol. This chapter has thus 
acted as a prelude to the ‘proposed protocol’ chapter in so far as the reader has gained an idea 
about the various methods and algorithms that are being used and is now also aware of how 
each cryptographic primitive is used to achieve certain specific security goals.   
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CHAPTER 5: IMPOSING ANONYMITY AND 
FAIRNESS PROTOCOL 
 
This is the key chapter of the research. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the 
proposed protocol, namely, ‘Imposing anonymity and fairness’. It provides a brief about the 
actual research problem, the central research question and the gaps in the current research 
environment as well as the need for designing a new protocol. It then discusses the protocol 
steps in detail, categorising each step into a specific e-commerce phase. It clearly describes how 
this protocol helps overcome the current gaps in research and literature. Additionally, it 
performs a scenario analysis that is used to prove that the protocol is effective. This is achieved 
by taking into account the various possible scenarios and determining how the protocol works, 
as well as assessing whether the protocol achieves its aims in each of the scenario specified.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Introduce the reader to the proposed protocol and describe the steps of the protocol in 
detail. 
 Understand how various steps of the protocol could be classified under different e-
commerce phases. 
 Understand the performance of the protocol and check that it satisfies all the conditions 




5 Imposing Fairness and Anonymity Protocol 
The primary aim of this chapter is to discuss the underlying mechanisms of the protocol and to 
detail the techniques used in the protocol. It also aims at analysing and discussing in detail the 
actual protocol. 
The chapter begins with the approach the protocol takes and the underlying evolutionary 
concept of the protocol, followed by a detailed explanation of the Imposing Fairness & 
Anonymity (IFA) protocol through a discussion and analysis to check that the protocol satisfies 
the criteria of fair exchange and anonymity.  
 
5.1 Research Problem and Requirements 
The main objective of this research is to propose an efficient and effective protocol for e-
commerce transactions that provide both anonymity and fair exchange. The protocol is based on 
three other protocols that provide the same features, namely, Ray et al.’s anonymous and 
failure resilient fair-exchange e-commerce protocol, Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol 
and Zhang et al.’s Efficient Protocol for Anonymous and Fair Exchange. Although these protocols 
have achieved both the above-mentioned characteristics of anonymity and fair exchange, 
inherent problems related to these protocols remain, as discussed in earlier chapters. The 
protocol also makes use of an online Trusted Third Party (TTP) to mediate between the 
transacting parties and for any dispute resolution purposes. In addition, it is aimed at providing 
fair exchange throughout all phases of an e-commerce transaction. The proposed protocol has 
the following success criteria: 
1. Fair Exchange: The key goal is to ensure true fair exchange where either both the parties 
or none of the parties receives the goods at the end of the transaction. This ensures that 
honest parties are not being punished for the deeds of the dishonest party. 
2. Anonymity: Using the blind signature concept, the protocol ensures that the customers’ 
identities are kept secret, thus providing privacy. This is achieved by using the concept 
of blind cash (Chaum, 1990). 
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3. Trusted Third Party (TTP): The protocol ensures that the TTP which is partially trusted or 
semi-trusted does not have the ability to masquerade as another party or to alter or 
read messages in any way.  
4. Single Payment Token: The efficiency of the protocol is increased as the payment is 
made by using a single token rather than multiple tokens with the same denomination.  
5. Simplicity: The protocol makes use of symmetric key cryptography wherever possible, 
for example, encryption and decryption of messages to ensure that it is simple; it also 
reduces any computational bottlenecks and key management overheads. 
 
5.2 Protocol Process 
This section of the document aims at providing a gist of the steps involved in the protocol. In 
summary, the following are the key stages in the proposed protocol, which describe the 
messages sent between all parties involved in the protocol process. 
Step 1: The Merchant obtains approval to sell the digital contents from the Producer (P), who 
owns the digital copyrights for the product. 
Step 2: The Merchant, on receiving acknowledgement from the Producer to sell the products, 
proceeds to obtain verification of the digital contents through the Certificate Authority (CA). The 
CA verifies the identity of the merchant and issues a certificate that is digitally signed. The 
certificate issued by the Certificate Authority is of the standard X.509 format.  
Step 3: The Merchant uploads the product details online to his website to attract potential 
customers. Along with the product details, the merchant also uploads the certificate received by 
the CA to help enhance the perception of trust. 
Step 4: The interested Customer now views the product and verifies the digital signature to 
ensure the authenticity of the merchant.  
Step 5: The Customer withdraws cash (electronic cash) from the bank. 
Step 6: The Bank issues the electronic cash to the Customer. 
Step 7: The Customer, after viewing the digital products available for purchase, contacts the 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) with a hashed, time-stamped and encrypted Electronic Cash. It is 
encrypted to ensure that the TTP cannot read it, time-stamped to avoid any replay attacks and 
hashed to protect the integrity of the file, avoiding any file tampering. 
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Step 8: The TTP verifies the hash and now sends the same to the Merchant. This allows the 
Merchant to trust that the Customer is indeed genuine and will definitely pay on receipt of 
products being delivered. 
Step 9: The Merchant now contacts the TTP with the hashed, time-stamped and encrypted 
digital product. The product is encrypted to avoid any misuse by intruders or the TTP and is 
hashed to be able to be verified if tampered with. 
Step 10: The TTP now verifies this and sends the same to the Customer.  
Step 11: Merchant and the Customer now directly send each other the hash to verify. 
Step 12: Each party verifies the hash individually and exchanges private keys. 
Step 13: The Merchant requests the TTP to send the electronic cash that the customer sent 
previously. 
Step 14: The TTP sends the encrypted cash to the Merchant who then decrypts the same using 
the key exchanged in Step 12. 
Step 15: The Customer requests the TTP to send the digital product sent by the Merchant. 
Step 16: The TTP sends the encrypted product to the customer who then decrypts it using the 
keys exchanged in Step 12. 


























1. The Merchant (M), obtains permission to sell the digital contents from the Producer (P). 
2 The Merchant contacts the Certificate Authority (CA) to obtain a certificate for the electronic 
identity. The Merchant then uploads the product details online for potential customers to 
browse and buy. 
3. The Customer withdraws cash (electronic cash) from the Bank. 
4. The Bank (B) issues the requested cash to the customer.  















5b. When the decision to purchase is made, the Customer contacts the Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
with a hashed, time-stamped and encrypted electronic cash transfer.  
6a. The TTP verifies the hash of the encrypted cash with Customer's bank. 
6b. Once verified, the TTP indicates the Customer's interest to the Merchant and sends the 
encrypted electronic cash. 
7. The Merchant replies to the TTP with a hashed, time-stamped and  


















(Steps 11 -17 of the protocol) 
8a. The TTP verifies the hash of the encrypted digital product with the Producer (P). 
   
8b.Once verified, the TTP sends the encrypted digital product to the Customer. 
9. The Merchant and the Customer exchange the hash value for the digital product/electronic 
cash for verification and the decryption information (key). 
10a. Once the transaction is completed, the Merchant sends a request to the Bank to  
redeem the electronic cash from the Customer. 
10b. The Bank credits the Merchant’s account with the cash. 
Fig 5.18:  Imposing Fairness Protocol 
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5.2.1 Protocol Stages 
The steps described above gives a gist of the proposed protocol. This section is aimed at 
providing a detailed analysis of the individual stages of the e-commerce transaction.   
The protocol covers five different stages of the standard e-commerce phases; these are:   
1. Pre-Negotiation Phase 
2. Negotiation Phase 
3. Withdrawal Phase 
4. Purchase Phase  
5. Arbitration Phase  
5.2.1.1 Pre-negotiation phase 
This phase of the e-commerce transaction, as discussed in previous chapters, is the first phase in 
any e-commerce transaction. This phase deals specifically with gathering data, identifying needs 
of customers, identifying key suppliers, determining the trustworthiness of the suppliers etc.  
In the proposed protocol, the first three steps form the pre-negotiation phase. In these steps, 
the Merchant identifies the potential supplier, acquires permission to sell the digital product 
online, and obtains a digital certificate from the Certificate Authority to improve the perception 
of trust in the potential customers.   
 
Fig 5.19: Pre-Negotiation Phase of Imposing fairness protocol 
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5.2.1.2 Negotiation phase 
During this phase, the actual formal relationship is being established. The potential customer 
views the product, along with any attached terms and conditions and attempts to understand 
the legality of the contract. This phase is when the customer shows interest in buying the 
product and negotiations happen between the merchant and the customer.  
In the proposed protocol, steps 3 and 4 falls under the category of negotiation phase. This is 
where the merchant shows interest in selling the digital products by uploading the products to 
the online website and where the customer views the product of interest and can also verify the 
merchant’s digital certificate with the Certificate Authority (CA). Any questions that the 
customer has regarding the product are also answered in this stage.  
 
 
Fig 5.20: Negotiating phase of the Imposing Fairness Protocol 
 
5.2.1.3 Withdrawal phase 
This phase of the e-commerce transaction describes areas which concern withdrawal of cash for 
the purposes of purchasing electronic products from the merchant. It is a phase where the 
customer requests his/her bank to issue electronic cash and where the banker then checks the 
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customer’s account to ensure that he/she has sufficient funds in the account. Once the banker is 
certain of the funds in the account, electronic cash is then issued to the customer. Steps 5 and 6 
of the proposed protocol deal with the withdrawal phase. 
The customer has now identified the digital product of interest and has verified the costs with 
the merchant. The customer has also reviewed the Terms and Conditions attached to the 
contract and is also satisfied with the trustworthiness of the merchant. The customer now wants 
to make a purchase and requires cash. Therefore, the customer requests the bank to withdraw 
electronic cash and the bank approves the request, based on the satisfactory funds available in 
the account of the customer. 
 
Fig 5.21: Withdrawal phase of the Imposing Fairness Protocol 
 
5.2.1.4 Purchase phase & Arbitration phase 
This phase of the e-commerce transaction describes the actual purchase of electronic goods. 
This is where the offer made is accepted. Acceptance shows the willingness of both the 
transacting parties to deliver the product and pay the money as stated in the contract. If for any 
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reason, either of the parties is not satisfied, the contract could be re-negotiated or the parties 
are free to withdraw.  
The arbitration phase involves interference from a trusted, unbiased party (TTP in the case of 
this protocol) to resolve any issues relating to distrust or issues that might occur when either of 
the transacting parties behave in an untrustworthy manner. Dispute resolution could also be 
involved. 
This protocol has an overlapping purchase and arbitration phase, as it involves the TTP entirely 
once the customer has decided to make the purchase. Hence, from the 7th step onwards, the 
protocol covers the purchase and arbitration phases; thus, the arbitration phase arises every 
time the TTP is involved and the actual purchase phase occurs when the electronic cash is 
delivered to the merchant and the digital product is delivered to the customer.  
After the digital product and electronic cash are delivered to the appropriate parties, disputes 
may still arise. In such cases, records from the TTP can be used to effectively resolve the issues. 
This protocol, however, does not describe the process to be used for dispute resolution. 
 




5.3 Protocol Analysis 
The aim of this section is to analyse the proposed protocol in order to be able to identify any 
flaws in the protocol and to be able to justify the properties that the protocol aims at achieving. 
This section not only aims at identifying the gaps in the protocol but also assesses whether or 
not the proposed protocol is able to overcome the drawbacks mentioned in the other protocols 
discussed earlier. It also identifies areas where disputes may arise and how the protocol enables 
the transacting parties to resolve these conflicts. 
In addition, this section details the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed protocol through 
comparison with other protocols, and concludes with a detailed analysis of dishonesty detection 
in this protocol.  
5.3.1 Fair Exchange 
One of the desirable key properties that the proposed protocol aims at providing is fair 
exchange. This section aims at analysing in detail this property of the protocol. The Bank (B) is 
entirely trustworthy as is the Certificate Authority (CA). The Trusted Third Party (TTP) is semi-
trusted as it is capable of masquerading. The other two parties, namely, the Customer (C) and 
the Merchant (M) are very much capable of misbehaving and being dishonest. This section 
shows a case-by-case scenario of all the possible actions that are considered dishonest.  The 
following scenarios give a more detailed analysis that help identify dishonesty amongst the 
participants. 
Scenario 1:  The Merchant sends a different price to the Customer. This inconsistency would be 
easily detected by the Customer when the Customer checks the product price received to the 
original product price when he/she was browsing the Merchant’s website.  
Scenario 2:  The Merchant sends a different product to the Customer. This inconsistency is again 
easily detected by the Customer when he/she checks the hash of the message. 
Scenario 3:  The Merchant tries to redeem cash from the Bank before sending the digital 
product. This is not possible, as the Customer would not exchange the decryption key for the 




Scenario 4: The Customer sends no cash. This is identified as the decryption key for the digital 
product sent by the Merchant would not be exchanged with the customer to enable decryption 
of the message and usage of the product. 
Scenario 5: The Customer sends wrong amount. This inconsistency is identified by the Merchant 
when he checks with the Bank to verify the funds of the Customer. 
Scenario 6: The Trusted Third Party (TTP) modifies the message sent by the Merchant. This is 
easily identified by the Customer as the hash of the message would not match. 
Scenario 7: The TTP modifies the message sent by the Customer. This is easily identified by the 
Merchant as the hash of the message would not match. 
Scenario 8: The TTP does not forward the digital product to the Customer or the electronic cash 
to the Merchant. This is rendered useless as the Customer and the Merchant (M) exchange the 
decryption keys in private without the involvement of the TTP. Without the key, the TTP cannot 
do anything with these messages.  
Scenario 9: The Customer, after sending the electronic cash but before receiving the digital 
product, decides to withdraw from the transaction. This is managed easily as the Customer can 
refrain from exchanging the decryption key with the Merchant. Without the decryption key the 
electronic cash sent would be rendered useless.  
Scenario 10: The Merchant, for some reason, after sending the digital product to the TTP but 
before receiving the electronic cash, decides not to proceed with the transaction. This again is 
easily managed as the Merchant can refrain from exchanging the decryption key with the 
Customer. Without the decryption key, the Customer cannot access or make use of the digital 
product.  
5.3.2 Anonymity  
Another of the protocol’s key features is the provision of customer anonymity. This property is 
achieved by two means: 
1. Usage of anonymous electronic channels 
2. Usage of anonymous electronic cash 
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In the protocol, during the second phase (the negotiation phase), the Merchant and the Trusted 
Third Party (TTP) are not aware of the true identity of the Customer, as the Customer does not 
share this. 
In the next phase (the withdrawal phase), only the Bank (B) is aware of the Customer’s true 
identity as the Customer would have shared this information with the Bank earlier. However, 
this does not compromise the anonymity of the Customer as the Bank cannot communicate the 
real identity of the Customer in any other phase to any other parties involved due the usage of 
the Blind Signature concept.  
Similarly, in the purchase phase, no other participant including the TTP is aware of the 
Customer’s identity, as the Customer does not share any of his/her personal details. 
Furthermore, since anonymous electronic cash is used for the transaction, it is impossible to 
trace the Customer’s true identity. 
In the arbitration phase again, the Customer does not share any details regarding his/her true 
identity, and hence, no other party involved would be able to identify the true identity of the 
Customer. 
Thus, under all circumstances, no other participant, other than the Customer him/herself would 
be able to find out the true identity of the Customer. From the above it is clear that the 
Customer’s identity is protected during all phases of the e-commerce transaction; thus, the 
proposed protocol provides complete anonymity to the Customer.  
5.3.3 Payment Security 
One of the other key features that the protocol assures is security of payment. As in traditional 
commerce, a threat also exists to the security of payments in e-commerce.  However, unlike in 
traditional commerce, payment security has additional challenges that are very different. 
Key researchers in the area of payment security have identified two key challenges (Xue et al., 
2005; D Chaum, 1983; Lin et al., 2006). These key factors are: 
1. Prevention of forging electronic cash 
2. Double-Spending of electronic cash 
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This section of the document aims at highlighting various scenarios where the transacting 
parties attempt to either double-spend the electronic cash or forge electronic cash,  describing 
in detail what happens when such attempts are made.  
Scenario 1: The Customer tries to forge the electronic cash to gain illegal benefits from the Bank. 
Argument: This is not possible. In order to generate electronic cash (or forge it), the Bank’s 
signature is required. For obtaining the signature of the Bank, it is necessary for the Customer to 
know the Bank’s private key. Therefore, if the Customer attempts to forge other values of 
electronic cash, the Bank would be able to easily identify the anomaly.  
Scenario 2: The Merchant tries to modify the electronic cash received from the Customer before 
sending it to the Bank in order to gain a benefit that he/she is not legally entitled to gain. 
Argument:  This is not possible. In order to make modifications to the electronic cash (or forge 
it), it is necessary that the Merchant has the Bank’s signature. To forge the electronic signature 
itself, it is necessary for the Merchant to have knowledge of the Bank’s private key that would 
be used for signing the electronic cash it generates. Since this is the Bank’s private key, the 
Merchant would never be able to gain access to this. Hence, any attempt made by the Merchant 
to forge the value of the electronic cash would be easily identified by the Bank.  
Scenario 3: The Customer tries to use spent electronic cash (electronic cash that has been spent 
on an earlier transaction or purchase) to buy a digital product from the Merchant. 
Argument:  This again is not possible. Every time the Customer spends electronic cash, the Bank 
enters the details of the spent cash in its database. Thus, when the Customer sends electronic 
cash, the Bank  decrypts the message and compares the kept cash with the spent cash; 
therefore, if the sent message is already stored in the spent cash database, the Bank can easily 
identify the anomaly.  
From the above scenarios, it can be clearly understood that neither of the transacting parties, 
namely, the Customer and the Merchant, can forge the electronic cash. It can thus be said that 
the protocol offers good payment security. 
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5.3.4 Dispute Resolution 
After the completion of an e-commerce transaction, as in a traditional commerce transaction, 
there might be disputes that require resolution. Unlike in traditional commerce, however, the 
disputes are varied in nature and the handling of disputes and their resolution is quite different 
in an e-commerce scenario.  
With specific reference to the proposed Imposing Fairness and Anonymity protocol, after the 
completion of the transaction between the Merchant and Customer, there are four different 
scenarios that are likely to occur from the point of view of the Customer. These scenarios are as 
follows: 
1. Customer received the correct digital products that he/she ordered 
2. Customer did not receive the correct digital products 
3. Customer received the correct digital products but the product(s) were defective or not 
according to the specifications 
4. Customer did not receive the product at all 
The protocol aims at achieving the first output, the most desired outcome of the protocol, which 
is smooth facilitation of the transaction and guaranteeing fair exchange. Similarly, from the 
point of view of the Merchant, there are three key outcomes that are the most likely to occur. 
These outcomes are as follows: 
1. The Merchant received the correct payment for the digital product(s) sold. 
2. The Merchant received an incorrect payment for the digital product(s) sold. 
3. The Merchant did not receive the payment for the digital product(s) sold.  
Again, the protocol aims at achieving the first outcome, as that is the most desired. If however, 
for any reason, the second or the third output occurs, then there is a dispute. Incorrect product 
refers to the digital product that was not requested by the Customer or more specifically a 
product that does not match the product description given by the Merchant. Similarly, incorrect 
payment refers to the sum of money that does not match the Merchant’s price mentioned or 
more specifically payment that is not exactly what the Merchant advertised and requested.  In 
such cases, dispute resolution plays a major role in identifying the cause of the dispute, and 
provides a means to resolve the issue. 
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The aim of this sub-section is to discuss in detail the various possibilities that might arise at the 
end of the e-commerce transaction and describes scenarios where there might be issues or 
disputes. The protocol, however, does not involve or discuss about the mechanism that needs to 
be used or the steps to be followed when there is a dispute. It is assumed that the aggrieved 
party in the transaction will take appropriate measures in order to be indemnified.  
Customer (C) Merchant (M) Honest? Outcome 
Receives the correct 
product 











Dispute raised by the 
Merchant 
Receives the correct 
product 





















Dispute raised either 








Dispute raised either 
by the Customer or 
the Merchant 
Receives correct 





Dispute raised by the 
Customer 
Receives correct 





Dispute raised either 
by the Customer or 
the Merchant 
Receives correct 
product but defective 




Dispute raised either 
by the Customer or 
the Merchant 
Table 5.3: Dispute Scenario based on product and payment 
From the above table(Table 5.3) it can be seen that there are twelve possibilities where a 
dispute might arise. It can be noted that if both the parties (the Customer and the Merchant) 
receive the end products, then there is no cause for dispute.  
Similarly, during the e-commerce transaction, there are various possibilities where disputes 
might occur. The following sub-chapter identifies the possibilities where the transacting parties 
might be dishonest and describes the scenarios that might lead to a dispute. 
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5.3.5 Detection of Dishonesty 
For the protocol to be able to implement fair exchange, it is pivotal that the protocol is able to 
identify dishonest behaviour. It is very important that the protocol enables either of the 
transacting parties to detect any kind of abnormal behaviour that is being displayed by the 
other. The Customer can act in a dishonest manner by doing any of the following: 
1. Sending an incorrect payment 
2. Making a payment that is encrypted with a different key than the one exchanged with 
the Merchant  
3. Using an invalid signature on the payment 
When the Merchant receives the payment details from the TTP, he/she will check the signature 
on the payment along with the encryption key. If the encryption key is different to the one that 
is being exchanged, the Customer’s dishonesty is clearly identified.  
Similarly, the Merchant can act in a dishonest manner by doing the following: 
1. Sending incorrect product 
2. Encrypting the product with a different key than the one exchanged with the Customer  
3. Using an invalid signature on the product 
Similarly, when the Customer receives the product details from the TTP, he/she will check the 
signature on the product along with the encryption key. If the encryption key is different to the 
one that’s being exchanged, the Merchant’s dishonesty is clearly identified. 
In worst case scenarios, there is also a possibility that the TTP acts as an intruder and 
masquerades. The TTP can also in some cases modify the messages sent to the Customer and/or 
the Merchant. The dishonesty that could be detected by the protocol is as follows:  
1. Modifying message 
2. Replaying the stored message 
3. Not sending the product and/or the cash to the designated party 
If the message is modified by the TTP, the hash value of the message changes and hence the 
Customer or the Merchant can easily detect the interception, as the messages are time-
stamped, and hence, it is easy to check the time when the message was originally sent; 
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therefore, either party can easily detect any dishonesty in the Trusted Third Party and reject the 
messages if the time frame has elapsed. The TTP can sometimes act dishonestly by not sending 
the products or the cash to the appropriate, designated party. In this case, it will not be of any 
use, as the Merchant and the Customer alone have the decryption key that they have shared in 
private. Hence, even though the TTP has the product/cash, it would be of no use, as the TTP 
cannot decrypt the same without the shared key. 
If either the Customer or the Merchant does not send the product/cash, the protocol 
automatically terminates as these are sent to the TTP, which only sends the cash to the 
Merchant and product to the Customer on receipt of both items. Hence, the TTP will not be 
disadvantaged by having sent the product and/or cash.  
The four possibilities for the Merchant with reference to the product and encryption key are: 
1. Merchant sends the correct product and the correct encryption key. This is the perfect 
situation and proves that the Merchant is honest. 
2. Merchant sends the correct digital product but the wrong decryption key. This implies 
that the Merchant is dishonest. 
3. Merchant sends the incorrect digital product (faulty or wrong product) and the incorrect 
decryption key. This again shows that the Merchant is dishonest. 
4. The Merchant sends the wrong digital product and the correct decryption key, which 
indicates that the Merchant is dishonest. 
 
Table 5.4 below explains the possibilities for the Merchant. 
Digital Product Decryption Key Result 
√ √ Honest 
√ X Dishonest 
X X Dishonest 
X √ Dishonest 




With reference to the encryption key and cash, there are again four different possibilities that 
exist for the Customer with specific reference to electronic cash and hash value. These are:  
1. Customer sends the correct cash and the right encryption key. This is the perfect 
situation and proves that the Customer is honest. 
2. Customer sends the correct electronic cash but the wrong decryption key. This implies 
that the Customer is dishonest. 
3. Customer sends the incorrect electronic cash (wrong amount) and the incorrect 
decryption key. This again shows that the Customer is dishonest. 
4. Customer sends the wrong electronic cash and the correct decryption key, which 
indicates that the Customer is dishonest. 
Table 5.5 below explains the possibilities for the Customer. 
Electronic Cash Decryption Key Result 
√ √ Honest 
√ X Dishonest 
X X Dishonest 
X √ Dishonest 
Table 5.5: Possibilities for Customers’ dishonesty with reference to Electronic Cash and 
Decryption Key 
The four possibilities for the Merchant with reference to the product and the digital signature 
are:  
1. Merchant sends the correct product and the right digital signature. This is the perfect 
situation and proves that the Merchant is honest. 
2. Merchant sends the correct digital product but the wrong digital signature. This implies 
that the Merchant is dishonest. 
3. Merchant sends the incorrect digital product (faulty or wrong product) and incorrect 
digital signature. This again shows that the Merchant is dishonest. 
4. The Merchant sends the wrong digital product and the correct digital signature, which 
indicates that the Merchant is dishonest. 
Table 5.6 below explains the possibilities for the Merchant (M). 
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Digital Product Digital Signature Result 
√ √ Honest 
√ X Dishonest 
X X Dishonest 
X √ Dishonest 
Table 5.6: Possibilities for Merchant’s dishonesty with reference to Digital Signature and Product 
Similarly, the four possibilities for the Customer with reference to the product and the digital 
signature are:  
1. Customer sends the correct electronic cash and the correct digital signature. This is the 
perfect situation and proves that the Customer is honest. 
2. Customer sends the correct electronic cash but the wrong digital signature. This implies 
that the Customer is dishonest. 
3. Customer sends the incorrect electronic cash (wrong amount) and the incorrect digital 
signature. This again shows that the Customer is dishonest. 
4. The Customer sends the wrong electronic cash and the correct digital signature, which 
indicates that the Customer is dishonest. 
Table 5.7 below explains the possibilities for the Customer. 
Electronic Cash Digital Signature Result 
√ √ Honest 
√ X Dishonest 
X X Dishonest 
X √ Dishonest 





5.3.6 Scenario Analysis 
This section aims at performing a scenario analysis. Various scenarios where the transacting 
parties are either honest or dishonest are taken into consideration and the execution of the 
protocol is checked. 
The various scenarios where either party could behave in a dishonest manner are shown in 
Table 5.8 below. 
Customer (C) Merchant (M) Result 
Honest Honest Normal 
Honest Dishonest Abnormal 
Dishonest Honest Abnormal 
Dishonest Dishonest Abnormal 
Table 5.8: Outcome based on behaviour of Customer and Merchant 
To discuss in detail, the first scenario is where the Customer and the Merchant are both being 
honest. In this scenario, the first stage is where the Customer and Merchant are both being 
honest and send the correct electronic cash and digital product, respectively, to the Trusted 
Third Party (TTP). In the second step, the Customer and Merchant now exchange the keys and in 
the third step, they are able to use the key to decrypt the digital product and electronic cash, 
respectively.  When both the parties are being honest, they exchange the keys and then receive 
their respective products from the TTP. This is the key step in the protocol. 















Fig. 5.23: Scenario 1 – Customer and Merchant are honest 
 
Scenario 2: Customer is honest and the Merchant is dishonest 
In this scenario, it is assumed that the customer is being honest by sending the electronic cash 
to the Trusted Third Party but the Merchant is being dishonest by not sending the digital 
product. In this case, steps 2 and 3 from the above scenario do not take place. The key exchange 
happens only on confirmation from the TTP that it has received the cash and the product. Since 
this does not happen, in this case, the Customer can understand that the Merchant is not 
trustworthy. Hence the Customer would not exchange the key with the Merchant. Hence, unlike 








Fig. 5.24: Scenario 2 – Customer honest, Merchant dishonest 
Since there is no communication from the Merchant, the protocol cannot proceed as it identifies 
that the Merchant is being dishonest. Hence, the communication stops. Although the electronic 
cash is sent by the Customer, it is of no use to the TTP as there is no decryption key that has 
been exchanged. The TTP, hence, cannot misuse the electronic cash.  
Scenario 3: In this scenario, the Customer is being dishonest by not sending the electronic cash 
and the Merchant is being honest by sending the digital product to the TTP. Similar to the above 
scenario, steps 2 and 3 of the first scenario do not take place. This is because the key exchange 
can only happen if the TTP actually sends a confirmation to the parties after receiving the items 
from both parties. This is clearly depicted in  Figure 5.25 below. 
Since there is a lack of communication from the point of the Customer, the protocol stops 
further exchange process as it identifies that one of the transacting parties, the Customer in this 
case is not being honest. The Merchant need not be worried about the digital product being 
misused by the TTP, as the product is encrypted and the Trusted Third Party does not have the 












Scenario 4: In this scenario, both the Customer and the Merchant are being dishonest. They do 
not send the electronic cash or the digital product respectively and try to gain undue advantage 
by assuming the other party would be honest. In this case, nothing happens as the TTP does not 
receive the electronic cash from the Customer or the digital product from the Merchant.  This is 









Fig. 5.26: Scenario 4 – Customer Dishonest, Merchant Dishonest 
 
Since there is no communication from both the Merchant and the Customer, after a timeout 
period, the protocol stops as it is assumed that neither party is interested or that both parties 
are behaving in a dishonest manner. This just leads to the abrupt termination of the protocol. 
We have now analysed what happens when either party is dishonest. The next step is to analyse 
what happens when either party wishes to withdraw. Here, we are assuming that the first step 
of sending the electronic cash or the digital product to the TTP has already occurred and the 
Customer or Merchant at this stage wishes to withdraw. The following table, Table 5.9, 








Customer Merchant Result 
Sends the electronic cash to 
the TTP and wants to 
continue 
Sends the electronic cash to 
the TTP but wants to 
withdraw 
Protocol proceeds in the 
normal flow 
Sends the electronic cash to 
the TTP and wants to 
continue 
Sends the digital product to 
the TTP but wants to 
withdraw 
Protocol terminates 
Sends the electronic cash to 
the TTP but wants to 
withdraw 
Sends the digital product to 
the TTP and wants to 
continue the transaction 
Protocol terminates 
Sends the electronic cash to 
the TTP but wants to 
withdraw 
Sends the digital product to 
the TTP but wants to 
withdraw 
Protocol terminates 
Table 5.9: Withdrawal scenarios for Customer and Merchant 
 
Scenario 1: Both parties send items to the TTP and both the parties wish to continue the 
















Fig. 5.27: Scenario 1 – Withdrawal Phase – Normal flow 
Both the Merchant and the Customer then exchange the decryption keys and the Trusted Third 
Party sends the electronic cash to the Merchant and the digital product to the Customer.  
Scenario 2: Both the Customer and the Merchant send the electronic cash and the digital 
product respectively to the Trusted Third Party but the Merchant wishes to withdraw from the 
transaction. In this case, the Merchant and the Customer would not exchange the decryption 
key, and hence, the second and the third step from the above diagram would not take place. 
Since the TTP does not have the decryption key, the electronic cash sent by the Customer can 












Fig. 5.28: Scenario 2 – Withdrawal Phase – Merchant wants to withdraw 
 
Scenario 3: The Customer and the Merchant both send the electronic cash and the digital 
product respectively to the TTP but the Customer wants to withdraw from the transaction for 
some reason. In this case again, the Customer and the Merchant would not exchange the private 
decryption keys. The TTP will not be able to make use of the electronic cash or the digital 













Fig. 5.29: Scenario 3 – Withdrawal Phase – Customer wants to withdraw 
 
Scenario 4:  The Customer and the Merchant have sent the electronic cash and the digital 
product to the TTP respectively and both of them now wish to withdraw from the transaction for 
various reasons. Similar to the above two scenarios, in this scenario, the Customer and the 
Merchant would not initiate the exchange of the private decryption keys. Without the 
decryption keys, both the electronic cash and the digital product is rendered useless in the 











Fig. 5.30: Scenario 4 – Withdrawal Phase – Customer and Merchant want to withdraw 
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter analysed the protocol based on various conditions that aimed to fulfil, including fair 
exchange and anonymity. Furthermore, areas that might lead to dispute were discussed in detail 
and identified the key areas where it becomes mandatory for the protocol or the parties 
involved in the e-commerce transaction to be able to easily detect dishonesty at different 
stages. From the analysis above, it is clearly understood that the protocol satisfies all the key 
aims, namely, fair exchange, provision of anonymity and payment security assurance. This is 
shown by highlighting all major scenarios and in certain cases all possible behaviours that could 
be shown by all of the transacting parties. Each scenario was then analysed and the result or the 
output detailing how the protocol would behave under each circumstance was described. In 
addition, from the above analysis, it can be clearly understood that, during a dispute, it is easy to 
identify the dishonest party and the reason for the dispute could be verified in a simple manner, 
as various scenarios and possibilities have been identified and explained in detail.  Finally, a 
scenario analysis was conducted to see what happens when either or both parties are honest or 
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dishonest.  This was demonstrated through a case-by-case example to determine if the 
detection of dishonesty was conducted in the correct manner by the protocol. 
Furthermore, from the above sub-sections, it can also be understood that the protocol is 
designed in such a way where the number of disputes that might arise would also be minimal. 
This is because neither of the transacting parties, namely, the Customer and the Merchant, 
would receive the digital product or electronic cash before they sent the electronic cash or the 
digital product respectively, As the Trusted Third Party would only forward the items to the 
appropriate entities after receiving items from both parties. Furthermore, in the case of 
certificates and signatures, both the Merchant and the Customer can verify their authenticity 
before sending the digital product or the electronic cash respectively, as in order to forge a 
signature, the private key of the other party needs to be known. For example, if the customer 
wants to forge a signature on the electronic cash, then the customer would need to know the 
private key of the Bank that would be used to sign the electronic cash. Therefore, the question 
of incorrect or forged signature is impossible in this case.  
Any failure in securing the communication channel is not a part of the protocol, and the protocol 
also does not describe any fail safe mechanisms or fault-tolerant techniques that could be 
adopted for the purposes of securing the communication channel. Hence, this is not within the 
scope of the protocol. Therefore, this area could be worked on in future development of the 
protocol. 
The chapter also clearly demonstrated that there is a significant reduction in the number of 
actual messages between the Customer and the Merchant (which is restricted to two messages 
while they exchange the private decryption keys). The usage of an online Trusted Third Party is 
limited and is advantageous as the TTP does not need to be online full time. The TTP is also not 
involved in the key exchange process, which reduces the overheads of the TTP, making it more 
secure. Similarly, in case of disputes (all possible scenarios are clearly shown and discussed by 
the protocol), the number of messages required to resolve the issues are limited. In many cases, 
as indicated clearly in this chapter, the number of disputes arising is significantly reduced as 
fairness is imposed on the transacting parties of the protocol and no party involved in the e-
commerce transaction (including the TTP) can take undue advantage of the other party/parties.  
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CHAPTER 6: PROTOCOL COMPARISONS 
 
This chapter is aimed at comparing the proposed “Imposing Anonymity and Fairness Protocol” 
with various other similar protocols; that is, protocols that provide either anonymity or fair 
exchange, or both. This will help us to understand how efficient the proposed protocol is, and 
how it eliminates the gaps and/or deficiencies that are apparent in the other protocols.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Enable the reader to comprehend the novelty of the proposed ‘Imposing Anonymity and 
Fairness Protocol’. 
 Understand the key differences in the protocols of similar nature, and clarify the 
contribution that the proposed protocol makes. 
 Enable the reader to grasp how efficient the proposed protocol is, and to see how well it 
implements both anonymity and fair exchange. This will also help the reader to 




6 Protocol Comparisons 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the proposed protocol with the other protocols described 
earlier. This is done in order to understand how the protocol fares in terms of how well it 
overcomes the shortcomings of the other protocols discussed. It also aims at comparing the 
protocols’ features and the overheads, and determining if the new protocol does better than the 
others. Also, only protocols with similar characteristics are compared here, to give a fair idea of 
how this protocol scores in comparison with those others.  
In order to effectively compare the protocols, certain factors need to be taken into account 
against which the comparison is done. Accordingly, certain criteria used to make the 
comparisons, and these are as follows: 
1. Number of messages  
2. The requirement to hold data by the Trusted Third Party 
3. Involvement of all the parties, namely the Customer (C), Merchant (M) and the 
Trusted Third Party (TTP), in case of dispute resolution 
Furthermore, each protocol’s disadvantage(s) is stated and is compared against the proposed 
protocol, to see whether or not the proposed protocol overcomes that disadvantage(s). 
6.1 Number of Messages 
The number of messages being exchanged throughout all the phases of the protocol plays a key 
role in determining the efficiency of the protocol. A large number of messages being passed 
between the transacting parties would mean that the protocol is complicated, and could 
become very cumbersome while being implemented. This is because ‘messages’ translate into 
‘time taken to process by the protocol’, and during implementation, this also takes up a great 
deal of memory and processing space.  
The proposed protocol is compared against the following protocols for the number of messages. 
These are:  
1. Franklin & Reiter’s Fair Exchange (with a semi-trusted Third Party) Protocol 
2. Ray’s Anonymous and Failure Resilient Fair Exchange E-commerce Protocol 
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3. Zhang’s Efficient Protocol for Anonymous and Fair Exchange, and 
Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Enabled Fair Exchange and Anonymous E-payment Protocol 
These four protocols provide both anonymity and fair exchange. The following table (Table 6.10) 
shows the number of messages in each protocol. The protocol becomes more efficient and 
effective when the number of messages are less. This is because, it makes it less cumbersome 
and while implementing the protocol, the amount of memory space required is less and the 
execution time is lessened resulting in a light-weight protocol. Hence the proposed protocol is 
better as seen from the table due to the lesser number of messages when compared to the 
other protocols. 
Protocol Number of Message  
Franklin & Reiter 8 messages in the normal flow and 6 in the 
optimized protocol. This does not include the 
verification steps. Added with verification, it 
has a significantly large number of messages 
namely 10 in normal flow and 8 in the 
optimized flow. 
Ray’s Anonymous & Failure Resilient Protocol 10 messages 
Zhang’s Anonymity and Fair Exchange 10 messages 
Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol Total of 11 messages across 6 different 
phases. 
Imposing Fairness Protocol 7 messages 
Table 6.10: Number of messages 
6.2 Requirement to Hold Data 
This means that the Trusted Third Party would hold information that is being passed on between 
the two transacting parties, namely the customer (C) and the merchant (M). This sometimes 
leads to excessive space being used for storage and can create a bottleneck through having to 
secure the data being held by the TTP. 




Protocol Requirement to hold data 
Franklin & Reiter The TTP holds information for a short while 
for the purposes of verification. 
Ray’s Anonymous & Failure Resilient Protocol Requires the TTP to hold data (the 
Merchant’s item) before the exchange takes 
place. 
Zhang’s Anonymity and Fair Exchange The TTP is required to hold data. 
Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol The TTP is required to hold data. 
Imposing Fairness Protocol The TTP is used only to hold data for a very 
short while, for the purposes of verification. 
All other messages are sent directly between 
the transacting parties. 
Table 6.11: Requirement to hold data 
6.3 Involvement of Parties during Dispute Resolution 
This refers to what happens and which parties are involved in case of dispute resolution. This is 
an important aspect as, depending on the number of parties involved, it could become easier or 
more cumbersome.  
The following table (Table 6.12) describes the involvement of parties during the dispute 




Protocol Involvement of parties 
Franklin & Reiter Only the party that is not happy along with 
the TTP. 
Ray’s Anonymous & Failure Resilient Protocol All the transacting parties are involved in the 
dispute resolution phase. 
Zhang’s Anonymity and Fair Exchange 
 
Only the party that is not happy, along with 
the TTP to provide an affidavit. 
Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol 
 
Only the party that is not happy along with 
the TTP. 
Imposing Fairness Protocol The dissatisfied party and the TTP are 
involved. 
Table 6.12: Involvement of parties 
6.4 Imposing Fairness vs. Franklin & Reiter’s Fair Exchange Protocol 
The disadvantages of Franklin & Reiter’s Protocol and how the Imposing Fairness Protocol 
overcomes the same are listed in the table (Table 6.13) below. 
Franklin & Reiter Imposing Fairness Protocol 
Semi-Trusted TTP Partially trusted third party but controls in 
place to circumvent the TTP to read or modify 
messages 
Assumes only one party is dishonest at any 
given point in time, and hence does not 
provide a solution when two parties are 
dishonest. 
Assumes that any party can misbehave and 
has a feature whereby the protocol 
terminates in any case where dishonesty is 
detected. 
Provides only partial anonymity  Provides full anonymity 




6.5 Imposing Fairness vs. Ray’s Anonymous and Failure Resilient Protocol 
The disadvantages of Ray’s protocol are listed in the table below (Table 6.14) and it shows how 
the Imposing Fairness Protocol is designed to overcome the disadvantages mentioned. 
Ray’s Protocol Imposing Fairness Protocol 
It uses pseudo-identifiers to provide 
anonymity. A customer is required to 
generate these pseudo-identifiers, and when 
customers generate a new one for every 
transaction, this results in a bottleneck. 
Anonymity is provided by means of using 
electronic cash and secure channels. This 
does not create any overheads. 
Verification of the protocol by Kong et al. 
(2004) clearly shows that the TTP is not 
entirely trustworthy. 
The Third Party here is entirely trustworthy 
as the protocol assumes that none of the 
parties can be trusted and takes steps to 
overcome this problem. 
Provides only partial anonymity  Provides full anonymity 
Table 6.14: Ray vs. Imposing Fairness 
6.6 Imposing Fairness vs. Anonymity and Fair Exchange by Zhang 
The table (Table 6.15) below lists the disadvantages of Zhang’s Anonymity and Fair Exchange 
Protocol and compares it against Imposing Fairness Protocol. 
Zhang’s Protocol Imposing Fairness Protocol 
Too many messages Only 7 messages across all phases 
It does not assure fair exchange through all 
the phases of the transactions. It does not 
cover the withdrawal phase. 
Fair exchange is guaranteed throughout all 
the phases of the e-commerce transaction as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
Customers are required to disclose the public 
key during the transaction. Using the same key 
again and again might allow the merchants to 
trace the customer thus compromising the 
anonymity feature. 
As electronic cash is being used, this is 
virtually untraceable and hence provides 
complete anonymity. 
Table 6.15: Zhang’s Anonymity & Fair Exchange vs. Imposing Fairness 
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6.7 Imposing Fairness vs. Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol 
The table below (Table 6.16) clearly indicates the shortcomings of Zhang’s Mutual 
Authentication Protocol, and shows how these shortcomings are tackled by the proposed 
Imposing Fairness Protocol. 
Zhang’s Mutual Authentication Protocol Imposing Fairness Protocol 
Too many messages – 6 phases and 11 
messages  
Only 7 messages in total 
It is very cumbersome as it has many phases. The proposed protocol does not have 
iterative phases and hence is very efficient 
and fast. 
It has a commit buffer that is used by the TTP 
and assumes that the commit buffer is always 
sufficient and available. If the commit buffer is 
not available, the protocol fails and it does not 
provide any solution when this happens. 
It does not make use of any buffers and the 
protocol has been thoroughly analysed to 
ensure it is available. 
Table 6.16: Zhang’s Mutual Authentication vs. Imposing Fairness 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter compared the proposed protocol with various other protocols. The comparisons 
(based on various criteria) clearly demonstrate that the proposed protocol fares a great deal 
better than all the other protocols, and effectively and efficiently overcomes their respective 
disadvantages. This clearly indicates the novelty of the protocol. Now that the protocol has been 
compared against the protocols, it is imperative to check the protocol’s implementation that is 




CHAPTER 7: PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The key goal of this chapter is to explain in detail the implementation of the “Imposing 
Anonymity and Fairness Protocol”. This chapter provides a detailed report on the software 
framework that has been used, discusses the need to implement the protocol, describes the 
various modules that are present in the protocol’s implemented prototype, and also explains the 
key features of the prototype. It concludes by identifying areas for improvement or 
enhancements that could be made to the protocol’s prototype.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Enable the reader to understand the need to implement the proposed protocol as a 
software prototype.  
 Justify the selection of the programming language and the interface that has been used 
to implement the prototype.  
 Enable the reader to grasp the key features of the implemented prototype and also to 
identify the shortcomings of the prototype that is being developed. 
 Help readers get an idea about the different software modules within the prototype and 











7 Protocol Implementation 
To further understand the performance of the protocol, it is implemented as a prototype. This 
will assist in evaluating the protocol and the results that it generates will be illustrated in a more 
visually appealing manner. The implementation of the proposed protocol serves as one of the 
verification and evaluation methods as discussed in the previous chapters. The main aims of 
having an implementation of the proposed protocol are as follows: 
1. To demonstrate that the protocol that is proposed is ready to use in the real world and 
can be extended to run on a client-server environment.  
2. To further understand the time it takes for the protocol to actually execute and to 
identify areas that need to be modified; in simple terms, it aims to identify the key areas 
of concern or those areas that affect the performance of the protocol, to ensure that 
these areas are redesigned or revisited. 
7.1 The Prototype 
The prototype is an implementation viewpoint of the proposed e-commerce protocol. It enables 
thorough testing of the protocol once it is implemented, to identify any key flaws in the logic, 
design or data and/or system flows. The prototype is implemented using a web service based 
Java Enterprise Edition. The key features of this prototype display the main functions and show 
all the key entities responsible in an e-commerce transaction. In simple terms, it represents the 
key participants or the core functions in the proposed e-commerce protocol. 
1. A server side Java EE application for the Trusted Third Party (TTP). 
2. A client side web interface to access and validate hashes with the TTP. This web 
interface is accessible to both the Customer (C) and the Merchant (M). 
3. A server side Java EE application for the Certificate Authority (CA).  
4. A client side web interface to access and validate the hashes with the CA. This client 
interface is accessible to both the Customer and the Merchant. 
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5. A server side Java EE application for the Customer Bank (CB). 
6. A client side web interface to withdraw and validate digital cash with the CB. This web 
interface again is accessible to both the Customer and the Merchant. 
The whole prototype is deployed in a single server (for testing purposes). The prototype is 
designed in such a way that it could be made fully responsive and suitable for mobile 
applications. The prototype that has been developed using Java can be divided into two key 
parts. These are: 
1. The Kernel: this acts as the ‘central module’ that loads during the initial stages of the 
protocol and remains constantly in the memory. It provides all the key services that are 
required by various other modules in the prototype and enables the smooth running of 
the prototype.  
2. Application Modules: these modules represent the various entities in the proposed 
protocol, namely C, M, CA and TTP. These application modules have the capability to 
communicate with each other.  
In simple terms, the kernel is something that would act as the core or the crux of the program. 
The main function of this part is to ensure that all required modules are loaded correctly and to 
make sure that the Java program is running without any glitches.  
The figure below (Fig. 7.31) describes the structure of the Application Module as well as the 
components and structure of the key computational modules. 
Application Modules 
Customer (C) Merchant (M) 
Certificate Authority (CA) Trusted Third Party (TTP) Bank (B) 
Fig. 7.31: Components of the application modules 
As mentioned, there are five application modules and these have the ability to communicate 





Cryptographic Modules Hash Modules 
Java Cryptographic Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 
Fig. 7.32: Components of the key computational modules 
The computational modules are those modules without which the program cannot run. The APIs 
and the JRE are automatically provided by the Java programming language. The remaining three 
modules are common modules that could be used by any of the application modules. 
It is also important to understand that these two key modules, i.e. the application modules and 
the computational modules, communicate with each other. For example, if the Customer wants 
to send hashed and encrypted cash to the Trusted Third Party, the Customer Module will make 
use of the Cryptographic Modules and the Hash Modules to be able to hash and encrypt the 
cash in order to send it to the TTP. 
The Java Enterprise Edition system architecture is depicted in the diagram below (Fig 7.33) 
 
Fig 7.33 Java Enterprise System Architecture (Source: Oracle, 2014) 
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From the above diagram, it is clear that the enterprise edition provides platform services, 
middleware services as well as application services in order to support the web application that 
is being developed. 
This implementation uses a three-tier logic whereby the clients or the end users make calls to 
specific business tier logic components or Java Modules which internally communicate to the 
web services and servers. At the back end the databases are present which can be accessed by 
the business logic tier. This is depicted in the diagram below (Fig 7.34) 
 
Fig 7.34 Implementation Design Logic 
The five key components namely the client, merchant, Trusted Third Party, Certificate Authority 
and Merchant Bank communicate with each other during an e-commerce transaction either by a 




Fig: 7.35: Interaction between components 
7.1.1 Kernel Component 
This section aims at describing in detail all the modules within the Kernel Component of the 
prototype. This component has four key modules. These are: 
1. Hash Module 
2. Cryptographic Module 
3. Signature Module, and 
4. Computational Module 
7.1.1.1 Hash Module 
This module is used to compute all the hashes that are used by the prototype. For example, this 
module is called when the Customer wants to hash the message before sending it to the TTP. It 
services all of the layers within the application module. In simple terms, this module can be 
called by any of the modules within the application layer. When any of the modules within the 
application layer require messages to be hashed, this module is called. This function works by 
taking a variable-length string, which is known as the pre-image, processes it using the hash 
function and outputs a fixed-length string, which is known as the hash value or a cryptographic 
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checksum. Whatever the length of the input, the size of the output remains constant. The hash 
function used in this prototype is SHA-1. The SHA-1 algorithm that is used in this module (Secure 
Hash Algorithm - 1) uses a 512 bit block size for hashing. The process is as follows: 
The message is broken down to 512 bit blocks. The message is then padded with one followed 
by zeros so that there are 448 bits in the final block of the message.The original message is then 
appended as an unsigned  64 bit integer. The method given in SHA-1 Manual (NIST, 2013) is 
followed whereby  5 blocks of hash are initialised (h0, h1, h2, h3 and h4) and an internal loop is 
used to calculate the hash and a final block of 160 bits is output.  
7.1.1.2 Cryptographic Module 
The cryptographic module is one of the key modules that would be called upon to perform any 
cryptographic functions (except hashing and digital signature). In a gist, this includes encryption 
and decryption of messages, producing timestamps, generating key pairs, etc. The key functions 
of this module are as follows: 
1. Generate symmetric key pairs for encryption with AES (Advanced Encryption Standards). 
The block size is 128 bits.  
2. Perform the function of symmetric encryption and decryption. This is done by taking the 
symmetric key that has been generated and performs the appropriate function of 
encryption or decryption as required. Again, AES is used by this function and the block 
size in use is 128 bits. 
3. Perform the function of asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric encryption, as discussed in 
the earlier chapter makes use of two keys (unlike symmetric key cryptography), a private 
and public key. The keys are RSA-based. 
4. Perform the function of asymmetric decryption. This is done by making use of the 
private and public keys that are generated (based on the RSA algorithm).  
7.1.1.3 Signature Module 
This module is used for all signing purposes for any digital signatures. It makes use of two other 
modules, namely the hash module and the cryptographic module, to integrate different inputs 
and output a digital signature. It is used for the following purposes: 
1. Produce a digital signature: this makes use of a signing function whereby the private key 
of the signer is taken to sign the hash value of any message. This signed hash using the 
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private key on a message represents the digital signature of the signer. This module can 
be used by the transacting parties only if they know the private key.  
2. Verify the digital signature:  to verify a signature, this function makes use of the signer’s 
public key. This is used to decrypt the message. After the message is decrypted, the hash 
value of the original message is calculated. Once this is done, this value is compared 
with the hash value of the decrypted signature. This helps in verifying the signer of the 
message. Any discrepancy in the hash values would mean that the signature has been 
forged by the sender. 
 
7.1.1.6 Computational Module 
This module is developed to service all layers in the Kernel Module below it. In short, it would 
perform all requests from the Signature Module, Hash Module and the Cryptographic Module. 
The main functions carried out by this module would include all mathematical operations that 
would be needed for the other modules to perform their operations. These mathematical 
operations, for example, might include: 
1. Generation of random numbers for computing the RSA keys. 
2. Performing basic the mathematical operations that are required for encryption or 
decryption.  
7.1.2 Application Modules  
The application modules represent the key entities that are involved directly or indirectly in the 
e-commerce transaction. This module communicates with the underlying kernel layer to enable 
the computation and processing of requests. This module enables communication with each of 
the sub-modules or layers, and assumes that all interactions between the modules are secure. 
This module consists of the following layers: 
1. Customer 
2. Merchant 
3. Trusted Third Party 





The Customer Module enables the Customer to do the following: 
1. View the products that are displayed on the Merchant’s site. 
2. Verify the digital certificate provided by the Merchant through the Certificate Authority. 
3. Withdraw electronic cash from the Bank. 
4. Communicate interest in buying to the Trusted Third Party. 
5. Show proof of funds to the TTP. 
6. Exchange keys with the Merchant. 
7. Decrypt the electronic product purchased. 
The customer can also withdraw from the transaction by not sharing the decryption key with the 
Merchant.  
7.1.2.2 Merchant 
This module is developed for the Merchant to facilitate the Merchant in carrying out the 
following functions:  
1. Obtain a digital certificate from the Certificate Authority to confirm the online identity 
and to improve the customers’ perception of trust. 
2. Upload digital products online for potential customers to view and purchase. 
3. Verify with the Customer’s bank the authenticity of the electronic cash. 
4. Communicate with the Trusted Third Party and send the encrypted product to the TTP. 
5. Exchange keys with the Customer for decryption. 
6. Decrypt the electronic cash. 
7.1.2.3 Trusted Third Party 
This module assists in facilitating the Trusted Third Party to perform various key activities. These 
activities include the following: 
1. Verify the authenticity of the digital product and the electronic cash that has been sent 
by the Merchant and the Customer, respectively. 
2. Mediate between the Customer and the Merchant as and when necessary. 
3. Store records of transactions in case of any disputes. 
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4. Send the digital product and the electronic cash to the Customer and the Merchant, 
respectively, after they have exchanged the keys. 
7.1.2.4 Certificate Authority 
This module enables the Certificate Authority to perform the following key tasks: 
1. Issue a digitally signed certificate to the Merchant after verifying the Merchant’s identity 
in the pre-exchange or the pre-negotiation phase of the e-commerce transaction. 
2. Verify any certificates issued on request from the Customer or the Trusted Third Party. 
This is done by maintaining a list of certificates issued earlier. 
7.1.2.5 Bank 
This module enables the Bank to perform the following activities: 
1. When the Customer requests electronic cash, check the account of the Customer to 
ensure that there are adequate funds. 
2. On confirming funds, either issue the electronic cash or a rejection due to lack of funds. 
3. Ensure that the electronic cash is not double spent or forged by checking the database 
of spent cash and verifying the blind signature. 
4. On request from the merchant, to deposit the electronic cash after the e-commerce 
transaction, and process the request. 
 
The following diagram (Fig. 7.36) clearly depicts the communications between all the modules in 




Fig. 7.36: Communication process between all modules in the application layer 
 
Each module in the application layer is defined as a ‘class’ in the actual Java program. Each class 
contains many objects. The objects of a class have attributes and behaviours associated with 
them. Communication between the classes happens by making use of the objects. For example, 
in this case, Customer is a class. The class has various methods that define what the Customer 
can do. For example, the methods of the Customer class include View Product, Send Cash, and 
so on. Each and every individual customer is an object of the class Customer. Methods define 
what the class can do. In short, these define the capability of the class to perform certain 
actions.  
For example, if the customer wants to encrypt, hash and timestamp the e-cash before sending it 
to the TTP, the customer first calls the cryptographic module to encrypt the message. For the 
purposes of encryption, the cryptographic module first generates a symmetric key pair with 
Advanced Encryption Standards with a 128 bit block size. To divide the message to the blocks, 















Once the blocks are obtained, the AES function within the cryptographic module (or class) is 
used to encrypt the data and this is sent back to the customer. The customer then calls on the 
hash module with the encrypted message to provide a hash. The hash module then calls the 
computational module to divide the message into blocks and then performs the hash. This 160 
bit hash is then passed on to the customer. The customer would now need to call the signature 
module to digitally sign the message. The signature module then calls the cryptographic module 
to obtain the private key of the customer and then the hash method to hash the private key to 
obtain the signature. When the cryptographic module is called to obtain the private key, it 
internally uses the RSA algorithm to generate the public-private key pair. The RSA method, in 
order to generate the key pairs would need to call the computational module to perform 
operations such as random number generation etc. This example is depicted in the diagram 




Fig 7.37: Example of Customer encrypting, hashing and signing a message 
7.1.3 Future Developments 
The aim of this prototype was to provide a very basic functionality to the protocol in order to 
test its readiness to be implemented in the real world. Hence, there are many areas that could 
be considerably improved, keeping in mind the latest technologies available.  
This prototype therefore is not production ready, but for all intents and purposes perfectly 
suitable for testing. Also, there is no authentication and it may be error-prone on some 
occasions, as Test Driven Development (TDD) was not used. One of the key assumptions is that 
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everything in the forms is filled correctly. Given these drawbacks, the following could be done 
for further enhancement of the protocol’s prototype: 
1. Automatic decryption of the product after the final stage of the protocol. Trusted Third 
Party asks if the customer wants the product to be decrypted by the TTP server for him. 
The button is already there in the TTP interface.  
2. Full-blown X.509 security stack with run-time certificate issuing and revocation. At the 
moment, the prototype does not deal with certificate revocation. However, in the real 
world, the Certificate Authority is required to maintain a list not only of the certificates 
issued but also of the certificates revoked. This is known as the Certificate Revocation 
List. This is also done in real time and updated as and when the certificates are issued 
and/or revoked. 
3. Proper authentication and authorization. This could be done by using an appropriate 
login and password for all the parties. This has not been implemented in the prototype 
as the security of the individual parties is not within the scope of the protocol.  
4. Merchant's view on placed orders and their payment states. This could be done to 
enhance the user experience. This shows the list of all recent orders that are placed by 
customers, the status of payment (whether or not payment has been received, whether 
or not the electronic cash is redeemed from the bank, et cetera). 
Also, it needs to be understood that although the protocol’s implementation is fully functional, it 
is in a very raw form; it needs to be modified to enhance and appreciate the protocol 
thoroughly. This means that the prototype only provides the basic services and implements only 
the two layers mentioned above (namely the kernel and the application), i.e. it does not provide 
any additional features to improve the experience and cannot be used as a substitute to a full-
blown implementation-ready application. Also, the protocol does not exactly use X.509 
certificates; rather, it just uses RSA key pairs, just like the X.509 certificates, to simulate the 
X.509 stack. Improvements would also enhance the user experience but this is not within the 
scope of this implementation. This implementation has proved that the protocol is feasible; it is 
a simple means to verify the outputs and also to show that the logic followed is correct.  
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7.2 Message flows in the prototype 
 
The prototype is done with the intention of showing the readiness of the protocol in the real-
world. It helps to show that the protocol is a robust model that could be implemented and 
adapted to different platforms for Business-to-Consumer electronic commerce transactions. The 
prototype is created with the intention of proving that the protocol’s logic works fine. Based on 
these, the following are the key assumptions that have been followed while developing the 
prototype: 
1. There is only one Merchant and his name is “Merchant”. Though the protocol allows 
having multiple merchants, the prototype was created with the intention of showing the 
logical flow. Hence only one Merchant was used. Similarly only one Bank is being used 
for the purposes of simplicity and ease.  
 
2. All prices are denoted in terms of integers. Though in the real-world prices could be 
both integers and decimals, for implementation purposes, it is assumed that the prices 
are integers. 
 
3. The implementation of the prototype does not provide for any error correction as it is 
assumed that the forms are filled up in the correct manner. Validation on individual text 
fields is not present as the purpose is to demonstrate the logical flow of the protocol 
and not the implementation itself.  
The prototype does not provide a page specifically for the customer as it is designed from the 
point of view of the customer. The bank page provides a list of the customers. It provides an 
interface to withdraw digital payments and also to perform other banking related transactions. 
The banker can add new customers and the account details. A payment can be generated in the 
bank’s website by selecting the banking client from the list and filling the form with the payee 
details. Given that we have only one Merchant, the payee would always be “Merchant” in this 
case. The price of the product could be filled in depending on the amount to pay. The diagram 





Figure 7.38: Bank Client Interface 
Once Generate button is pressed, it generates a digital code for the payment to be made. It 
gives the hash of the payment to be checked at a later stage (to ensure integrity of the 
payment), the encrypted hash (for confidentiality purposes) and the private key that needs to be 
shared with the merchant.  A JSON for the Payment is also generated at this stage which the 
customer can now make use of to make the payment for the desired product. This is depicted in 









Figure 7.39: Payment Generation by Bank 
Now, the customer can go to the merchant page (which represents the merchant’s website in 
the real-world) and choose the desired product. The customer can choose to verify the product 
with the Certificate Authority by using the “Verify” option that is available. When the customer 
clicks on the buy option, the customer is redirected to the Trusted Third Party website. The 
details of the product would automatically be populated and the customer is just required to 
paste the copied JSON code on the text area that is provided and press the “Parse JSON” button. 
The figure below shows the Merchant’s website (Figure 7.40) from a point of view of the 
customer. 
 
Figure 7.40: Merchant website from the point of view of the customer 
The figure below (Figure 7.41) shows the redirection to the Trusted Third Party website when 
the customer clicks on the buy option. The trusted third party site is used by both the customer 




Figure 7.41: Trusted Third Party website for Customer 
The customer can then click on the initiate protocol button. This leads to the protocol 
generating the encrypted contents of the product. The customer can now click on make 
payment (or verify with CA before making the payment to ensure that the product is legitimate). 
When the customer clicks on the verify button, he/she is redirected to the Certificate Authority’s 
page where the verification status is shown. The figure below shows the verification screen for 




Figure 7.42: Product Verification by Certificate Authority 
 
Once the make payment option is clicked, the private key that has been generated can now be 
used to decrypt the product contents. Similarly, the merchant would be able to use the key to 
decrypt the payment and withdraw cash from the Bank. 
Now, from the Point of view of the merchant, the following happens. First, the Merchant goes to 
the Certificate Authority’s page and adds the desired product including the product name, 
contents, price and clicks the certify option. This generates the certificate for the product added. 




Figure 7.43: Merchant getting a product certified by the Certificate Authority 
The merchant can now add these details on his webpage to enable the prospective customers 
view the product. The merchant would add the product details and the certificate details and 
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click on save. This will then display the product. This is depicted in the diagram below (figure 
7.44) 
 




This chapter has described in detail the implementation of the protocol. The prototype’s 
features, key modules and how each module communicates with the others were also 
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explained. This chapter has proved that the proposed protocol is viable and that the logic of the 
protocol is indeed correct. It also demonstrated the fact that the proposed protocol could be 
implemented in real-life scenarios without much ado. This implementation has also shown that 
the communication and data flows of the proposed protocol work fine and that the desired 
outputs are obtained.  
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CHAPTER 8: VERIFICATION AND EVALUATION 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to verify and evaluate the proposed “imposing Anonymity and 
Fairness Protocol”. This chapter starts by introducing the concepts of formal verification and 
evaluation, and describes the various techniques that are used to verify and evaluate protocols 
in detail. It then discusses in detail the pros and cons of each of the verification techniques and 
methodologies followed. Based on the Key Process Indicators, this chapter compares the 
proposed “Imposing Anonymity and Fairness Protocol” against various protocols, and also 
provides evaluation criteria to demonstrate how well the proposed protocol fares under 
different scenarios.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Enable the reader to understand the concept of evaluation, and to introduce the reader 
to the various techniques and methodologies that are in vogue. It also explains the 
advantages and disadvantages of using each method. 
 Understand the key differences in the techniques that are used, and be able to see a 
comparison of how well the proposed protocol fares against similar protocols. 
 To be able to see how the proposed protocol fares against various informal verification 
criteria, and also see how effective the informal verification process is. 
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8 Verification and Evaluation 
The proposed protocol needs to be verified to ensure that it is not prone to errors, and that 
under all given circumstances it achieves the key aims and satisfies all the conditions. It is 
therefore required that the proposed protocol be thoroughly analysed using various methods to 
ensure that all granular details are addressed, and that these do not introduce any deviation to 
the proposed standards.  
The protocol that is proposed has a set of predefined, desirable characteristics; these include 
anonymity and fair-exchange. Customer anonymity can be satisfied using various key 
cryptographic techniques and secure channels; also, the protocol does not involve the 
establishment of such secure communication channels. Hence, this property or characteristic 
cannot be formally verified and the scope of the verification is strictly limited to fair exchange.  
Verification of the proposed protocol can be done in two different ways, namely: 
1. Formal verification 
2. Informal verification 
Protocol evaluation refers to the process whereby the protocol is assessed based on how well it 
performs; this entails assessing the network statistics, the time taken for the protocol to 
complete a transaction, the total memory it needs, et cetera.  
Based on the prototype design, it is easy to evaluate the protocol against these criteria. 
Evaluation can assist in comparing it against similar protocols and in assessing how far the 
proposed protocol represents an improvement or where it needs to be further improved. As 
evaluation is based on the language being coded, it is important to understand that there are 
certain limitations, such as good coding practices, usage of the correct methods for coding, 
programming language features, network capacity, et cetera. Hence, it cannot be taken as a 




8.1 Formal Verification 
Formal verification of the protocol helps to detect any unanticipated situation and flaws in the 
design and logic of the proposed protocol. It also helps to detect any errors in the flow of 
communication and messages in the implementation.  
There are various techniques that can be used in order to formally verify a protocol; each one 
requires varying amounts of time, effort and cost. Similarly there are various advantages and 
disadvantages to using each technique. Some of the techniques that could be used are manual 
proofs, theorem-proving, model checking and simulation.  
Manual proofs: this is one of the oldest methods, and it requires much time and effort on the 
part of the protocol designer or developer. As there is human intervention and everything is 
done manually, this method is prone to errors and there is no absolute guarantee that the result 
of this verification is 100% accurate. 
Theorem-proving: this helps to verify the mathematical correctness of the protocol. Not all 
protocols are able to use this method, and even those that can use theorem-proving cannot 
verify the protocol in its entirety, as only the mathematical components are verified and proved 
to be correct.  
Simulation: this involves automating the various processes and actions of the protocol using a 
simulation software tool. It is a common method used for authentication and cryptographic 
protocols (Goubault-Larrecq, 2000). 
Model checking: this is yet another effective mechanism for the verification of a protocol. As 
with simulation, this is an automated method that makes use of automated software tools. 
Model checking provides a promising methodology, especially for e-commerce protocols 
(Anderson et al., 2006). It enables the designer and/or developer to be able to say that the 
proposed protocol has indeed shown that it has all the desirable characteristics that it aimed to 
provide.  
8.1.1 Comparisons 
Now that the various formal methods have been described, it is important to understand the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method, and to compare these in order to identify the 
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correct method to adopt. Adopting the most appropriate verification method is important and 
should be chosen carefully; it depends on the type of the protocol, the involvement of users, the 
relative importance of the protocol, and the availability of tools and resources. Each method has 
its own strengths and weaknesses, and (depending on the requirement and the criticality) one 
or more verification methods could be used. The table below (Table 8.17) clarifies these 
advantages and disadvantages (Anderson et al., 2006). 
Verification Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Theorem-Proving 1. Helps to prove 
program or protocol 
specifications in an 
exact manner. 
2. Helps to reduce 
human error. 
3. Helps to provide a 
formal and clear 
structure for the 
purposes of 
verification. 
1. Not much 
documentation is 
available. 
2. It is complex in nature 
and hence requires 
much experience and 
expertise. Thus, it is 
not easy for every 
individual and is not 
the apt choice for 
those that do not 
possess the skills. 
3. No counter examples 
are provided in case 
the theorem fails. 
Simulation 1. Automated and has a 
great deal of 
computational power 
that could be relied 
on. 
2. Saves much human 
time and effort. 
3. Faster than manual 
methods. 
1. Given the nature of 
this method, it 
requires much work 
to be done every time 
the model changes, 
as it is ad hoc and 
must be remodelled 
each time and for 




2. Simulation allows the 
developer or designer 
to simulate only a few 
given scenarios. This 
means that not all 
scenarios are taken 
into consideration. 
Manual Proof 1. Provides the 
developer or designer 
with a great deal of 
flexibility in deciding 
what needs to be 
done. 
2. Proves to be a simple 
and easy-to-use 
method if the 
protocol is 
straightforward. 
3. Very cost effective 
and does not require 
any computational 
power or tools. 
1. It requires a lot of 
effort and is very time 
consuming. 
2. Given that there is 
human involvement, 
the chances of error 
are high. 
3. It has limited 
capability and can 
become very difficult 
in the case of a really 
complex problem. 
4. It could become 
difficult for any 
individual to take into 
account all scenarios, 
and hence might not 
provide a complete 
result. 
Model checking 1. It is fast, robust and 
provides a more 
effective and efficient 
solution.  
2. Given the nature of 
1. In the case of 
business modelling, 
this might not be the 
most viable solution. 




it is easy to identify 
the exact point of 
failure, and it also 
provides counter 
examples. 
3. Identify the critical 
points of failure or 
the pivotal flaws 
relating to flow of 
information that 
other techniques fail 
to identify. 
language specific, the 
expressiveness is 
limited to the 
language and is 
subject to the 
constraints of the 
language in which the 
protocol is modelled. 
3. This might mean that 
the entire protocol 
itself might not be 
thoroughly validated. 
It just enables certain 
aspects of the 
protocol to be 
validated. 
Table 8.17: Verification methods advantages and disadvantages 
 
8.2 Informal Verification 
The informal verification methods and technologies were commonly used earlier. This method 
involves listing the scenarios that could occur, and possible attacks or areas that could go wrong 
are determined. For security protocols, however, informal methods are not very effective. This is 
because it becomes very difficult or nearly impossible to be able to determine all modes of 
attack and threats that might occur (given that there are new threats and system vulnerabilities 
that are discovered every day, and also given the vastness of these). It is ad hoc by nature – this 
means that there is no specific rule on how scenarios are listed or what scenarios are taken into 
consideration. Given that there is no scientific way of approaching this, there is also no 
guarantee that all scenarios are taken into account (Kong et al., 2000). 
Some researchers (e.g. Wang et al., 2001) describe how ineffective this method is. They suggest 
that e-commerce protocols involving security and cryptographic mechanisms need a stronger 
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form of verification due to the complex nature of these protocols and the errors that could be 
caused due to human intervention. They describe how it is important for all the stakeholders of 
the protocol to be involved in all the stages of verification in order to ensure that various attack 
scenarios are addressed and to ensure that the protocol is fail-safe and resilient.  
This research used two different methods to verify and evaluate the protocol. Firstly, the logic of 
the protocol was evaluated by implementing a prototype. This evaluation helped prove that the 
protocol’s logic was indeed correct and that the protocol could be used as a viable solution in 
the real-world. The implementation was then run using the model-checker, which helped to 
evaluate the network statistics and the time taken for the protocol to process the information 
end-to-end. 
The protocol logic is interpreted by the model-checker as a transition diagram made up of nodes 
and internodes. A count of the number of nodes or states is made by the checker as it moves 
through the logic diagram to check for any assertion violations.  
In addition, the model-checker also verifies the logic, that is, it assures that the software satisfies 
all the expected requirements. The dynamic verification of the program by the model-checker is 
helpful in diagnosing for bugs in the program. These bugs could sometimes not be revealed 
while working on the implementation of the prototype. The model-checker helps to trap even 
those that could be ignored during development.  
As a whole, the program is verified and the results are supplied through logical evaluation. In our 
case, we have found unhandled exceptions about array indices out of range; however, this can 
be further verified by compiling the program logic pack as a project/solution and resolving the 
exception by checking for any array indices to be resized. 
To check this, the implementation that was originally done using Java was recompiled, as the 
converted C# code might have the issue of resizing the relevant array index size to meet the 
logic requirements. On doing this, it was found that the original Java code compiled properly 
without problems, and hence this issue can be closed as the modelling is, by itself, successful. 
The following table (Table 8.18) shows the execution time statistics for every individual program 




Execution time for Compile.exe 0.03 seconds 
Execution time for Certificate.exe 0 .109 seconds 
Execution time for EncryptedProduct.exe 0.09 seconds 
Execution time for Order.exe 0.109 seconds 
Execution time for Payment.exe 0.09 seconds 
Execution time for Product.exe 0.09 seconds 
Execution time for Verification.exe 0.109 seconds 
Table 8.18: Program execution time 
 
The table below (Table 8.19) shows the statistics for the total memory used by every individual 
program’s executable file run. Effective usage of memory determines how efficient the code is 
and also ensures that there is no garbage.  
Program Time 
Current memory for Compile.exe 33672 KB 
Current memory for Certificate.exe 32636 KB 
Current memory for EncryptedProduct.exe 33048 KB 
Current memory for Order.exe 33040 KB 
Current memory for Payment.exe 33216 KB 
Current memory for Product.exe 32664 KB 
Current memory for Verification.exe 32640 KB 
Table 8.19: Memory usage for each executable file 
The memory usage table shows that the memory space that each program takes up individually 
is not very huge, and that the evaluation of this aspect reveals the efficiency of the protocol.  
The research goal of developing a protocol that is both effective and efficient is satisfied by the 
above two evaluations of time and memory. The speed at which the protocol is being run plays a 
critical role in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the protocol. As the application of 
the protocol would be one of the key factors in determining the success or failure of a business, 
time plays a major role. A protocol that takes a lot of time to implement would not be a 
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favoured choice by either the business or the end-user or customer. A shorter execution time 
would mean that the total turnaround time for the transaction would be less and would also 
result in a significant reduction in waiting time.  
Another way to discuss the effectiveness of the protocol is to compare it with similar protocols -
that is those protocols that have the same characteristics and properties. This helps identify how 
well the proposed protocol performs and how well it helps manage the research gaps identified. 
The protocols are compared against the key performance indicators. These key performance 
indicators include: 
1. Number of messages sent 
2. Type and role of the Trusted Third Party (TTP) 
3. E-commerce phases covered 
4. Dispute resolution mechanism in place 
5. Fairness in all stages 
6. Complete anonymity 
The proposed protocol is compared against the following protocols: 
Ray: An anonymous and failure resilient fair exchange e-commerce protocol. This protocol has a 
total of 10 messages that are exchanged between all the parties. 
Zhang: A mutual authentication enabled fair exchange and anonymous e-payment protocol. This 
protocol uses many rounds of authentication in order to achieve fair exchange and anonymity. 














Zhang: A mutual 
authentication enabled 






Table 8.20: Protocol comparison using key performance indicators 
From the performance indicator table, it is clear that the Imposing Fairness Protocol fares much 





7 messages 10 messages 11 messages and 6 phases 
Type and role of 
TTP 
Paritally Trusted online 
third party but controls 
in place to circumvent 









All phases. The protocol 
addresses all phases of 
e-commerce from pre-
negotiation to the 
delivery phase. 
Does not include 
the pre-
negotiation 
phase and the 
protocol 
assumes that 
this would be 
taken care of. 
No provision for providing 
fair exchange during the 
negotiation phase and does 
not discuss the issue of 
withdrawal (what happens if 
either of the parties decide 





Inbuilt mechanism for 
dispute resolution. Also 
the Trusted Third Party 
stores information in 
case of disputes arising 
post-delivery of goods. 
It assumes that 
the parties to 
not misbehave 




when either or 
both parties 
misbehave. 
Does not discuss what 
happens when both the 
parties are dishonest and 
that part of the dispute 
resolution is not specified. 
Fairness in all 
stages 




fairness is not 
achieved. 
No – not provided during 




Yes Yes but becomes 
a bottleneck due 









8.3 Model checking  
Model checking has become very popular in recent years and is an evolving field. It offers a 
platform to verify and evaluate protocols in an effective and efficient manner. It is a formalised 
evaluation and verification process. Model checking is thus a mechanised technique which could 
be used to discover scenarios that could lead to failures and specifically to showcase those areas 
of concern whereby design changes need to be considered.  
Model-checkers have a few key tasks to perform. These tasks are as follows: 
1. Specification of the model. This refers to a process whereby the system is defined 
clearly.  
2. System requirement specification and definition. The system requirements are those 
properties that need to be tested.  
3. Verification and checking. The model-checker checks the properties defined to see 
whether or not these hold good; it also checks for system behaviours. 
4. Provision of counter examples. This is the fourth pivotal task performed by the model-
checker, and one of the main advantages of using model checking over other 
techniques. When the model-checker finds out that the system behaviour or the 
properties specified do not hold good, it proposes counter examples and also explains 
why those properties failed.  
5. Some model-checkers have the ability to provide random simulation of the system to 
further enhance the verification. (Clarke et al., 1999) 
Many model-checkers are available and many of these have different capabilities, and so choices 
are based on requirements. Researchers make use of various model-checkers to ensure that the 
protocols proposed are verified thoroughly. The most popular of these model-checkers are as 
follows: 
 FDR – Failures Divergences Refinement: more of a refinement-checker rather than a 
typical model-checker, these software tools are designed to check formal models that 
are expressed in Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP). This was designed and 
developed by Formal Systems Ltd. (Formal Systems Ltd., 2013). 
 VeriSoft - Designed by VeriSoft: this model-checker is used for exploring the state-space 
of an implementation and is based on the C programming language. This is particularly 
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useful for concurrent systems, i.e. systems that are composed of many processes or 
elements that run concurrently (simultaneously) and have the ability to communicate 
with each other (P Godefroid, 1997). 
 SPIN – developed by Holzmann at Bell Labs: this has a simulation feature available that 
can be used to simulate different scenarios. This model-checker checks for the code 
written in PROMELA (Process Meta Language), which is very similar to the C 
programming language (SPIN, 2013). 
 MoonWalker: this is a model checker similar to VeriSoft in that is used for exploration of 
the state-space of a program that is written in bytecode (.NET applications). This is 
based on a Mono C# compiler (Aan de Brugh, 2009). 
 SMV – Symbolic Model Verifier: this model-checker was developed by SMU and is one of 
the very first model-checkers, designed in the early 1990s. This was one of the most 
successful and powerful tools at that time. It provides a true or false output; true 
indicates that the property holds good, and false that the property does not hold good. 
It also gives a trace as to why it is false. (CMU, 2013). 
The above is not a complete and exhaustive list of all the model-checkers available. It only gives 
a list of the most popular ones or those that have been used by other researchers for verifying e-
commerce and security protocols. For example, Ray’s protocol uses the FDR model-checker and 
Wang et al. makes use of both VeriSoft and SPIN for the verification of their protocol. AlAraj uses 
the SPIN model-checker for model checking his Enforcing Customer Honesty Protocol (A AlAraj, 
2008).  
8.4 MoonWalker Model checking Tool 
This section describes the model checking tool that was selected and used, and also describes in 
detail the outcome of this formal verification process. It aims to describe areas that require 
attention, and helps prove that the protocol has been thoroughly analysed and that the protocol 
satisfies all its pre-determined key properties, thus fulfilling the research aims.  
The tool that is used for the formal verification of the proposed protocol is MoonWalker. 
MoonWalker is a software model checking tool that is used for Common Intermediate Language 
(CIL) bytecode programs. CIL programs are those programs that are written for the .NET 
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platform. The MoonWalker tool is based on Mono C# Compiler, which is used to run the C# 
compiled bytecode (.NET). 
The MoonWalker software tool uses an approach called the Virtual Machine (VM) approach for 
the purposes of model checking and verification. This means that every byte of the CIL code that 
is fed is thoroughly analysed, and every state of the code is systematically studied and verified.  
Unlike many other software tools for model checking, MoonWalker does allow code from 
different languages to be run and verified. It was earlier known as the Mono Model Checker but 
was renamed MoonWalker due to name clashes. The design was inspired by the Java Path 
Finder, a model-checker for Java programs.  
The later versions of MoonWalker have many improvements added. These enhancements were 
added in order to improve the usability of the tool and to augment the user-experience. In 
simple terms, the later version is more user-friendly and has a more effective error-tracker (one 
that does not confuse the user). An extensive test framework, to detect most flaws in logic and 
flows, is also added to the most recent version. 
The version that is used for the research purpose is MoonWalker 1.0. This version of the 
software uses a different approach, which is based on the concept of shortest-path-first. Based 
on this, a new algorithm called the Memonised Garbage Collector (MGC) is implemented. This 
detects various changes in the state of the process or activity (objects). This tracks the changes 
of any given object from the beginning stage to its end stage (Aan de Brugh, 2009). 
The figure below (Fig 8.45) gives a conceptual overview of MoonWalker’s model checking 
functionality. As described in the above paragraph, precompiled C# (.NET) source code, which 
can be executed by the .NET runtime environment, is loaded along with the assertions specified 
within it to the Moonwalker model-checker tool. This precompiled executable C# code is also 
known as a .NET assembly. The tool explores the state-space of the assembly. The state-space is 
a space whose axes are the state variables. The state-space representation is a mathematical 
model of an actual system (in this case the software) as a set of input, output and state 
variables, related by equations. In simple terms, the .NET assembly file and the assertions (true 
or false statements) that need to be tested or checked against are fed into the MoonWalker 
tool. The tool then analyses and displays the results. A result could either be a pass, which is OK, 
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Figure 8.45: Conceptual view of the MoonWalker model checking tool 
Figure source: www.simple-talk.com 
8.4.1 The process 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the protocol’s prototype was written using the Java 
programming language. This source code (written in Java) was rewritten in C# language. The re-
written code was then compiled using Visual Studio 2010 Professional. The purpose of using C# 
was to ensure that the compiled code could be used with the MoonWalker tool (to be able to 
check for assertion violations and deadlocks as well as race conditions). Mono C# compiler, 
which is based on Command Line Interface (CLI), was used primarily in order to be able to run 
the MoonWalker tool and to model the protocol’s prototype.  
The main aim of the modelling was to help identify the following key issues, and to determine 
that the protocol was free from the same. These are: 
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1.  Assertion Violations: an assertion is nothing but a true/false statement (known as a 
predicate). It is a statement that the developer always assumes to be true. So while 
model checking, if false is obtained at run-time, then this results in an assertion 
violation. For example, the protocol always assumes that the encryption would be 
successful and that there would be no loopholes. When this assertion is run through the 
model-checker, this must return true. A false value represents a flaw in the assumption, 
thus leading to an assertion violation. An assertion in general is used to indicate the 
validity of certain modules and also to check for the program’s correctness. Assertions in 
certain cases are also added to help with error-handling. 
2. Deadlocks: a deadlock situation occurs where two or more competing actions are 
waiting for each other to execute, where neither ever does. For example, say there are 
three actions A, B and C. A cannot carry out a transaction until it has input from B. In 
order to provide that input B has to wait for C to finish but C is waiting for an instruction 
from A to be able to finish. Here all the three processes are held indefinitely as these are 
waiting for each other to be able to continue execution. This leads to a stage where the 
program will not be able to continue. It is a problem when there are many processes 
involved in a program.  
3. Race Conditions: this refers to a situation when the program or application module can 
be executed correctly only when the sequence of threads or processes run in a specific 
order or timing. Race condition can lead to unexpected behaviour if it is not critical or in 
certain critical cases can lead to bugs or invalid execution of the program or application 
module. To illustrate this let us assume that there is a global variable GV. Two different 
modules, namely A and B, would need to read the value of this variable and increment it 
by one. But the condition is that it has to be mutually exclusive (this means that the 




Normal execution of the program or code is shown in the table below (Table 8.21). 
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A B Value of GV 
Read  0 
Increment  1 
 Read 1 
 Increment 2 
Table 8.21: Normal execution of the program or code 
The table below (Table 8.22) shows what happens to the flow when there is an interruption: 
A B Value of GV 
Read  0 
 Read 0 
Increment  1 
 Increment 1 
Table 8.22: Interrupted flow, which leads to race condition 
As incrementing happens simultaneously, and A and B are not mutually exclusive; this results in 
a race condition whereby the value of GV gets updated only once, thus leading to an incorrect 
output.  
Given that the original prototype was written using Java, certain modifications had to be made 
as they were inevitable in ensuring that the C# programs compiled successfully into executable 
files. Care was taken to ensure that wherever possible, the source code programs were seen as 
units and where necessary (keeping in mind the output required), the source code programs 
were seen as one whole project on Visual Studio. For example, to identify the time taken by 
individual modules (e.g. encryption), the necessary program was taken as a separate unit and 
compiled, and when the execution time for the whole protocol was required, all programs were 
compiled together as a project. 
During the model-check, in the case of no assertion violations being found, OK is outputted. 
Otherwise, a trace of instructions that leads to the assertion violation is generated, which can be 
an output to a file for reading. The instructions are given in CIL or Common Intermediate 
Language, which is used by the Microsoft .NET framework and the Mono compiler that has been 
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used for this exercise. MoonWalker is a CIL assembly that is developed on Windows XP, and 
Mono and works on this platform. 
8.4.2 Model Checking - Analysis 
 
The MoonWalker model-checker has two panes. The right pane has the solution explorer and 
the left pane lists all the program references. These programs are written in the C# 
programming language and have the .cs extension.  
The source code programs are given on the right-hand side on the solution explorer. This is the 
equivalent of the Java program that was written for the purposes of implementation. Many 
individual programs were compiled together to be run and packaged together as one individual 
executable project. This was done in order to ensure that the entire project (or the executable) 
was modelled and not just the individual modules. The key programs compiled into one project 
as “compile.exe” are as follows: 
  EmfInstanceManager.cs 
  EncryptionHelper.cs 
  TrustedTransaction.cs 
   MerchantApi 
  EntityManager.cs 
 Order.cs 
  Payment.cs and  
 Product.cs.  
Once the above mentioned files were bundled together and the compile.exe file produced as a 
result of the compiled project, this was fed into the model checking tool MoonWalker. 
Output with statistics turned on were run in order to understand and analyse if there were any 
assertion violations or deadlocks. The statistics also showed the amount of memory space each 
module occupied along with the time taken for the module to execute. While compiling the 
program there was one exception that was encountered.  
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The output here enables us to identify the deadlocks, race conditions and assertion violations. 
MoonWalker enables the user to output with the statistics feature turned on. All outputs would 
be displayed in a separate console (similar to a DOS-based console). The statistics feature shows 
any memory error or management issues, bug management issues, et cetera. It also allows the 
user to select which features need to be enabled and those features that need to be set to false 
or disabled. For example, in the figure below, the properties StoponError and TraceonError are 
set to true or, in other words, enabled. This means that the MoonwWalker tool would halt an 
execution when a bug is found and would display the same. Similarly, the TraceonError feature 
would allow the user to trace the error in a step by step fashion that would enable the user see 
the intermediate result of each and every line of the code, and to identify the root cause of the 
bug by placing check points. 
Thus, the output of the model-checker can be interpreted in a straightforward and consistent 
fashion by studying the console statements displayed. The first few statements show that 
features such as Statistics are enabled in the configuration, whereas features such as the 
“Interactive” mode are set to false. This was displayed by running the compiled executable file, 
compile.exe using the argument ‘-s’, such as: compile.exe –s. Arguments in MoonWalker are 
very similar to Linux-type commands. These arguments tell the MoonWalker tool what exactly is 
required and what needs to be done. Arguments have the prefix ‘–‘ (hyphen) followed by an 
alphabet letter or a word. Two or more arguments can be combined together by following one 
hyphen, which is again very similar to the Linux-based environment.  
First, all the programs were complied together as one single unit. Key points derived from the 
output of the model checking are as follows: 
 An exception has been encountered. This is the System.IndexOutofRange exception. 
 
For the runs of all programs through the model-checker, an unhandled exception has 
been encountered during the model checking towards the end, as a 
System.IndexOutofRange exception. Although this message does not indicate deadlock 
or race condition explicitly, it may need to be revisited to ensure that there is no issue. 
Moreover, it is important to note that exceptions are issues relating to compilation and 
program structure. The model-checker checks for assertion violations and reports on 
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conflicts such as deadlocks or infinite loops, i.e., it reports on the modelling behaviour of 
the program logic. 
 
This exception might have occurred due to the fact that the code was originally written 
for Java and then rewritten in C# for the purposes of model checking. As the Java code 
did not show any exception, this could be taken as an issue that has occurred only 
because of the conversion in the language and is nothing serious.  
Once it was clear that there is no major problem with the program compiled as a whole, the 
individual modules were then run through the model checker. The outputs and screenshots are 
attached in the appendix of this thesis.  
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed in detail the evaluation and verification of the protocol. It discussed 
the different verification methods that are available, and compared the various methods to 
point out the advantages and disadvantages of each. Furthermore, it provided a clear 
description of the evaluation methods and presented statistics on how well the proposed 
protocol performed. It finally compared the various protocols to show how effective and 
efficient the proposed protocol is, when compared with the other protocols. 
This chapter has explained the basics of model checking and described in detail the model 
checking tool MoonWalker. It also discussed the output of the model checking in detail and from 
the results of the model checking done on the compiled project (as well as on the individual files 
of the program), it may be concluded that the logic of the protocol holds good and that the 
project has passed the modelling test. Apart from unhandled exception and the 
ArrayIndexOutofBounds exception, no other issues were encountered. It is important to note 
that these do not signify any errors or flaws in the logic (or in the model itself; rather, it just 
shows that there could be issues with the build (which is a programming issue). It should also be 
noted that these issues could have occurred due to the programming language change from Java 
to C#. Hence it can be stated that the model satisfies the fair exchange property. 
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While it is clear that the modelling has been a success, it is key to understand that the protocol’s 
model and the actual protocol itself might be two different things. This is because the model 
cannot in its entirety represent the logic of the protocol, and also that it is only an abstract way 
of representing the protocol. The idea of modelling the protocol is not to drill down to the 
detailed level of all attributes of the protocol, but to check the protocol against certain specified 
behaviours that it might exhibit, to be able to verify it and to see if it holds good. From the 
above, it can be shown that the protocol clearly fares well by satisfying the key properties 
mentioned, and behaves in an appropriate manner, as required.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
The main goal of this final chapter is summarise all the other chapters and also to give a brief 
explanation of how the aforementioned objectives of this research have been successfully 
achieved. It also helps to measure the level of success of this research.  
Chapter Objectives: 
 Enable the reader to understand the protocol’s achievements 
 Provide an overview of the other protocols that formed the basis of the research, and to 
quickly recap the disadvantages of those protocols. 
 Understand the various methods that have been used to successfully achieve the 
objectives of the research. 





9 Conclusion  
The research primarily was concentrated on two key aspects of an electronic commerce 
protocol, namely fair exchange and anonymity. It concentrated on these as they help to increase 
trust in e-commerce websites. Various studies (Anon, 2001; Forrester, 2001; Westin, 1991; 
Westin, 1994) have pointed out that many of the customers who use e-commerce are still 
sceptical, and that the e-commerce market has an even greater potential if one aspect is 
adequately addressed: trust. These studies also point out that customers would be more willing 
to engage in e-commerce (and potential new customers would also be attracted) if they could 
be assured of privacy. This was proved in a recent report by Gartner (Gartner, 2005), which 
clearly shows that customer privacy is not fully respected in e-commerce, and that this trend 
may increase, which would result in people eschewing such technologies, thereby limiting their 
growth.  
From this research, it has been clearly demonstrated that trust plays a major role in e-commerce 
and that it can be perceived from many different angles, namely technological, psychological, 
legal, business, etc. The technological aspect of trust has been addressed in this research to a 
certain extent by ensuring that the building blocks of technology (the basic protocol that is used 
for electronic commerce) deliver fair exchange and that the identity of the customer is 
protected. Fair exchange gives both the customer and the merchant the confidence to know 
that they will not be cheated in the end. This increases trust. Similarly, the customer’s 
uncertainty over whether their personal information will be misused (e.g. identity theft while 
shopping online) is addressed through anonymity, whereby the customer’s identity is kept 
secret and the merchant or any interceptor will not be able to trace back the transactions to the 
customer. One research (R Smith & J Shao, 2007) shows that customer privacy plays a major role 
in increasing trust in e-commerce, and that it is beneficial to both customers and e-business. 
From a customer point of view, personal choices are kept secret and transactions untraceable, 
hence increasing trust and satisfaction. From a business point of view, increased customer 
satisfaction leads to more business and greater revenues. Enabling privacy by making use of 




The research identified four protocols (Ray, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Zhang, 2003;Franklin & Reiter, 
1997) that concentrate on both anonymity and fair exchange. Thorough review of literature 
enabled identification of the drawbacks of these protocols. The research then aimed at 
developing a protocol that would counter these drawbacks and provide not only anonymity and 
fair exchange but also payment security. The protocol made use of an online Trusted Third Party 
(TTP) and provided fair exchange throughout all phases of the electronic commerce transaction, 
namely the pre-negotiation, negotiation, withdrawal, purchase and arbitration phases. The 
protocol was also designed in such a way that it provides automated dispute resolution. The 
designed protocol was made efficient by ensuring that the number of messages was kept to a 
minimum. Automated dispute resolution ensures that the TTP would be able to provide time-
stamped and accurate data when required.  
It is also important to note that the protocol takes into consideration that either of the 
transacting parties, namely the customer or the merchant, can at any time withdraw from the 
transaction. If either or both the parties wish to withdraw at any point in time, the protocol can 
be terminated.  The protocol also assumes that one or more parties can be dishonest and is 
therefore capable of terminating the transaction when dishonesty on the part of one or more 
parties is discovered. For the protocol to continue with the normal flow, the transacting parties 
are required to remain honest, and fairness in any transaction is then imposed by the protocol.  
This research identified the key drawbacks in the other protocols that provide both anonymity 
and fair exchange. These include one or more of the following: 
 A TTP that was not entirely trustworthy (semi-trusted).  
 The protocol(s) was complicated with many rounds and too many messages.  
 The protocol had not taken into account what would happen if more than one party was 
dishonest.  
 The protocol did not provide complete anonymity. 







The proposed protocol has significant advantages. These are: 
 The TTP’s semi-trusted nature is taken into account and controls are placed to make 
sure that this partially trusted attribute of the TTP is circumvented. The TTP cannot 
masquerade or join another party to conspire against the remaining party. The protocol 
also ensures that the TTP cannot modify any messages that are being sent. This 
additional security makes the TTP completely trustworthy. 
 The protocol is simple to use and with a limited number of messages.  
 The protocol takes into account that more than one party can always be dishonest and 
terminates when it detects dishonesty. 
 It provides complete anonymity for the customer across all phases. 
 It provides fair exchange throughout the e-commerce transaction. 
 In addition to anonymity and fair exchange, the protocol provides payment security by 
ensuring that the payment tokens cannot be duplicated or reused by either of the 
transacting parties. 
 It makes use of symmetric key cryptography where possible. This ensures that the 
protocol is kept simple and offers better performance. 
 The protocol offers automated dispute resolution. In simple terms, it has a built-in 
dispute resolution mechanism. The TTP can be able to give accurate data regarding 
transactions, as all messages are time-stamped and stored. 
 The protocol makes use of a single payment token. This means that whatever the cost of 
the digital product, only one payment token is used per transaction. In simple terms, this 
means that the denomination of the payment token is variable and is dependent on the 
amount that is required. In the proposed protocol, cash withdrawal is done only once 
during the entire e-commerce transaction as only one payment token is required. This 
makes the protocol less cumbersome and increases effectiveness. 
 The protocol offers security by means of hashing, encrypting and time-stamping the 
messages. The time-stamping ensures that replay attacks are avoided (even if 
intercepted by someone in the middle). 
 Using both asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography ensures that neither participant 
is required to store and distribute many keys. Asymmetric key cryptography is used only 
when absolutely necessary, thus avoiding issues relating to key management. 
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To test the efficiency of the proposed protocol, it has been subject to scrutiny under different 
circumstances. The protocol has been evaluated and verified using both formal and informal 
verification methods. The simulation of the protocol was conducted using Java and this ensured 
that the protocol is ready to use; the output of the protocol was also verified. This also proved 
that the protocol could be adapted to real-world scenarios without much ado, and that it is not 
just a theoretical idea that might not be of practical use. The formal verification method (using 
model checking) ensured that the protocol satisfies the key property of fair exchange 
throughout all stages of the transaction process. This was also done to highlight the fact that 
there have been no critical errors, assertion violations or race conditions that could lead to an 
abnormal termination of the protocol or lead to the protocol not being able to achieve the 
fairness property.  
Different verification methods and techniques were used from different perspectives and with 
the aim that each verification method would complement the other. For example, the design of 
the prototype using Java was done with the point of view of implementation and testing the 
protocol’s readiness and adaptability in the real world. This was complemented by running it 
through the model-checker. Model checking was done with the view point of testing the 
process-orientation of the proposed protocol and testing the protocol’s logic and correctness. 
This was further complemented by conducting a scenario analysis, which was done from the 
point of view of checking the protocol’s methodology. All those scenarios that could not be 
tested using the other two methods were taken into account to give a complete picture and to 
guarantee that the protocol has been tested to its entirety without leaving anything to chance. 
From the verification and evaluation that has been done, it could be said that the proposed 
protocol has been designed well and satisfies all the key criteria mentioned in the research 
objectives. It could also be said with certainty that the protocol has a huge potential in the 
electronic commerce arena if implemented, as it overcomes a major challenge of customer data 




9.1 Success Criteria & Contribution Revisited 
The introduction chapter of the thesis defines the contribution of this research and the success 
criteria for the research. This section revisits the success criteria to evaluate the contribution of 
the research and to see how well the research has contributed.  
 The research is deemed to be successful as the first measure of success has been achieved. 
The research has answered all the research questions. 
 The second measure of success listed in the introduction has also been fulfilled as the 
research has conducted an in depth analysis to determine the difference between various 
other protocols and the proposed protocol to show how efficient it is. The literature review 
has successfully identified the key gaps in the other researches and has determined the 
need for the protocol. Chapters 5 - 8 has clearly analysed the protocols and shown how 
effective the proposed protocol is in comparison with other protocols. 
 Development of the protocol: The research aimed at designing a protocol that was effective 
and also practical. The protocol has been developed to overcome the defects and gaps that 
were identified in the other protocols.  
 Specifying the effectiveness criteria of the protocol: The protocol clearly defined the 
number of messages. It also provided an explanation of various key performance indicators 
and described why these KPIs were chosen to measure effectiveness.  
  Automated dispute resolution: The research designed a protocol that has automated 
dispute resolution. The importance of having a good dispute resolution mechanism has 
been identified and explained.  
 Protocol analysis: The proposed protocol is analysed completely in all given circumstances 
and scenarios. The protocol has also been put through theoretical verification by taking into 
account all possible scenarios for dishonesty and how these would be detected. The 
research has also defined the areas of dispute and which party would be responsible for 
initiating a dispute resolution.  
 The prototype developed proves that the protocol can be adopted in real-world scenarios. 
Furthermore it was used to verify issues in the information flows and for any logical errors. 
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 Model checking and verification: The proposed and implemented protocol is model-
checked and verified thoroughly to validate the logical flow of steps, and also to determine 
that the protocol successfully satisfies all the key criteria mentioned. In simple terms, this 
assists in establishing that the protocol implements fair exchange, anonymity and payment 
security throughout all stages. It also helps identify any deadlock situations that might 
prevent the protocol from running successfully. 
In short, the key contributions of the research can be summarised as follows:  
1. This research has successfully answered the research questions.  
2. The proposed system is able to provide the key features and meet the needs of the 
emerging e-commerce market 
3. The protocol can successfully detect dishonesty and terminate 
4. The parties cannot collude or conspire.  
5. Ready for real-world implementation and not just a theoretical idea. 
9.2 Protocol Limitations and Future Works 
This section describes in the limitations of the proposed protocol. The limitations prevailing in 
the current protocol can be examined by future researchers and this provides some scope for 
enhancement of the current protocol.  
1. The protocol uses Chaum’s blind signature for the provision of anonymous electronic 
cash. This method has some known issues, such as money laundering using anonymous 
electronic cash. For this to be avoided, certain alternative measures need to be put in 
place, such as traceability by the trustees or legal authorities and ensuring that there is a 
cap to the amount that a customer would be allowed to spend per day anonymously. 
 
2. The payment scheme that is provided by the protocol is based on RSA. There are two 
disadvantages here: RSA has some known vulnerabilities and could be subject to attack, 
and the second one is that RSA is quite complex and has many computational modules 
that consist of several modular exponentiations. This complexity could affect the 
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proposed protocol’s efficiency, particularly in cases where there is not much 
computational ability or resources at the participant’s end.  
Future research could include trying to overcome the limitations mentioned above. For example, 
various payment methods are available that are non-RSA based. These methods could be tried 
to see if the effectiveness of the protocol could be improved.   
While working on further developments to the proposed protocol, the researcher should able 
keep in mind the following: 
1. Complexity: making changes to the payment scheme or adapting different methods for 
ensuring anonymity might lead to the protocol becoming more complex with increased 
number of messages. The researcher should also take into consideration the execution 
time of the protocol and if implemented the amount of memory it takes. It should be 
understood that the timing, memory space and the number of messages are all directly 
proportional to the protocol’s efficiency. Future developments to the protocol should 
therefore ensure that the advanced versions still have the efficiency of the current 
protocol. 
 
2. Security: this protocol takes into account security features. Making use of an RSA-based 
payment method has several advantages too. Though RSA is subject to attack, the 
success rate of an RSA attack is still low. Given the popularity of the RSA-based payment 
method, it is imperative to understand that the RSA method has been subject to much 
scrutiny within the security community and is thus considered highly secure. Introducing 
a different payment method might lead to compromises on the security front. 
Therefore, future researchers should take into account the security of the protocol and 
should ensure that security is in no way compromised.  
 
3. Readiness: the proposed protocol is ready for implementation and can be adapted to 
any real-world scenario. This has been proved by implementing the prototype of the 
protocol in Java. It has also been shown that the protocol can be implemented on an 
even more advanced platform to enable it to work on mobile devices. This is one of the 
key advantages of the protocol and future developers should take this into account and 
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make enhancements to the existing protocol in such a way that it would still remain 
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This section provides the screenshots that were taken during the modelling process and explains 
what the outputs in the screens refer to. It explains what has been tested, what the checkpoints 
were for every program, and how the output shows a deviation in the logic (if any).  
 
Figure A01: The different panes in the MoonWalker tool 
 
The output with statistics turned on is as shown in Figure A02.  
The features displayed in the screen below can be switched on or enabled using the arguments 
listed in the Help list. The ’-h’ argument will show the list of arguments that can be used to turn 






Fig A02: Output screen of MoonWalker with statistics turned on 
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The above figure (Figure A02) shows that there is no major issue with the program currently. 
Please note that at 35:11 minutes, the “Exploration starts now” refers to the model-checker 
beginning to check the state-space for any violations. In the following statement it is displayed 
as “End-of-Story” which refers to the state-space exploration being complete. Once the state-
space exploration is complete, the statistical data relating to deadlocks, memory management 
issues (including heaps, stacks, memory usage) and assertion violations are displayed in detail.  
This shows that the compiled code has no problems. From the output, it can be found that the 
total time taken for the execution of the program (compile.exe) is 0.0312 seconds. Note that the 
model-checker message says “Exploration starts now”, which means that the model-checker is 
starting to check for assertion errors and violations after having loaded the necessary DLLs 
(Dynamic Link Libraries).  
The number of stored states is 1. The model-checker enters and stores a state where it has to 
perform an evaluation. Current-state memory use is about 32.88 MB. This helps us determine 
how much memory the process uses while performing the model-check and not the memory 
that the program itself uses. 
The displayed statistics suggest that there are no assertion violations or deadlocks. This means 
that there is no flaw in the logic of the proposed protocol and that the modelling has been 
successful; thus, the proposed Imposing Fairness Protocol has passed the test. 
Given that the compilation of all programs together has been successful and no problems have 
been spotted, now it is necessary to individually compile every program to check for deadlocks, 
assertion violations and race conditions. For individual programs as well, the –s argument can be 
used to list statistics and turn features on or off. The screenshot below (Fig. A03) displays the 







Fig A03: Model-checker output for certificate.exe file 
 
The above screenshot is the model-checker run-through for the certificate.exe file. Like the 
compile.exe, this module gives us a similar result, showing us that there are no assertion 
violations or deadlocks.  
This module however displays an unhandled exception being encountered while running the 
compiled program. Unhandled exception is not an assertion violation in modelling, nor is it a 
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modelling failure; rather, it is an array index – an ‘out of range’ exception. The model itself has 
been tested and passed without violations or race conditions. Thus, it is only a warning to the 
user about a probable unwanted behaviour due to the form in which the code is being run 
through the model – in simple terms, it means that the logic is trying to access an array that 
does not exist, and once we have defined this array, the exception should not occur. So in other 
words, the compilation is successful, the modelling is successful, and the exception can be 
rectified by making sure that during compilation and build, the array sizes are defined and the 






Fig A04: Model checker run for EncryptedProduct.exe file 
The above screenshot (Fig. A04) is the model-checker run-through for the EncryptedProduct.exe 
file. From the above, we can find that this file, as with the other two compilations, has no 









Fig A05: Model checker run for the file Order.exe 
The above screenshot (Fig. A05) is the model-checker run-through for the Order.exe file. Again, 
it can be noted that, as with the other outputs, there are no deadlocks or assertion violations 








Fig A06: Model checker run for Payment.exe file 
The above screenshot (Fig. A06) is the model-checker run-through for the Payment.exe file. This 










Fig A07: Model checker run for Product.exe file 
 
The above screenshot (Fig. A07) is the model-checker run-through for the Product.exe file. This 









Fig A08: Model-checker run for Verification.exe file 
The above (Fig. A08) screenshot is the model-checker run-through for the Verification.exe file. 
This gives us a similar result, as there are no assertion violations or deadlocks.  
